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Re´sume´
La se´curisation des communications sans fil prend une importance croissante aussi
bien pour les besoins des personnes prive´es que les besoins professionnels et institu-
tionnels. Bien que la cryptographie syme´trique assure largement la confidentialite´
des donne´es, elle est pe´nalise´e par la ge´ne´ration et la distribution de cle´s secre`tes.
Des e´tudes re´centes indiquent que les caracte´ristiques intrinse`ques de la propagation
peuvent eˆtre exploite´es afin de renforcer la se´curite´. En effet, le canal radio fournit
une source d’ale´a partage´e par l’e´metteur et le re´cepteur, a` partir de laquelle des
cle´s secre`tes peuvent eˆtre ge´ne´re´es. Cette me´thode de ge´ne´ration de cle´s secre`tes
(“secret key generation”, SKG) repose sur la re´ciprocite´ du canal de transmission,
sur la richesse de la propagation multi-trajets et sur la de´corre´lation spatiale des
caracte´ristiques du canal.
Dans ce manuscrit, nous nous inte´ressons a` la SKG, avec comme objectif de relier
les proprie´te´s du canal radio a` la qualite´ des cle´s ge´ne´re´es. Le travail mene´ a permis
d’analyser l’impact du canal sur la performance de la SKG en relation avec le nombre
de degre´s de liberte´ (DOF), dans diffe´rentes conditions en particulier dans des envi-
ronnements statiques. Nous avons de´veloppe´ un mode`le statistique simplifie´ du canal
qui montre une me´moire spatiale re´siduelle bien au-dela` d’une distance de quelques
longueurs d’onde (sce´narios spatialement non-stationnaires). Puis, nous avons e´tudie´
des canaux plus re´alistes en environnements exte´rieur et inte´rieur (respectivement
graˆce a` des donne´es de´terministes simule´es et a` des mesures) et mettant en e´vidence
l’effet de la dispersion du canal dans des domaines de´lai et angulaire. Les re´sultats
montrent que, meˆme pour des bandes mode´re´es (compatibles avec les normes IEEE
802.11a, g/n/ac), le seul DoF fre´quentiel ou son association avec le DoF spatial est
souvent suffisant pour ge´ne´rer des cle´s longues, a` condition d’utiliser une me´thode
efficace de quantification des coefficients complexes du canal. La qualite´ de la cle´
est en outre e´value´e apre`s les e´tapes poste´rieures a` la SKG, i.e. la re´conciliation et
l’amplification de confidentialite´, qui jouent un roˆle tre`s important pour aboutir a` un
sche´ma robuste et se´curise´.
i
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Abstract
Nowadays, the security of ubiquitous wireless communications becomes more and
more a crucial requirement for private, professional and institutional needs. Even
though data is widely protected via symmetric ciphering keys, a well-known difficulty
is the management of such keys, both regarding their generation and their distribu-
tion. In the recent years, a set of works have addressed the exploitation of inherent
characteristics of the fading propagation channel towards security. In particular, se-
cret keys could be generated from the wireless channel, considered as a shared source
of randomness, available merely to a pair of communicating entities. This approach
of secret key generation (SKG) relies on the reciprocity property of the transmission
channel, on the richness of the multipath propagation and on the spatial decorrelation
of channel characteristics.
In the present dissertation, we are interested in relating the radio channel proper-
ties to the quality of the generated keys obtained from SKG. Accordingly, we analyzed
the channel degrees of freedom (DoF) and their impact on the SKG performance in
different channel conditions, especially in static environments. We first developed a
simple stochastic channel model, focusing on the security with respect to the eaves-
dropper side, which appears to be impacted by a residual channel memory well beyond
a few wavelengths distance (in spatially non-stationary scenarios). Then, we investi-
gated more realistic channels in both outdoor and indoor environments (respectively
from simulated ray tracing data and through measurements) and highlighted the ef-
fect of channel dispersion in the delay and angular domains. The results show that,
even for moderately wide band (such as standardized in IEEE 802.11a, g/n/ac), the
sole frequency DOF or its association with the spatial DOF is often enough for gen-
erating long keys, provided an efficient quantization method of the complex channel
coefficients is used. The key quality is further assessed after the subsequent steps
of the SKG scheme, i.e. information reconciliation and privacy amplification, which
turn out to play an essential role in achieving a robust and secured scheme.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 General motivations
Given the growing prevalence of wireless communications, their security becomes a
major concern for various applications such as broadband internet, e-commerce, bank
services, health monitoring, terrorism and military operations. Indeed, the broadcast
nature of the wireless medium makes it vulnerable to various attacks, e.g. eaves-
dropping, man-in-the-middle attack, etc. Although classical security mechanisms are
widely used to protect data transmission, they present many challenges showing a
lack of confidentiality. This lack is proved by e.g. the monitoring of Angela Merkel’s
smartphone during years [2]. Therefore, trends to strengthen security are going to-
wards new security paradigm acting at the physical layer [3, 4].
Traditionally, a set of protocols provides security (e.g. confidentiality, authentica-
tion, integrity) by encrypting data using cryptographic keys. In symmetric encryption
methods, the main drawback is the key management, which includes key generation
and distribution, since the same secret key is used for both data encryption and data
decryption [5]. More clearly, challenges stem from, on one hand, the need to share a
prior key between each legitimate user and a key distribution center (KDC) which is
responsible for delivering secret keys. On the other hand, the KDC may not be easily
accessible in scenarios such as dynamic mobile networks and wireless sensor networks.
However, these symmetric key management issues are alleviated by asymmetric
techniques where a pair of public and private keys, generated by each user, is used to
secure communications [5]. Nevertheless, the usage of these public-key cryptosystems
is restricted for covert key exchange through the Diffie-Hellman algorithm [6] since
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they suffer from high computational cost. Moreover, the robustness of conventional
cryptography relies on computational constraint on the attacker. However, with the
continuous progress of high power computing, unconditionally secured systems are
more and more required [4].
Recently, several researches investigate information-theoretic security techniques
where the illegitimate user (let us call here Eve) of a wireless communication is as-
sumed to be enabled with unlimited computing power and only her information about
the propagation scenario may help her to break the data privacy [4, 7]. In this re-
spect, a special approach to physical layer security (PhySec) field [4] intends to achieve
wireless communications and data protection by exploiting the inherent properties of
the wireless propagation channel such as reciprocity, multipath fading and noise. On
one hand, security over the radio channel may be achieved through secrecy coding
schemes (e.g. LDPC, Lattice and polar codes [8, 9, 10]) that require advantages at the
legitimate part over the eavesdropper part, such as the signal to noise ratio (SNR).
On the other hand, for cryptographic purposes, PhySec enables legitimate parties to
generate independently identical secure key bits from the reciprocal radio channel.
Both of these approaches, often combined with beamforming techniques and artificial
noise [11, 12, 13, 14], are targeted in the European project PHYLAWS (i.e. physical
layer wireless security) [15], which supports the present PhD thesis work.
1.2 Brief history of physical layer security
Information-theoretic security was firstly introduced by Shannon in 1949 [16], where
a secrecy system had been defined in relation with Shannon’s previous work in in-
formation theory. Shannon proposed to use the one-time pad, where messages are
encrypted using the binary addition (XOR), in order to achieve perfect secrecy, where
the codeword conveys strictly no information about the initial message. Although no
restriction on the computational power of Eve was adopted, she was assumed to have
no useful information to break the data confidentiality. We note that this perfect
secrecy is impractical since it relies on unrealistic assumption where Eve can obtain
the codeword (i.e. the encrypted message) without any error [4], while in contrast,
the radio channel is corrupted by intrinsic noise.
In 1975, Wyner [3] revisited Shannon’s information theoretic secrecy by consider-
ing a realistic assumption, i.e. Eve obtains noisy observations owing to the intrinsic
noise of the wireless propagation. This implied the definition of the secrecy coding
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concept through a proposed channel model called the “wiretap channel”. Accordingly,
the protection of data entails that the channel seen by Eve should be degraded with
respect to legitimate entities channel, in other words, the Alice/Bob channel capacity
should be greater than that of Eve. Otherwise, wireless communication cannot be
secure.
Alternatively, in 1993, Ahlswede, Csiszar and Maurer [17, 18] proposed to distil
a shared secret key from a shared source of randomness, even if Alice ad Bob do
not have an advantage over Eve. This may be achieved through public discussions
over an error-free authenticated channel. The channel advantage may be provided
by exploiting the reciprocity law and the spatial decorrelation (intrinsic properties of
the electromagnetic channel, other than the SNR) in order to distil a shared secret
key from the channel randomness instead of using secrecy codes. The resulted secret
key may provide data confidentiality through e.g. conventional symmetric encryption
methods.
1.3 Thesis Context
In this work, we are mainly interested in wireless channel-based secret key genera-
tion (SKG), which seems to be an efficient alternative to conventional key distribu-
tion. Authorized users jointly generate a common secret key from a shared source
of randomness, which is not directly accessible to an eavesdropper. This theoretical
foundation goes back to Ahlswede, Csiszar and Maurer in 1993 [17, 18]. While the
first implementations of SKG concern quantum physics [19, 20], their application is
limited owing to many challenges, e.g. high cost. Hence, nowadays much attention
goes towards the ubiquitous wireless channel as a shared source of random secret
keys. Practical implementations have early been introduced by Hassan et al. [21, 22]
by establishing secret keys from the information phase of a frequency-selective fading
channel. Fundamentally, when channel reciprocity applies, typically when legitimate
parties use the same frequency at the same time instant, they share the same prop-
agation channel. Randomness is ensured through multipath fading, which results
in decorrelation properties in the spatial, temporal and frequency domains. Conse-
quently, an eavesdropper is probably not able to efficiently exploit her own measured
channel in order to crack the key.
While channel reciprocity is a crucial requirement for key reliability, i.e. ensuring
the same key for both legitimate users (typically referred to as Alice and Bob), it
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does not hold perfectly in practical scenarios owing to electronic hardware differences
between transceivers. Moreover, even in time-division duplex (TDD) systems where
the same frequency is used, the forward and reverse channels may differ from each
other when the environment changes between the two channel estimation instances, in
other words when the channel estimation is not occurring within the same coherence
time. All these issues, including noise, limit in practice the number of shared bits
that may be reliably extracted from a single channel observation. Therefore, a secret
key of a sufficient length generally results from the concatenation of several sub-keys,
obtained from multiple channel observations. Subsequently, especially in time-varying
channels, an issue related to the latency in the key generation process appears, which
requires further investigations in order to harvest more randomness from a single
channel estimation.
Furthermore, the random character of the key is essential in making eavesdropping
extremely difficult or, on the other hand, which requires a small correlation between
the channel samples seen by Alice/Bob and by the eavesdropper. This also entails
statistical independent channel samples. Indeed, key randomness may be achieved
through random channel variations, which occur inherently in small scale fading (SSF)
owing to constructive/destructive combination of dispersive multipaths. This may be
heavily accomplished by user movement, e.g. when using a smartphone or a connected
watch emerging from the internet of things. Obviously, if we consider the case of a
fixed laptop in an office, some channel variability may be provided if people are
moving around, but experiment shows that the degree of channel variation incurred
by such changing environment is quite weak, unless of dense crowds. So, a general
questions is: is the randomness of the key sufficiently guaranteed? If not, how may
the security performance be improved in static environments? Moreover, how much
correlated information can Eve obtain about the legitimate channel and subsequently
about the key?
1.4 Thesis objectives
The work reported in this PhD thesis takes place in the context of the European
project PHYLAWS [15], which aims to improve the protection and confidentiality
of wireless communications through approaches operating at the physical layer level,
mainly. PHYLAWS intends to identify and test security approaches in both theo-
retical and experimental manners in order to elaborate efficient techniques that are
simple to implement and consume few resources. The project outputs will thus benefit
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a variety of existing and future standards for a large set of needs.
PHYLAWS intends to investigate several techniques able to enhance the level of
security. Among them, the secrecy coding scheme assumes a message to be protected
by exploiting the channel noise instead of using encryption keys. Hence, the “secrecy
capacity” can be defined by the number of message bits that could be transmitted
securely and reliably, per channel use, between legitimate users while Eve is unable
to decode it. This approach requires an advantage on the legitimate link over the
eavesdropper link, otherwise, the secrecy capacity is null. Along this line, artificial
noise and jamming techniques are targeted within PHYLAWS project, in order to
confuse the attacker and sustain legitimate users.
Alternatively, PHYLAWS considers another aspect of PhySec, which is SKG from
common randomness provided by reciprocal radio channels, as introduced above.
Since the implementation of PhySec techniques, especially SKG, will be deeply im-
pacted by the radio channel characteristics, it is crucial to assess the main limitations
of this technology in realistic scenarios. Therefore, the main objective of this PhD
thesis is to study the fundamental role of multipath fading channels in security and,
subsequently, to relate the characteristics of the radio channel to the security of the
SKG process. Moreover, we intend within PHYLAWS to devise adequate channel
models, which imply specified measurements or simulations, where SKG behavior is
assessed either using information-theory or through the practical implementation of
a key agreement scheme.
1.5 New contributions
To summarize, the general aforementioned limitations in SKG concern the quality
of the key (i.e. reliability, randomness, size and secrecy), especially when SKG is
distilled from time-variant channels and in static environments. Accordingly, this
dissertation targets the strategy of generating shared keys from a reciprocal radio
channel that is seen as a shared source of randomness available at legitimate parties.
The main objective is to assess SKG performance with respect to realistic propagation
channel features. This is achieved through the usage of several channel models, e.g.
stochastic or deterministic, accounting for Alice/Bob/Eve locations and features. In
this context, the contributions of the present dissertation are:
1. Investigate the channel degrees of freedom (DoF) existing in either the space
or the frequency/delay domain, even in the joint space-frequency domain, in
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the generation of shared secure keys [23, 24]. Intuitively, such an investigation
intends to harvest more randomness from a single channel observation, and
thereby, to alleviate the issue of the lack of time-variability in static environ-
ments.
2. Analyze the quality of the generated keys in relation with the channel prop-
erties (delay spread, angular spread, shadow fading, LOS/NLOS, etc.) in dif-
ferent propagation environments including both indoor and outdoor. The key
robustness is assessed either in terms of size of the generated keys or of diffi-
culty/impossibility for Eve to reconstruct Alice/Bob’s key.
3. Define and “play” with a parameter based stochastic channel model, in order
to gain deep insight on the relation between SKG performance and physical
characteristics of the propagation and of the environments. Specifically, we
develop a multi-link channel model to account for the spatial correlation between
channels seen by Bob and Eve, covering both stationary and non-stationary
regions.
4. Use deterministic channel models “close to reality” for sets of outdoor environ-
ments of main interest, and see how much the channel characteristics investi-
gated impact SKG performance.
5. Carry out indoor channel measurement campaigns, which will allow to imple-
ment SKG in different environments and settings, considering varying separa-
tion distances between users on one hand and LOS/NLOS propagation condi-
tions on the other.
6. Analyze and compare the robustness of the generated key after each phase of
SKG (i.e. quantization, information reconciliation and privacy amplification),
while considering different approaches to compute the quantization maps.
1.6 Organization of the dissertation
Following the brief above introduction designed to motivate the main topic of the
dissertation, Chapter 2 provides in a first part an overview of the radio propagation
channel since it heavily impacts the security level bring by PhySec approaches. In the
second part, we describe the principle of wireless channel-based secret key generation
and review the prior works in the relevant area of SKG.
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We explain in Chapter 3 both the metrics and the methods used in the the present
work, to assess the robustness of the generated keys. In particular, we describe the
quantization algorithm, which maps the complex channel coefficients into a stream
of key bits. Moreover, we explain how to investigate the channel variability in either
the space or the frequency domain in order to increase the key rate per single channel
observation, with a specific emphasis on the delay dispersion through an exponential
decaying power delay profile (PDP).
A simple channel model is then developed in Chapter 4 and focuses on the
amount of information disclosed to Eve, which may cover several scenarios, including
stationary and non-stationary ones with respect to Bob-Eve distance. To adequately
model the spatial correlation between Bob and Eve, the proposed geometry-based
stochastic channel model employs a per path shadow fading correlation [25].
SKG, in relation with the exploitation of different types of channel degrees of
freedom, is investigated for deterministic outdoor channel models in Chapter 5 and
for measured indoor propagation in Chapter 6. The security is addressed from
Alice/Bob point of view, as well as from Eve point of view.
While we emphasis, in the aforementioned chapters, on the SKG performance
right after the channel quantization phase, we subsequently dedicate Chapter 7
to the full implementation of the SKG scheme, including reconciliation and privacy
amplification, and analyze the performance gain with respect to the sole quantization.
In addition, we investigate the impact of the way the quantization map is computed.
Finally, in Chapter 8, we summarize the work of the thesis and we draw some
conclusions after the comparison of the SKG behavior in different environments.
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Chapter 2
State of the art on secret key
generation from random channels
In the context of wireless communications, the propagation channel plays an impor-
tant role towards the improvement of security services at the physical layer level.
A deep understanding of this communication medium is thus crucial. Hence, the
first section of this chapter is dedicated to a brief overview of the main notions re-
garding the propagation channel, especially those relevant to PhySec. The second
section subsequently provides a state of the art about the propagation-based secret
key generation, including a description of the different steps of the SKG strategy.
2.1 Fundamentals of wireless propagation channels
A radio communication system, as depicted in Fig. 2-1, aims to convey a message
between two remote users through a propagation channel. At the transmitter side,
the message is encoded into an electrical signal which is suited to efficient transmission
and radiated into space by the antenna, in the form of an electromagnetic (EM) wave.
On the other side, at the receiver, the original information is reproduced from the
received EM waves, assuming it can be decoded without errors. The medium through
which these signals propagate between the transmit and the receive antenna is called
the wireless propagation channel. The wireless transmission channel is defined as the
combination of the propagation channel and of the antennas. Fig. 2-2 depicts the
difference between the transmission and the propagation channels.
The time-variant received signal y(t) is the convolution of the time-variant trans-
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Figure 2-1: Communication system.
Figure 2-2: Transmission vs. propagation channel.
mission channel response h(t, τ) and the emitted signal x(t), expressed as follows:
y(t) = (h ∗ x)(t) + n(t) (2.1)
where ∗ denotes for convolution. τ is the time delay. The received signal is affected
by an additive noise n(t), which may be generated inside the receiver itself or caused
by some radio interferences. n(t) is often approximated as a white Gaussian random
variable.
Before reaching the receiver antenna, the emitted signal undergoes several physical
interactions with the environment such as specular reflection, edge diffraction and
diffuse scattering, as shown in Fig. 2-3. Hence, the received signal is the superposition
of several replicas of the transmitted signal where each partial wave is attenuated,
delayed and phase shifted according to the traveled distance as well as to the type
of the physical interaction. This wave propagation phenomenon is referred to as
multipath propagation. Accordingly, the propagation channel impulse response may
be approximately described as:
h(t, τ) =
Np∑
n=1
βnδ(τ − τn) (2.2)
where βn and τn are respectively the complex gain and the delay of the nth partial
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wave. Np is the total number of paths occurring in the channel. This discrete multi-
path channel model neglects the frequency dependence of the interactions mentioned
above and is specially valid for narrow or moderate bands.
Figure 2-3: Location-specific multipath propagation.
2.1.1 Channel reciprocity
The channel impulse response measured between two transceivers is the same re-
gardless of the direction of transmission, since EM waves undergo the same physical
interactions in both directions and there are usually no magnetic (non reciprocal)
interactions. This is known by the channel “reciprocity” property, which holds in
TDD systems where the same frequency band is used for both uplink and downlink
[26, 27]. One benefit of such a property in wireless communications is, e.g., intended
to enhance transmission efficiency such as throughput by providing channel state in-
formation (CSI) at the transmitter side without additional feedback [28]. Recently,
the reciprocity has been exploited in PhySec in such a manner that the shared CSI
between two entities is exploited to protect exchanged data against an eavesdropper
[22], in particular by extracting identical encryption keys.
However, establishing radio reciprocity may be limited by some practical issues.
In fact, in TDD systems, the channel is required to remain invariable during the
channel estimation phase in both directions. In other words, the channel should
be estimated during the coherence time in order to reduce channel discrepancies.
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Moreover, the asymmetric radio-frequency electronic hardware in the transmit and
receive communication chains may break the reciprocity property [29, 30], owing
to the unidirectional characteristics of certain components. This challenge is mostly
addressed by performing calibration [31, 32, 33] and has been tested for SKG purposes
in [34]. Nevertheless, although reciprocity is not valid in frequency-division duplex
(FDD) systems, there have been attempts to mitigate its lack in such systems through
alternative approaches, for example by using a frequency correction algorithm [35].
However, for instance, the reciprocity in FDD systems is not sufficiently resolved to
sustain SKG algorithms.
All over the thesis, we concentrate on a communication scheme appropriate for
perfect reciprocity or nearly so, such as TDD. Then, any two entities (who may be
legitimate terminals) may privately share common information extracted from the
reciprocal channel, from which secure key bits may be established in order to encrypt
data and thereby protect wireless communications. More clearly, because of the
absence of an explicit feedback from receiver to transmitter, a third party (who may
be a malicious attacker) has no access to the shared information considered as a source
of secret keys, unless she exploits different methods, e.g. her own measurements.
2.1.2 Path loss, shadowing and small scale fading
Fig. 2-4 visually depicts the spatial variation of a propagation channel, which is often
expressed in terms of three physically identified phenomena according to the spatial
scale, i.e. the long distance path loss, the shadow fading and the small scale fading
[36].
Path loss is explained by the average attenuation of the power of the EM wave
with the transmitter-receiver separation distance d as the wave propagates through
space. If we consider propagation between two isotropic antennas in free space, the
signal experiences the following path loss (commonly known as the Friis transmission
equation) in dB:
PLfs = 20 log10
4pid
λ
(2.3)
where λ is the wavelength. Besides the distance, the path loss depends also on the
environment, the propagation medium and on the antenna location. Indeed, it is
largely impacted by interaction effects such as reflection, refraction and diffraction,
in addition to the minimal free-space loss. Accordingly, all these elements contribute
to define, based on measurements and theoretical analysis, an empirical model for the
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Figure 2-4: Path loss, shadowing and small scale fading.
average large scale path loss as follows:
PL(d) = PL(d0) + 10γ log10
d
d0
(2.4)
where d0 is a reference distance. γ is the path loss exponent that expresses how
fast the path loss increases with distance. This parameter strongly depends on the
propagation environment. According to measurements, the value of γ is in the range
of 2 to 6. While γ = 2 characterizes free space, we can found γ ≤ 2 for scenarios
presenting waveguide effects such as corridors. Moreover γ can reach the value 6 in
scenarios where there is a severe attenuation, e.g. terminals separated by multiple
floors/walls in an indoor environment.
Although the path loss changes mainly with the distance, two terminals at a fixed
distance from a base station do not receive the same power since they may not receive
the same dominant paths. In fact, according to the local surrounding media, some
paths may be blocked by obstacles such as building or hills for only one receiver while
they still reach the other. This phenomenon is known as shadowing where random
slow power variation occurs around the mean path loss. Shadowing is often modeled
by a log-normal random variable with zero-mean and a local standard deviation,
usually in the range of 3-10 dB [37]. Shadowing is also known as medium-scale fading
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since the changes in the received power occur for distances in the range of tens of
wavelengths or more.
Furthermore, the received power still changes randomly for smaller distances (on
the order of the signal wavelength) owing to the multipath propagation where the
combination of all partial waves may interfere constructively or destructively. The
changes in the interfering combination over a short distance is explained by the phase
shift experienced by the different paths when the receiver moves. This multipath
propagation effect is called either small-scale fading or fast fading. It is noteworthy
that the amplitude fluctuation is rapid and is often modeled either by a Rayleigh
distribution or by a Rician distribution. The first distribution describes environments
where interference is caused by a large number of paths uniformly distributed in
space and having almost the same average power. However, in the case where a path
(generally, but not necessarily, the line of sight (LOS)) dominates the propagation
channel, the amplitude variation is better described by the Rician distribution.
While the path loss variation is deterministic owing to the dependence with the
distance, the multipath fast fading is a random process. Therefore, the fading chan-
nel and the related differing physical mechanisms will make it very difficult for an
eavesdropper to reconstruct Alice-Bob’s channel accurately, especially for rich scat-
tering environments, if she is located at some distance from the legitimate terminals
(Fig. 2-3).
2.1.3 Channel degrees of freedom
In conventional communication system, the small scale fading is detrimental because
the receiver is unable to correctly reproduce the original transmitted message when
the channel is in a deep fade resulting from destructive multipath interference. In
order to mitigate this effect, the transmitter sends several time the same message
over the time-varying channel, until the fading turns toward constructive interference
where the message is correctly received. This means that the message should be
retransmitted after the channel coherence time, which is a statistical measure of the
time duration over which the channel response is considered invariant. In other
words, the coherence time is typically the time interval within which two channels
measured over two different time instances are highly correlated. The coherence time
is inversely proportional to the Doppler frequency, which is related to the rapidity of
channel variations.
Fortunately, SSF may be efficiently mitigated by exploiting the channel degrees of
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freedom (DoF) existing either over the frequency domain or in the space domain. The
idea consists of providing statistically independent multiple parallel fading channels,
which depends mainly on the richness on multipaths and their dispersion. Equiva-
lently, multiple DoF may bring improvements to the performance of a communication,
such as the channel capacity through multiplexing gain in multiple input/multiple
output - MIMO - techniques. In the frequency domain case, the channel correlations
are related to the dispersion of the propagation paths in the time domain. This can
be described by the root mean square (RMS) delay spread, computed as follows:
στ =
√∫ τmax
0
(τ − τ¯)2P (τ)dτ∫ τmax
0
P (τ)dτ
(2.5)
and the mean delay τ¯ is defined as follows:
τ¯ =
∫ τmax
0
τP (τ)dτ∫ τmax
0
P (τ)dτ
(2.6)
where τmax is the maximum excess delay and P (τ) is the average power delay profile
(PDP) computed over a set of time-varying CIRs as follows:
P (τ) = E{|h(t, τ)|2} (2.7)
The equivalent of the RMS delay spread in the frequency domain is the channel
coherence bandwidth, which provides a statistical measure of the range of frequencies
over which the channel undergoes a similar fading. In other words, the coherence
bandwidth is the frequency interval within which two sub-carriers are highly corre-
lated. We note that the coherence bandwidth is inversely proportional to the RMS
delay spread, although there is no unique relation between both.
Equivalently, the space diversity is investigated through the use of multiple an-
tennas, where the parallel channel correlations rely on the angular dispersion of the
multipaths. The higher the angular spread, the smaller the channel spatial corre-
lations. The RMS angular spread and the mean angle φ¯ are given respectively in
Eq. 2.8 and Eq. 2.9, where φ is the azimuth angle and P (φ) is the average power
angular spectrum. We note that this definition for σφ is specifically valid for small or
moderate angular spreads [38]. More general formulas could be found in [38, 39].
σφ =
√√√√∫ 2pi0 (φ− φ¯)2P (φ)dφ∫ 2pi
0
P (φ)dφ
(2.8)
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φ¯ =
∫ 2pi
0
φP (φ)dφ∫ 2pi
0
P (φ)dφ
(2.9)
2.1.4 Propagation channel models
For a long time, a multitude of propagation channel models has been widely proposed
and developed in the literature in order to express the EM propagation characteristics
that are involved in the functioning of wireless communication systems, and which
can support their evolution (e.g. from 2G to 4G and beyond). Channel models are
generally developed in order to be suited to specific applications, and the model is
required to be as simple as possible and with a limited number of parameters. Until
now, PhySec has not been considered as a scheme of interest for wireless communica-
tions. The main peculiar aspect resides in being a three terminal scenario, where the
presence of Alice, Bob and Eve has to be modeled in the same propagation environ-
ment. Although multi-link channel models have been investigated in the context of
relaying [40], a model that is able to address scenarios for three terminals with two
in proximity of each other is needed. Additionally, this model must have sufficient
accuracy in modeling the spatial correlation between the neighboring terminals.
Many classifications are possible to define channel models. An effective one is
presented in [41] and relies on the type of modeling approach. On one side, physical
models rely on the EM wave propagation by describing the double-directional multi-
path structure of the channel. These models are typically antenna independent, i.e.
the antenna can be embedded in post-processing. On the other side, non physical
analytical models characterize the channel in a mathematical/analytical way without
explicitly considering wave propagation.
Physical models
Ray-Tracing (RT) and related techniques such as ray-launching is a deterministic site-
specific method that is able to reproduce any channel characteristic and is therefore
suitable to be used in PhySec scenarios. Nevertheless, only very few contributions in
this context are found in the literature [42, 43]. The main drawback of RT resides in
its computational needs, especially when the environment becomes complex. It also
requests a very precise database of the geometrical environment, as regards the EM
aspects. The model is inherently usable in a multi-user scenario, although the amount
of computing need may accordingly increase. A great advantage of RT is its capability
to describe long distance channel variations, since it is able to compute the multipath
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structure at any Rx-Tx positions. However, there are two major drawbacks: i) Long
simulation times are required in the case of a massive computation, especially for
covering large areas and for many frequencies. ii) Pure specular path propagation
does not fully render the complexity of real channels, e.g. through “diffuse scatter-
ing”, which stems from the roughness of reflecting surfaces [44]. Conversely, diffuse
scattering may be included in RT tools, although this incurs even more computation
requirements and very long simulation times.
As opposed to RT, in geometry-based stochastic channel models (GSCM) the loca-
tions of scatterers and their characteristics are defined in a statistical way, according
to certain probability distributions. GSCMs are less computationally greedy than
RT and they can generate a variety of scenarios instead of a specific one. They are
able to simulate all channel characteristics, but only in the environment where they
have been parametrized. Moreover, only a subset of GSCM is multi-user/multi-link
oriented, e.g. Winner II [1] and COST 2100 [45].
The last and simplest, from the computational point of view, category of models
that relies on the physical wave propagation are the stochastic models that originate
from the Saleh-Valenzuela model [46]. This model relies on a cluster assumption
where clusters are defined in a purely statistical way, via cluster delay and intra-
cluster ray delay distributions. The amplitude of channel coefficients is Rayleigh
distributed and the phase uniformly distributed over [0, 2pi]. This has been extended
including angular behavior for MIMO scenarios [47].
Analytical models
Among analytical models, we mention the correlation-based models that characterize
the MIMO channel matrix statistically in terms of the correlations between the matrix
entries. Popular models are the Kronecker model and the Weichselberger model. The
Kronecker model describes the propagation channels by separate transmit and receive
correlation matrices [48]. However, the Weichselberger model [49] aims at overcoming
the restriction of the Kronecker approximation in separating transmit and receive
sides and at modeling the correlation properties at the receiver and transmitter jointly.
Non stationary channel models
Non stationary channel models pose another challenge, since there is extra complexity
with respect to small scale channel modeling. In addition to modeling the charac-
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teristics of interest of the radio channel at a given Tx/Rx location (e.g. multipath
structure and parameters), which should typically be done for the variety of environ-
ments concerned by the targeted applications, it is needed to model the macroscopic
changes experienced by the channel when the device moves (e.g. along a route). This
may be useful within a given type of environment (e.g. indoor) or from one type
to another (e.g. outdoor to indoor). The channel changes thus need to express the
channel variations of the medium scale fading (typically: shadowing), as well as the
slower changes (typically: variation in the long distance average attenuation).
The literature is still scarce, although it is a recognized relevant issue, especially
now that more and more nomadic wireless devices of all sorts will be used in the
coming years (by walking people, in vehicles, etc.). One possible approach is to use
a GSCM in order to recover the spatial variability from the placement of scatterers
seen from the mobile over its route [50, 51, 52, 53]. A simple manner to model
shadowing is to use the lognormal model for the attenuation (i.e. a normal distribution
in dB), which allows to generate channel coefficients stochastically from correlation
coefficients in a well-known manner for a Gaussian stochastic process [54].
2.2 Wireless channel-based secret key generation
In the recent years, a set of works have addressed inherent characteristics of the
fading propagation channel in an information-theoretic framework oriented towards
security. In fact, a well-known problem in classical cryptography is the management
of ciphering keys, both regarding the generation and distribution of these keys. A
way to alleviate such difficulties is to use a common source of randomness for the
legitimate terminals, not accessible to an eavesdropper [17, 18]. This is the case of
the fading propagation channel, when exact or approximate reciprocity applies [21].
Fig. 2-5 depicts a communication scenario where Alice and Bob wish to communicate
securely in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). SKG seems to be efficient for
several systems, such as local area networks [55], mobile networks, wireless sensor
networks [29, 56] including both body area network and emerging internet of things
in which the energy consumption is of major importance.
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Figure 2-5: Wireless communication scenario.
2.2.1 SKG basics
Establishing secure keys from reciprocal radio channel may be achieved through four
consecutive steps: i) channel estimation, ii) channel quantization, iii) key reconcilia-
tion, and iv) privacy amplification. An illustrative scheme is depicted in Fig. 2-6.
In a TDD system, such as IEEE 802.11, Alice and Bob estimate their CSI by
successively sending each other a known training signal, using the same frequency
band. According to Section 2.1.1 and owing to the EM reciprocity law, the CSIs at
both Alice and Bob sides are very similar. Therefore, assuming they use a common
quantization algorithm, they are able to jointly translate their measured channel in-
formation into a shared string of cryptographic key bits, which may be used by the
upper-layer protocols in order to consolidate security. We note that the channel esti-
mation phase and the key quantization phase, together provide shared randomness to
Alice and Bob. This is equivalent to the “randomness sharing” step of the “sequential
key distillation” strategy presented in [4].
Despite that radio channels may not be reciprocal especially when estimated with
ordinary commercial devices, we assume in this thesis that the reverse and forward
channels are reciprocal and that the slight channel estimation inaccuracies owing to
TDD are lumped into channel noise. Therefore, the time-varying channel is estimated
as follows:
hˆ(t) = h(t) + n(t) (2.10)
where the time-varying additive noise n(t) is supposed to be a complex Gaussian
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Figure 2-6: The four steps of SKG to agree on the same key.
random process. We also assume that the noise signals of differing terminals are
independent.
Clearly, channel noise may lead to mismatches between Alice-Bob keys, subject
to the SNR and the quantization scheme. Fortunately, such a key disagreement may
be diminished, as a simple first step, through an efficient quantization technique (see
Section 3.2.1) employing suitable censoring schemes [57, 58, 59, 60]. These algorithms
may need to exchange appropriate public information, without revealing any useful
information about the bit value to Eve. Since key disagreement may still occur, a
reconciliation step [7] is required where Alice and Bob publicly exchange messages,
termed syndromes, in order to agree on the same shared key bits with vanishing error
probability. The correction of mismatched bits may involve linear error correcting
codes [7, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65], e.g. Hamming code [64], LDPC codes [7, 61, 62, 65]
and polar codes [66], as examples. Moreover, key agreement is targeted through the
use of cyclic error correcting codes such as BCH code [55].
During the reconciliation phase, Eve attempts to exploit the shared public syn-
drome in order to guess as many key bits as she can. However, this information may
not be relevant, especially when the amount of the public information is small, which
in turn means that a small bit disagreement probability results after the quantization
phase. Nevertheless, a last step, called privacy amplification [67], seems essential in
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Figure 2-7: SKG in the presence of an eavesdropper.
rendering the key more random through e.g. hash functions, at the cost of a reduced
key length. However, indirectly, the key length reduction by privacy amplification
means that one of the first success criteria in SKG is the key length, so to have a
sufficient length margin. This part of the whole SKG mechanism, i.e. information
reconciliation and privacy amplification, is addressed in Chapter 7.
2.2.2 Security versus an eavesdropper
In the present work, we focus mainly on passive attacks where the eavesdropper is
able to measure the channel when either Alice or Bob transmits training signals.
She is also assumed to know the quantization algorithm used to establish a sequence
of key bits. Moreover, Eve is supposed to intercept all the public communications.
Therefore, Eve’s goal is mainly to exploit all this knowledge in order to collapse
the key space and make its search of the exact key easier. The idea underneath
SKG from random channels is that Eve’s gain of information about the key will be
negligible in a typical scenario, rich in dispersive multipaths. In such a scenario, the
location-specific propagation channel is expected to rapidly decorrelate in the space
or frequency domains, owing to rapid signal fluctuations (Fig. 2-3). Thus, a passive
eavesdropper who intercepts the communication between Alice and Bob, experiences
a channel significantly decorrelated from that experienced by legitimate users. As a
consequence, when Eve attempts to derive a key from the radio channel, the key has
few common features with that extracted by both Alice and Bob, making hacking in
practice unachievable. Fig. 2-7 depicts such a typical scenario.
However, channel decorrelation depends to a large extent on the nature of the
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propagation environment (e.g. multipath richness) as well as on the relative distance
between Eve and Alice/Bob. Furthermore, Eve might resort to some techniques in
order to gain insight about the wireless transmission between Alice and Bob and
therefore degrade the level of security. In [68], the degree of security is discussed
according to the statistical knowledge acquired by Eve, for example how Eve may
use her knowledge about the multipath structure in order to reconstruct the channel
coefficients and subsequently attempt to guess a portion of the secret key. In [42],
Eve uses ray tracing methods in order to predict the channel response, which depends
on side information such as the environment map and EM characteristics and on her
localization accuracy of the legitimate terminals.
Nevertheless, when considering active attacks, Eve may impersonate a legitimate
user since the channel over which Alice and Bob communicate is not authenticated.
This problem, also known as “man in the middle”, is extremely serious since difficult
to counter. In this respect, the authors in [60] proposed an authentication scheme
based on a level crossing algorithm. This kind of attacks is taken into account in the
PHYLAWS project where a technique based on furtive and adaptive radio signals
aims to protect the earliest stage of PhySec, in particular SKG [69]. Discussions
about different attacks and countermeasure may be found in [70]. Accordingly, we do
not consider active attacks in the present work.
2.2.3 Review of SKG
Prior works address issues encountered in the SKG process from either information-
theoretic perspective or from a practical view. In the former, bounds on secret key
rate are computed where simple analytical expressions are just found for perfect fad-
ing Gaussian channels, for either NB system [25, 58, 61, 62, 71, 72] or for WB/UWB
technology [63, 65, 73]. However, real measured channels may deviate from Gaus-
sian statistics, for example when a path dominates the propagation channel or when
limited interfering paths exist. Although secret key capacity is computed numer-
ically for both Nakagami and Suzuki fading channels in [74], this does not seem
efficient since a large amount of statistical data is required and more complications
appear for complex valued channel coefficients. Therefore, assessing security from the
information-theoretic side is not always suitable.
On the other hand, practical assessments consist of quantizing the channel infor-
mation (e.g. the received signal strength (RSS), the phase information, the CIR, etc.)
into a sequence of secret bits (Section 3.2.1), where security may be assessed through
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bit error rates and through achieved secret key rates. In this respect, most prior
works proposed quantization protocols, often combined with a reconciliation scheme,
in order to enhance the security [29, 59, 60, 75, 76, 77, 78]. In particular, they intend
to deliver key rates approaching the secret key capacity, after applying the four key
generation steps shown in Fig. 2-6. The authors in [71] target the key extraction
from the complex channel coefficients of a complex Gaussian channel model. They
show that the secret key rate may be within 1 bit from the secret key capacity, by
adapting the number of extracted bits according to the SNR, using gray codes and
LDPC codes with soft decision for error corrections.
Therefore, it is clear that most prior works focus on the role played by the quanti-
zation algorithm in retaining security, while few papers address the relation between
SKG and the propagation channel features. In [58], the authors emphasize the role of
multipath richness in 1) increasing the amount of randomness of MIMO technologies
and 2) keeping the key safe from Eve. SKG was also discussed with respect to the
Doppler frequency [60], to the LOS/NLOS character [58, 79] and to the coherence
time [63]. Premnath et al. [29] applied practical SKG algorithms to the RSS of real
channels, measured in different environment settings, including indoor and outdoor
conditions and stationary and mobile terminals/intermediate objects. The measure-
ments using 802.11-based laptops exhibited the weakness of SKG behavior in nearly
static environments, where the entropy of extracted key bits is very low, whereas it
turns out to be higher in mobile environments.
Hence, channel variability is a crucial requirement to establish long random se-
cret key bits. The quality of the key in part depends on the statistical independence
between key bits, which to some extent can be reduced to the lack of correlation
between channel samples. Such an independence stems from sufficiently separated
samples, in whatever domain sampling might be, which involves the physical propa-
gation mechanisms and characteristics of the radio environment. On the other hand,
several authors indeed emphasize the benefit of decorrelating channel observations,
especially highlighting MIMO systems [59, 62].
Security in static environments was targeted by creating channel fluctuations
through beamforming techniques provided by steerable array antennas [55, 80, 81].
Moreover, fast SKG in such environments was achieved by using opportunistic beam-
forming (without the need of a specific antenna design) and the frequency diversity
[82]. Furthermore, terminals/scatterers mobility can be compensated through the
investigation of the channel degrees of freedom (DoF), covering both the spatial do-
main and the frequency/delay domain, which express the channel richness and its
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expected impact on randomness [24, 58, 83, 84, 85]: the richer the channel, the better
the chance to exploit this richness usefully towards security. The spatial diversity
existing in MIMO systems is investigated theoretically and experimentally in indoor
channels [58]. In [65], the frequency diversity in orthogonal frequency division multi-
plexing (OFDM) systems is investigated theoretically in SKG techniques by assuming
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) channel transfer functions. However,
no validation of this approach was performed in well specified measurement campaigns
and no quantitative information about the achieved key length was provided.
From the eavesdropper point of view, several works assume that Eve is not able to
access correlated channel information when she is located more than a half or at most
a few wavelengths away from both legitimate terminals [55, 61]. This assumption is
valid in the case of rich omnidirectional multipaths, where the channel decorrelates
rapidly over the specified domain. Nevertheless, SKG performance has been inves-
tigated statistically and empirically for a simple scenario where Eve is very close to
Bob1 [58, 86]. Moreover, a simple correlation model, which relies on a low-pass filter,
is investigated equivalently in [84, 87]. However, the authors in [64] proved by mea-
surements that spatial correlation can be found even for larger separation distances.
In particular, shadow fading seems to be critical in PhySec, while shadow fading
correlations [37] between Bob and Eve are likely to affect the information accessible
to the eavesdropper and thus to impact the confidentiality. In this context, we have
presented in [72] a very simple version of a GSCM, relying on the presence of scat-
terers between Alice and Bob/Eve in order to capture the common characteristics
between Alice/Bob and Eve’s channels without a restriction to stationary region. An
extension of this model will be presented in Chapter 4.
2.3 Conclusion
This chapter presented an overview on the state of the art of both the wireless prop-
agation channel and the secret key generation. In the first section, a definition of the
wireless propagation was given, with special emphasis on features relevant to SKG,
such as the multipath propagation, the channel reciprocity and the three types of
channel fading. Moreover, an overview on existing channel models was given. These
models can not be directly exploited in the context of PhySec, in particular the SKG
scheme which seems to be very exigent. Indeed, on one hand, the SKG performance
analysis requires a multi-user channel model that accounts for the intrinsic spatial
1Both Bob and Eve are assumed to share the same multipath components
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channel variability between two users in proximity of each others, i.e. Bob and Eve.
Such a requirement is targeted in Chapter 4, by elaborating on a GSCM. On the other
hand, the quality of the key extracted from the radio channel heavily relies on the
multi-path channel richness, which should be modeled with a sufficient accuracy (e.g.
taking into account the diffuse components of the radio channel in RT simulations,
ref. to Chapter 5).
Furthermore, in the second section, the strategy of deriving keys from the prop-
agation channel was described, by discussing some scenarios for the eavesdropper.
Related works in the area of SKG were also cited, with particular emphasis on SKG
limitations.
In order to evaluate the quality of an on-the-fly generated key with respect to dif-
ferent propagation settings, we describe, in the following chapter, appropriate metrics
and performance methods. Specifically, we emphasize the relation between key qual-
ity and channel features when investigating delay-dispersive channels.
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Chapter 3
Secret key generation performance
evaluation methods
This chapter is dedicated to discuss different methods for evaluating the performance
in the establishment of secret keys and in relation to the randomness provided by
fading propagation channels. We first examine, in Section 3.1, both qualitative and
quantitative metrics that reveal the robustness of the generated key, mainly regarding
its length and its random character. These metrics may also be classified as theoretical
or practical, where the latter is evaluated after quantizing the channel information
into a stream of key bits. In contrast with the theoretical metrics where the SKG
performance is merely impacted by the propagation channel features, the practical
SKG behavior is also influenced by the employed quantization algorithm. Hence,
most earlier works intended to develop quantization protocols attempting to offer
performance approaching the theoretical one. Nonetheless, since our ultimate goal is
to relate the generated key robustness to the propagation channel characteristics, we
chose to implement an efficient quantization algorithm selected from the literature,
sensitive to fine channel characteristics and whose parameters can be adjusted. We
argue and describe this algorithm in Section 3.2.
Subsequently in Section 3.3, we target how to investigate the channel degrees of
freedom (DoF) existing in either the space or the frequency domain, with a goal to
harvest as much randomness as possible from a single channel observation, given that
channel noise or channel estimation errors limit the amount of random information
shared between Alice and Bob. One advantage of exploiting the DoF as much as
possible is to mitigate the requirement of terminal movements, in order to provide
independent channel samples. This is a critical constraint in static environments.
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Figure 3-1: The terminals’ propagation channels involved in the SKG scheme.
In other words, exploiting the channel DoFs may lead to address the SKG limita-
tions explained deeply in Section 1.2 and discussed with respect to the literature in
Section 2.2.3.
3.1 Metrics for SKG assessment
A cryptographic robust key is characterized by its length and its randomness. From
the computational constraint point of view, the importance of the key length resides
in avoiding a brute force attack, where the eavesdropper systematically checks all
possible keys until the correct one is found. Nevertheless, novel schemes (such as
investigated in the PHYLAWS project [15]) can bring an useful extra degree of se-
curity without requiring extremely long keys. This can be done by reinforcing the
security protocol, e.g. through a limited validity time for valid keys [88] or through
more sophisticated approaches [69]. On the other hand, from the perspective of
information-theory, a high key randomness is essential to avoid significant informa-
tion leakage to an eavesdropper, making life easier for her in reducing the key search
space [68].
Therefore, we discuss in this section how to quantitatively assess the quality of
the generated key, in terms of length and randomness, from both theoretical and
practical perspectives. Moreover, we present the channel correlation coefficient as a
qualitative metric, since, on one hand, the channel reciprocity is relevant to secret
sharing between Alice and Bob, on the other hand, the spatial decorrelation impacts
the amount of information exposed to Eve.
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3.1.1 Information theoretic bounds on key length
The reciprocal fading channels measured by Alice (hˆa) and Bob (hˆb) are considered
to contain a common randomness that should be quantized in order to obtain shared
key bits (see Fig. 3-1 for an illustrative scheme of the channels between members
of the trio). Thus, in an information-theoretic framework, the maximum amount of
random information reliably shared between Alice and Bob is measured by the mutual
information between their legitimate channels, or:
IK = I(hˆa, hˆb) (3.1)
We recall that the terminals measure noisy channel gains, as modeled in Eq. 2.10.
The available key bits are, on one hand, entirely secure only in case Eve experiences
channels (hˆe and hˆc) that are statistically independent from those measured by the
legitimate terminals, i.e. it is commonly considered that Eve should be sufficiently
far from both Alice and Bob. Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that Eve has
negligible information about the propagation scenario (e.g. terminals positions and
surrounding environment) [68], so that she is unable to perform channel predictions
through e.g. a ray tracing tool [42]. In general, not all of these bits are secure if the
eavesdropper may have access to some insight about the legitimate channels. There-
fore, the secret key rate ISK can be obtained by evaluating the mutual information
between the channels seen by Alice and Bob, given Eve’s observations [7, 17, 89], or:
ISK = I(hˆa, hˆb|hˆe, hˆc) (3.2)
In the present work, we consider a simplified scenario where Eve is closer to Bob
than to Alice, as seen in Fig. 3-1. As a result, we can assume that the channel Bob-
Eve (hˆc) is independent from the main channel Alice-Bob. Accordingly, the secret
key rate is simplified to:
ISK = I(hˆa, hˆb|hˆe). (3.3)
We also define the vulnerable key rate as follows:
IV K = IK − ISK (3.4)
Given that both available and secret/vulnerable key capacities are statistical quan-
tities computed based on mutual information, and in order to numerically evaluate
these theoretical bounds, we give in Eqs. 3.5 and 3.6 the basic definitions of the
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mutual information between two random variables (X and Y ) and also conditionally
to a third one (Z) [90].
I(X, Y ) =
∑
x
∑
y
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
(3.5)
I(X, Y |Z) =
∑
x
∑
y
∑
z
p(x, y, z) log
p(z)p(x, y, z)
p(x, z)p(y, z)
(3.6)
If the channels are jointly complex Gaussian random vectors with zero mean,
the mutual information in Eqs. 3.5 and 3.6 can be easily computed starting from
covariance matrices of channel observations [90]. In other words, the channels are
required to follow either Rayleigh or Rician fading, where the latter case requires the
removal of the dominant deterministic component [58, 71]. Nevertheless, IK and ISK
are expressed by the following formulas:
IK = I(hˆa, hˆb) = log2
|Rˆaa||Rˆbb|
|RˆAB|
(3.7)
ISK = I(hˆa, hˆb|hˆe) = log2
|RˆAE||RˆBE|
|RˆE||RˆABE|
(3.8)
where covariances with lowercase subscripts denote Rˆxy = E{hˆxhˆHy }, while those
with uppercase subscripts are covariances of stacked channel vectors, or RˆXY ···Z =
E{[hˆHx hˆ
H
y · · · hˆ
H
z ]
H [hˆ
H
x hˆ
H
y · · · hˆ
H
z ]}. Explicit evaluation of these covariance matrices
may be found in Appendix A.|.| denotes for the determinant.
Unfortunately, the Gaussianity of the channel coefficients cannot be ensured in all
scenarios. This will cause a significant difficulty in evaluating IK and ISK , since there
is no closed-form expression for the mutual information in the general case. Hence,
we just compute this mutual information for channels undergoing Rayleigh fading.
Nonetheless, we can assess the security performance after translating the channel
information into discrete key bits, as well explained in the next section, although
there is less guarantee than provided by the direct application of information theory
principles.
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Figure 3-2: The impact of the SNR on IK .
Impact of SNR
One main factor that limits the number of available key bits is the signal to noise
ratio (SNR). We assume that the transmitted power increases proportionally to the
number of transmission sub-channels. Thus, the average SNR, assumed for a single
antenna single frequency link, is defined as:
γ =
E{|h|2F}
Nhσ2
(3.9)
where |.|F and E{.} denote respectively the Frobenius norm and the expectation over
the channel realizations. σ2 is the noise power while Nh is the length of the channel
vector. Indeed, the components of the channel vectors refer to parallel multiple
channels, which occur in either an OFDM system, a SIMO/MIMO system or the
joint technologies.
We can simply examine the SNR impact by considering a narrow band complex
Gaussian channel between Alice and Bob, with i.i.d. channel realizations. It is
hence relatively easy to show that IK is determined by the signal to noise ratio γ (or
SNR = 10 log10(γ)), assumed identical at Alice and Bob sides. IK is thus expressed
by the following formula [71]:
IK = − log2
[
1−
(
γ
1 + γ
)2]
(3.10)
Obviously, the available key bits just reveal the accuracy of the analog to digital
conversion, which is limited by the SNR. Consistently, we show in Fig. 3-2 that IK
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increases proportionally to the SNR in dB, at least beyond ∼10 dB. In most of the
results presented in the following chapters, we consider the SNR to be equal to 15
dB, which results in IK(1) = 4.05 bits per channel observation for Nh = 1. Indeed,
while a higher SNR can be considered interesting, since providing more key bits and
more randomness, the noise in Eq. 2.10 is not only an additive thermal noise, but
also comprises channel estimation errors, imperfect calibration of the measuring chain
etc. Since SKG might be used predominantly in low cost commercial devices, it can
be anticipated that the effective lack of reciprocity between Alice and Bob channels
(represented through the SNR) will be significant and assuming very high SNR would
not be realistic.
Impact of the Rician K factor
Besides the impact of the noise, the robustness of the SKG heavily depends on the
amount of randomness available in the reciprocal radio channel. Indeed, uncondition-
ally security schemes rely on the fact that the eavesdropper should have insufficient
information about the source from which keys are extracted. Accordingly, merely the
random portion of the radio channel is beneficial for secret key generation [58, 79].
While Rayleigh fading channels are fully random, Rician fading channels contain a
predictable part (i.e. typically the LOS path) that limits the amount of randomness.
Thus, in order to appropriately apply the SKG, it is suggested to remove any pre-
dictable portion of the channel [58, 71, 91]. However, this cannot be achieved by just
removing the channel mean, as suggested in [71], since the dominant path may have
a changing phase owing to terminals motion. For that reason, the authors in [58]
perform principal component removal by investigating the eigenvectors of the MIMO
covariance matrix, the drawbacks of which stem from the need of sufficient statistics
as well as sufficient DoFs. Moreover, since the deterministic part may not restrict to
a single dominant path, other protocols attempt to predict and remove such a part
through the use of, for example, a Markov chain [92] or a linear prediction approach
[91]. Nonetheless, the task of removing the predictable portion of the channel is be-
yond of the scope of the present work, while the aim here is to simply quantify the
impact of the limited amount of randomness on the SKG. For that reason, we often
take in consideration the Rician K factor in the results presented below.
The K factor is defined as the power ratio of the dominant deterministic path to
the remained scattered paths. We consider the case of a narrow band Rician channel
resulting from the presence of a fixed dominant path hlos (with a unit mean power),
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where the complex channel gain can be modeled as follows:
h =
√
K
1 +K
hlos +
√
1
1 +K
hscatt (3.11)
hscatt results from the contribution of a sufficient number of i.i.d. scattered multipath
components, assuming a rich scattered environment. Hence, according to the central
limit theorem, hscatt follows a zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution with a unit
variance, i.e. hscatt ∼ CN(0, 1). We adequately evaluate the amount of shared
randomness between Alice and Bob once the dominant path is removed. We assume
that Alice and Bob see noisy versions of the reciprocal channel h with a fixed SNR
of 15 dB (γ in linear scale). Since SKG exploits merely the scattered part of the
channel, IK depends on the SNR of such a part, i.e. γscatt =
γ
1+K
. Consequently,
IK = − log2{1− ( γγ+(1+K))2}. We plot in Fig. 3-3 the variation of IK with the Rician
K factor for SNR=15 dB. It is straightforward to notice that IK decreases as K
increases. This results from the decrease in the received power as K increases after
removing the dominant component, yielding a smaller SNR for the scatterered paths
(γscatt). This shows that random keys may be extracted from Rician channels if the
diffuse components has sufficient SNR, however the price to pay is the capability for
the system to properly extract the dominant component.
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Figure 3-3: IK as a function of the Rician K factor.
Vulnerability in an ideal scenario
It is usually assumed that Eve has negligible information about the main wireless
channel provided that she is sufficiently far away from both Alice and Bob. This
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Figure 3-4: IV K/IK as a function of the separation distance d for Clarke’s model.
means that the channel experienced by Eve is totally decorrelated from that measured
by legitimate terminals. In fact, this represents an ideal scenario (i.e. the Clarke
model) where the channel is assumed rich in paths uniformly dispersive in the angular
domain. This brings rapid channel variations in either the time or the spatial domain,
expressed by the Jakes correlation function [93]:
E{hb, he} = J0(2pid/λ) (3.12)
where J0() is the zero-order Bessel function, λ is the wavelength, and d is the distance
between Bob (B) and Eve (E). Accordingly, the normalized vulnerable key rate, which
is plotted versus the distance d in Fig. 3-4, reveals that no information is disclosed
to Eve after a few wavelengths. However, the reality is more complex and may
significantly deviate from Clarke’s scenario. Indeed, in practice, the channel is often
dominated by a set of discrete multipaths, for which the angular spread may cover a
moderate angle, which will require a larger separation distance to warrant sufficient
decorrelation and an adequate degree of security. In the following chapters, we will
consider the vulnerability issue in more realistic scenarios.
3.1.2 Channel correlations
Given that the information security metrics for Gaussian channels recalled above
are based on second order quantities, the correlation between channel coefficients is
responsible for the imperfect security performance. Clearly speaking, the larger the
correlation between the legitimate channels, the more shared bits between Alice and
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Bob can be expected to be successfully extracted. Moreover, the confidentiality is
assured owing to the spatially decorrelated channel measured by the eavesdropper.
Therefore, the correlation can be used to assess qualitatively SKG performance in
terms of reliability and confidentiality.
We use the conventional channel correlation coefficient between two random com-
plex variables X and Y of mean µX = E{X} and µY = E{Y } , defined as follows:
corr(X, Y ) =
E{(X − µX)(Y − µY )∗}√
(E{|X − µX |2})(E{|Y − µY |2})
(3.13)
where (.)∗ stands for complex conjugate. We consider two types of channel correla-
tions: 1) the complex channel correlation coefficient (referred to as ρxy) where X and
Y represent respectively the complex channel coefficients hx and hy and 2) the power
envelope correlation coefficient, where X and Y are replaced by the channel powers
|hx|2 and |hy|2, respectively.
3.1.3 Channel quantization performance
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, Alice and Bob jointly quantize their estimated channel
information into a stream of key bits. If the EM reciprocity holds perfectly even
without channel estimation noise (i.e. hˆa = hˆb), legitimate users are then able to
adequately share the same string of key bits. Otherwise, they should reconcile their
keys with the least amount of information leaked to Eve. For that reason, the bit
error rate (BER) should be small. Hence, it is crucial to study the BER between
the key bits extracted by both Alice and Bob, which is the ratio of the number of
erroneous bits to the total number of bits1. Accordingly, we define the efficiency
η (in bits/channel observation) as the average identical number of bits that can be
extracted from a single channel observation even over Nh channel degrees of freedom
(i.e. the case of stacked channel vectors), or:
η = Nh(1−BER) log2(M) (3.14)
This formula assumes i.i.d. channel coefficients even over the stacked channels, which
refers to the channel DoF. As a consequence, this expression is not able to quantify
the length of “random” bits. Furthermore, if Alice and Bob do not agree on a given
symbol, it is relevant to discard the erroneous bit rather than the whole symbol since
1We choose to evaluate the BER instead of the symbol error rate (SER) in order to account for
the reconciliation phase which operates at the bit level.
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they are able to reconcile their bits in the steps that follow the bit extraction phase.
For that reason, we use the BER in the expression of η instead of the symbol error
rate as admitted in [58].
3.1.4 NIST tests
The fact that key bits are not statistically independent reduces the key quality since
in an information-theoretic framework Eve may exploit any useful information to
collapse the key space. In this context, the source of randomness, in addition to the
admitted quantization algorithm, is the most critical aspect that mainly affects the
key robustness behavior. Hence, we aim to assess the security performance in terms
of randomness, which can be achieved using the NIST test suite [94]. We notice that
these tests are not able to prove the perfect randomness of a key. However, each
test shows if the key bits follow a certain expected behavior owing to key generation
process [75]. There are 16 statistical tests in total, but we are not able to apply all
these tests owing to limitations on the requirement of each tested key length. Table
3.1 shows length limitations for some tests applied in this dissertation, where m is the
length in bits of the bit strings used in each test and N is the key length in bits. The
remaining tests require very long keys and do not apply to the physical layer based
wireless security scheme we here target.
Table 3.1: NIST tests limitations.
Mono-bit frequency N ≥ 100
Block frequency N ≥ 100
Runs N ≥ 100
Serial m < blog2Nc − 2
Approximate entropy m < blog2Nc − 5
Some tests try to show whether the sequence of bits has the statistical properties
of a random sequence. Consistently, the “mono-bit frequency” and the “block fre-
quency” tests investigate this randomness criteria on respectively the entire key bits
and in sub-blocks. For example, if we consider the following sequence of N bits:
00...00︸ ︷︷ ︸
N/4
10...10︸ ︷︷ ︸
N/4
11...11︸ ︷︷ ︸
N/4
01...01︸ ︷︷ ︸
N/4
,
we notice that it passes the mono-bit frequency test since 0 and 1 are equiprobable
bits in the whole sequence whereas it is not the case in subblocks where too many
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bits equal either to 0 or to 1 may be present, leading to failure of the block-frequency
test. Another test, which is the “runs” test, checks whether the frequency of runs
(uninterrupted strings of identical bits either 0 or 1) is that expected for a random
sequence. In other words, it determines whether the transition between bits 0 and 1
is too fast or too slow. Accordingly, the sequence in the above example is considered
random since the number of runs is very close to that expected for a random sequence
(i.e. N/2 runs). However, the following sequence:
00...00︸ ︷︷ ︸
N/3
11...11︸ ︷︷ ︸
N/3
00...00︸ ︷︷ ︸
N/3
is not random since only 3 runs are computed.
Both the “approximate entropy” (ApEnt) test and the “serial” test focus on the
frequency of occurrences of all possible overlapping 2m strings of m-bits length each,
across the entire key bits. Their purpose is to compare the frequency of overlapping
strings of several consecutive lengths against the expected result for a random se-
quence. To that aim, the ApEnt test uses two consecutive bit lengths (m and m+ 1)
while the serial test uses three consecutive lengths (m, m− 1 and m− 2). Moreover
the serial test differs from the ApEnt test by the fact that longer bit strings can be
used in the former for the same key length, as shown in Table 3.1. According to
both the ApEnt test with m = 1 and the serial test with m = 2, the first sequence
example is supposed random since strings of 2 bits are almost equiprobable whereas
the second key example fails these two tests. Furthermore if we consider strings of
higher lengths, the first sequence may fail the tests. More information about these
statistical tests can be found in [94].
For a single key, each randomness test indicates whether the key is accordingly
random or not. Furthermore, in order to relate the quality of the randomness to the
features of the radio channel, a set of generated keys is tested by each randomness
test, which returns a percentage of sequences passing the test. Then we computed
the “mean pass rate” by averaging the percentages of sequences passing each NIST
test and thus over all the applied statistical tests, which provides a global assessment
of the randomness for each specific scenario.
37
3.2 Channel quantization alternating (CQA) algo-
rithm for SKG
Apart from the crucial impact of random wireless channel, security through SKG is,
to some extent, related to the effectiveness of the quantization mechanism that is
required to extract more random key bits with vanishing error rate. Thus, we firstly
review various algorithms attempting to distill keys from various channel information,
such as the RSS. Then, we describe the channel quantization alternating scheme,
proposed in [58], which is used throughout this work to practically establish symmetric
keys.
3.2.1 State of the art
The key rate may be increased by extracting several bits from a single channel sam-
ple. However, this may increase the number of mismatched bits extracted by both
Alice and Bob, since samples become closer to quantization boundaries. In order
to address this issue in either mono- or multi-bit extraction schemes, quantization
algorithms seek to employ a suitable censoring scheme. While some algorithms in-
crease Alice-Bob’s key agreement by dropping down samples falling into a predefined
guardband region [57, 58], the time required to construct a long secret key increases,
which reduces the effectiveness of such algorithms. Alternatively, a more efficient
protocol adapts the quantization map to each channel observation, by using at least
two alternative maps [58, 59]. The main goal of these censoring schemes is to reduce
the BER in order to render the reconciliation phase more efficient, with a minimum
amount of information disclosed to Eve.
Furthermore, some algorithms intend to provide security by better ensuring the
random character of the generated bits. In this respect, decorrelation transformations
are proposed to be employed before the quantization step. In [59], a linear transform
(discrete Karhunen-Love transform), which exploits the eigenvectors of the covariance
matrix, is used to convert an estimated channel vector into decorrelated components.
A similar approach is used in [62], where the eigenvectors are transmitted over the
public channel between Alice and Bob. Other protocols attempt to exploit just the
unpredictable portion of the channel information, by predicting and removing the
deterministic components [58, 91, 92], as discussed above in Section 3.1.1. Despite
the pros and cons of these approaches, since we aim to assess the amount of intrin-
sic random information in relation to the channel features, we are interested in a
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simple approach that ensures preliminary randomness by defining statistically equal
quantization intervals [58] without any further data processing.
Moreover, the channel information quantized into key bits impacts the security.
Although the most common channel quantity used in practical SKG is the RSSI
[29, 55, 56, 57] because this parameter is widely accessible in most radio receivers,
the entropy of the generated keys is not very high. Alternatively, the channel phase
information has been investigated and found to generate more random and secure
stream of bits, such as in [65, 76, 95, 96]. However, either RSSI or the phase only
partially exploit the richness of the channel information [65]. Another candidate for
SKG is the channel impulse response (CIR) of either an OFDM, WB or even UWB
channels, whose ability to support SKG techniques has been targeted through the
literature [61, 64, 73, 75, 97]. Nevertheless, we can efficiently establish a sufficient
long and random key by exploiting as much as possible channel information at once,
which is achieved by making use of the joint real and imaginary parts of channel
coefficients (complex CSI) [58, 62].
3.2.2 CQA description
Therefore, we specifically consider in the present work the channel quantization al-
ternating (CQA) protocol proposed in [58], which offers the following advantages: 1)
the exploitation of the full information contained in the complex CSI, 2) the defini-
tion of statistically equally probable quantization regions (QR), and 3) the decrease
of the BER without samples rejection. A preliminary set of channel coefficients is
required in an initial learning phase, in order to statistically define the quantization
regions of a quantization map. Subsequently, it will be necessary to specify the nature
of the channel observations that serve in the construction of the I/Q maps (learn-
ing phase), from which subsequent observations can be quantized according to CQA
(SKG phase). Obviously, the more numerous observations can be used in the learning
phase, the more precise will the maps be and the more similar Alice’s and Bob’s maps
will be. Along this line, the more channel observations we have for the SKG phase,
the longer and the more secure the keys will be, providing margin since key length is
reduced after the privacy amplification step.
To generate secure key bits from the shared source of randomness, Alice and Bob
separately employ CQA. Alice defines her map QRs by quantifying the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of each of the aggregated real and imaginary parts of
the channel coefficients into
√
M statistically equal quantization intervals, resulting
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Figure 3-5: Illustration of the quantization intervals of the CQA scheme on one
dimension I or Q with M = 16.
in M quantization regions. In seeking key mismatches reduction, Alice divides each
quantization interval into two sub-intervals of equal probability. She then sets a
quantization mapping (QM) index to 0 or 1 if the current sample falls within the
first or the second sub-interval, respectively, and then publicly sends the QM to Bob.
Fig. 3-5 illustrates the quantization intervals along a single dimension (I or Q) for
both Alice and Bob and for M = 16 QRs (i.e. 4 quantization intervals in each single
dimension). On the other hand, Bob first performs the same earlier step done by Alice
and computes the preliminary boundaries from his own set of channel coefficients
observations. Bob then defines two alternative maps by shifting the quantization
boundaries, each one in a different direction, with the same probability (i.e. 1/4
√
M),
which corresponds to the half of each QM probability (please refer to [58] for further
insights). Fig. 3-5 shows a simple example demonstrating the efficiency of CQA where
Alice and Bob are able to obtain the same string of bits. Alice obtains the string
“00” by using her own unique map. If Bob uses the same map, he obtains a different
string, i.e. “01”. Otherwise, if Bob uses the map labeled with QM=1 as indicated
by Alice, he is able to reproduce the same string as Alice, i.e. “00”. Hence, Alice
publicly communicates the adequate QM index to Bob.
We note that we use the Gray coding in mapping each QR into a string of key bits,
since symbols affected to two alternative QRs differ from only 1 bit, which in turn
aids in diminishing the BER [71]. Fig. 3-6 depicts a particular channel realization
in the complex I-Q plane and shows Alice’s map by presenting the correspondence
between symbols and QR, both for M = 4 and M = 16. We recall that the interest of
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Figure 3-6: Correspondence between symbols and QR.
increasing M is to establish a certain key length with fewer channel samples. However,
we will see in the subsequent chapters the conditions suitable to increase M .
3.3 Exploiting channel variability in SKG
As shown in Section 3.1.1, the available key rate IK is limited by both the SNR
and the deterministic components of the radio environment. This is pragmatically
addressed through the accumulation of several sub-keys, which are required however
to be independent. Indeed, the quality of the key in part depends on the statistical
independence between key bits, which to some extent can be reduced to the lack of
correlation between channel samples. Such an independence stems from sufficiently
separated samples, in whatever domain sampling might be, which involves the phys-
ical propagation mechanisms and characteristics of the radio environment. Hence,
channel variability is essential to achieve SKG.
Given the limitations of SKG when exploiting the time variability, achieved through
movements of either the terminals or scatterers in the surrounding environment, we
propose to investigate either the space, the frequency or joint space-frequency degrees
of freedom (DoF). The benefit stems from the increase in the number of shared ran-
dom bits per channel observation and the reduction in the time required to achieve a
long secret key, for time variant channels. In the case of Nh independent degrees of
freedom, which would result from independent parallel sub-channels with reciprocity
between Alice and Bob limited by an SNR given by γ, the number of available key
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bits is given as follows:
IK = −Nh log2{1− (
γ
1 + γ
)2}. (3.15)
However, this equality does not hold in the case of non independent parallel sub-
channels. Hence, the security strongly relies on the sub-channels correlation degree.
Intuitively, the less correlation between them, the more key bits per single channel
observation.
SKG performance goes through maximizing key length, under the condition that
key bits are as much independent as possible, which means capturing as many as
possible parallel sub-channels and ensure as much as possible independence between
these channels. Such a consideration will be at the heart of the work performed and
described throughout this dissertation. In the present section, we mainly focus on
the exploitation of parallel channels coming from the dispersion in the delay domain
and try to get insights from a simple model of dispersive channels.
3.3.1 Space variability
Space variability stems from the use of several antennas at either the receiver or the
transmitter side (e.g. massive MIMO [98]) although coupling and other effects may
disturb this simple picture. Space variability also stems from varying positions for a
single antenna, which is equivalent to time variability if the channel can be assumed
static over the CIR duration.
The correlation between spatially variant channels relies in general on the angular
characteristics of the radio propagation. If the multipaths are dispersive in the angular
domain, the channels exhibit faster spatial decorrelation, especially in rich scattered
environments as may be expressed by the Bessel function of Eq. 3.12. On the opposite,
more correlated channels result from a highly directional multipaths scenario, for a
given distance between points where the channel is measured. This may be expressed
through the channel coherence distance. In dense and sufficiently omnidirectional
scenarios, it is commonplace to consider that antennas separated by at least λ/2
provide sufficiently decorrelated signals (i.e. channel coefficients). However, this is
less true in directional ones, such as rural scenarios or in street canyons with visibility
from the BST [99]. We notice that the vulnerability of SKG in either static or LOS
conditions may be reduced through the use of specific configurable antennas enabling
to create artificial fluctuations by randomly changing the beam-patterns, thus giving
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Figure 3-7: Some examples of PDP with different RMS delay spreads.
Alice/Bob an advantage over Eve [55, 81].
3.3.2 Frequency variability
In real world applications, a spatial degree of freedom may not always be available (e.g.
in single antennas links with very stable channels). In such a case, it is recommended
to find another source of channel variability, hence the need to exploit the frequency
variability existing in WB/UWB channels.
We here describe a simple dispersive channel model, which will help identify the
phenomena under SKG performance from correlated sub-channels and address the op-
timization of SKG schemes. It is based on periodic multipaths in the delay domain,
with an exponentially decreasing mean power. Each path is Rayleigh distributed,
i.e. independently Gaussian distributed with the same variance on the I and Q com-
ponents. The two sole channel parameters are then the delay gap between each
multipath and the delay spread (στ ), plus the SNR (Fig. 3-7). The instantaneous
channel response writes:
h(t, τ) =
Npath∑
n=1
βne
jφnδ(t− (n− 1)∆τ) (3.16)
∆τ and Npath are respectively the delay resolution and the number of paths that are
assumed statistically independent. φn is the random phase shift uniformly distributed
within [0, 2pi] while βn is the positive real-valued amplitude of the nth path, assumed
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Rayleigh distributed with a mean power [100, 101, 102]:
E{|βn|2} = exp{−(n− 1)∆τ
στ
} (3.17)
Notably, however simplified this model may seem, it is commonly used for repre-
senting channels in standards as advanced as IEEE 802.11ac [103, 104], complemented
by several clusters rather than one, and with extra parameters specifying the spatial
dependence of this channel (readily needed for multiple antenna systems).
Some examples of such PDP are displayed in Fig. 3-7 with both στ = 140 ns
and στ = 100 ns. The maximum excess delay is set to 1980 ns, corresponding to
Npath = 100 and ∆τ = 20 ns. Starting from the CIRs, we perform a discrete Fourier
transform in order to obtain 100 channel transfer functions within a BW of 50 MHz.
Then, Nf (≥ 1) channel transfer functions are stacked within a vector used in the
computation of the number of available key bits per single channel observation, i.e.
IK(Nf ). In other words, IK is computed in the frequency domain. Nonetheless, it
is also shown in [65, 63, 73, 71] that IK may be alternatively computed in the time
domain. In particular, the upper bound on the key rate may be expressed as follows2:
IK ≤ −
Nf∑
n=1
log2
[
1−
(
γt(n)
1 + γt(n)
)2]
(3.18)
where γt(n) is the SNR of the nth resolved path. The equality holds when the resolved
paths are independent.
In order to assess the security behavior with the channel DoF brought by the
frequency variability, we consider two different schemes with an increasing number of
sub-carriers, as illustrated in Fig. 3-8. The first consists in studying the impact on
the security of an increasing bandwidth with a fixed frequency separation (∆f = 0.5
MHz). More clearly, the BW increases proportionally to the number of investigated
sub-carriers Nf (i.e. BW = Nf∆f) that are added around a central frequency. The
second method investigates the increased number of sub-carriers within a fixed BW
(BW = 50 MHz) which is achieved by decreasing ∆f . Whatever the adopted method
is, we assume a fixed and equal SNR for both Alice and Bob, i.e. SNR = 15 dB for
which IK(1) = 4.05 bits per single channel observation. Moreover, we note that the
power spectral density (PSD) of both the sub-carrier and the noise is constant, which
means that increasing Nf yields a proportional increase in the transmitted/received
2The total number of resolved paths is equal to the number of investigated frequencies Nf .
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Figure 3-8: Frequency variability schemes with an increasing number of sub-carriers
Nf : (a) an increasing BW and a fixed ∆f , (b) a fixed BW and a decreasing ∆f .
power.
An increasing BW with a fixed frequency separation ∆f
Fig. 3-9 shows the evolution of the available key rate with respect to the number
of sub-carriers, directly proportional to the BW, and thus for several time delay
resolutions and for στ = 100 ns. It is shown that IK linearly increases with Nf
until a certain value beyond which the slope of the curve decreases showing a nearly
saturation behavior. This means that until this critical value, the set of selected
frequencies is not able to accurately resolve all the multipath components of the PDP
[105]. However, when using Nf frequencies corresponding to BW = 1/∆τ , the paths
are perfectly resolved indicating a full exploitation of the channel DoFs. In fact, when
Nf sub-carriers are used, the delays are quantized into Nf delay bins, each one with a
gain obtained by using a sinus cardinal filter [65]. As the inverse of the BW is larger
than ∆τ , several paths are overlapped to give correlated gains in several delay bins.
However, when 1/(Nf∆f) is proportional to ∆τ , the paths are perfectly resolved as
clearly illustrated in Fig. 3-10.
Once the CIRs are perfectly resolved, IK still increases with Nf (or BW), even
slowly. This is explained by the improvement on the SNR per resolved path owing
to the increase in the total transmitted power as the number of investigated sub-
carriers increases, according to Parseval theorem. Similar results are seen in [97].
However, we notice that if the energy is fixed in the frequency domain instead of the
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Figure 3-9: Evolution of IK with respect to Nf and to the time resolution ∆τ , for
στ = 100 ns.
PSD, the authors in [63] show that there is an optimal bandwidth that maximizes
the mutual information IK since increasing the BW yields a decrease in the power of
each sub-carrier.
Fig. 3-11 plots IK as a function of Nf , for several RMS delay spreads and for
∆τ = 20 ns, while Fig. 3-12 presents the variation of IK with στ for both Nf = 2 and
Nf = 100. Obviously, the available key rate increases as στ increases. Indeed, the
higher the RMS delay spread, the more randomness available in the radio channel
through the multipath components. This is explicitly shown in Fig. 3-7 where the
diffuse paths become with higher relative power for higher στ . As seen in Fig. 3-12,
the increase in στ yields that IK may approach the theoretical value corresponding
to i.i.d. observations even for small bandwidths, e.g. when Nf = 2, where the paths
are not perfectly resolved.
A fixed BW with a decreasing frequency separation ∆f
Consider now the case where Nf frequencies are uniformly distributed within a fixed
BW of 50 MHz (Fig. 3-8 (b)). The variation of IK with respect to Nf is depicted in
Fig. 3-13, where ∆τ = 20 ns and στ = 100 ns. For relatively small values of Nf , IK
increases dramatically with Nf in a manner such that it approaches the available key
bits given by i.i.d. sub-carriers, in contrast to results shown in Fig. 3-11. Indeed, the
fixed BW corresponds to the time resolution of the signal, leading to an observation of
the fine structure of MPCs while the decreasing value of ∆f determines the duration
of the resolved PDP. As a consequence, as Nf increases, more independent paths are
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Figure 3-10: Equivalent time domain when perfectly resolved paths, for ∆τ = 60 ns
and στ = 100 ns.
resolved in the time domain, revealing more information to be exploited in the key
generation process. In these conditions, it is clearly shown that IK can be computed
as in Eq. 3.18. When the number of sub-carriers becomes relatively dense, the SNR
per additional resolved path decreases as Nf increases, revealing little information
available to SKG, especially that the path power becomes near the noise power. This
results in a diminishing slope in the curve of IK . We note that a similar scheme is
targeted in [62] regarding the space variability, which results in almost similar results.
While this analysis only considers the security from Alice/Bob side, studying from
Eve’s side needs further investigations, which necessitates modeling the correlation
between Eve’s observations and those experienced by Alice/Bob. Therefore, this
more complicated scenario is addressed in the following chapters where more realistic
channel models, e.g. deterministic ones, are considered.
3.3.3 Joint space-frequency variability
Intuitively, the smaller the coherence bandwidth, the more efficient will the SKG
be able to exploit frequency variability. Unfortunately, the coherence bandwidth
changes from an environment to another and is out of control. SKG performance
should be achieved also in environments where the coherence bandwidth is small,
which is a difficulty when no sufficient spatial variability is provided. As a way of
mitigation, we propose to exploit jointly the space and frequency degrees of freedom,
so to relax the requirements on each of both individually. A potential use case is that
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Figure 3-11: Evolution of IK with respect to Nf and to RMS delay spread στ , for
∆τ = 20 ns.
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Figure 3-12: Variation of IK with the RMS delay spread for ∆τ = 20 ns.
of MIMO systems (such as IEEE 802.11n/ac), providing spatial variability, together
with OFDM technology providing frequency variability.
3.4 Conclusion
We present in this chapter the relevant metrics, including theoretical bounds and that
related to the quantization algorithm, which are used in the present dissertation to
assess the SKG performance. Furthermore, we have discussed the impact of using
various channel degrees of freedom, including spatial and frequency domain, on the
security behavior.
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Figure 3-13: IK as a function of Nf for BW = 50 MHz.
In particular, we address the potential SKG performance from delay dispersive
channels. This has been done through a simple model of CIR, with equidistributed
path delays, an exponentially decaying PDP and uncorrelated, Rayleigh faded path
amplitudes. Although simple, this model has allowed to identify major features in
terms of secret key rate (or available number of key bits) from a CIR, which can be
summarized as follows:
• For a fixed sub-carrier interval in the frequency domain, the secret key rate
increases roughly proportionally to the number of frequency sub-channels, al-
though more slowly than for i.i.d. sub-channels, until a first breakpoint for
which the number of available key bits equals the number of DoF computed
from the noise level for independent paths. Successive breakpoints occur at
each time the bandwidth “resonates” with the inverse of the inter-path delay.
This means that at very high BW, the increase in the secret key rate gets lower
and lower.
• When the bandwidth is fixed, increasing the number of sub-carriers nearly pro-
portionally increases the key rate, at a “speed” equal of that for i.i.d. sub-
channels. This comes from the fact that for few sub-carriers, their frequency
separation is large and they can be assume uncorrelated. A more slow pro-
gression occurs below a certain number of sub-carriers, because of the onset of
frequency correlation. This onset comes later, i.e. the available number of key
bits can be higher, if the delay spread is higher, because of a smaller coherence
bandwidth.
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We will further see, in the following chapters (5 and 6), to which extent these
observations would be seen in more sophisticated channel models as well as in nearly
realistic channel models.
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Chapter 4
Performance of secret key
generation in non-stationary
channels
In a PhySec perspective, the confidentiality of any wireless communication heavily re-
lies on the scenario of the Alice/Bob/Eve trio [68, 106]. On one side, the propagation
scenario of Alice/Bob (e.g. SNR, channel degrees of freedom, richness in dispersive
multipaths, etc.) determines the maximum amount of random information that would
be reliably shared between legitimate users. On the other side, the relative propaga-
tion scenario of Eve (e.g. SNR, distance, channel fading, etc.) affects the amount of
shared bits that would be useful for the generation of a “secret” key. Therefore, given
that the SKG is simply targeted from the Alice/Bob sides in the previous chapter
(Section 3.3.2), we intend in the present chapter to deeply investigate the relation
between the Eve propagation scenario and the secret key quality. In fact, the SKG
analysis with respect to Eve is more critical and requires a multi-user channel model
that accounts for the spatial correlation between two users in proximity of each other,
i.e. Bob and Eve.
In [58], a simple channel model is proposed where Bob and Eve are assumed very
close to each other, so they share the same multipath components (MPC). This sce-
nario may be valid in wireless sensor networks in which sensors may be located in
the same stationary region1. More general scenarios should account for larger sepa-
ration distances between Bob and Eve, which mean not only several wavelengths but
1By stationary, we imply an area/volume of space where the statistics of the radio channel are
constant
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ultimately up to distances such that all radio channel characteristics are completely
different (independent in mathematical terms). When this is achieved, the environ-
ments seen by Alice/Bob and Eve are necessarily different, which means that they are
not in the same stationary spatial domain. Such a scenario is targeted in our previous
work [72] through a very simple version of a “Geometry based Stochastic Channel
Model” (GSCM), relying on the presence of scatterers between Alice and Bob/Eve in
order to represent the propagation events at the origin of multipaths. However, the
proposed model did not account for the shadow fading and its spatial dependence,
involed in the spatial correlation.
Nevertheless, multi-user channel simulations are allowed through some GSCMs
(refer to Section 2.1.4 for propagation channel models state of the art). In particular,
the Winner II model [1] enables the simulation of correlated channels through the
filtering of large scale parameters such as shadow fading. However, the main draw-
backs reside in that the channel parameters are valid in a low temporal duration and
that radio links involving different propagation scenarios cannot be simulated. While
these issues are resolved to some extent in the QuaDRiGa model [107], physical layer
security protocols are investigated through both Winner II and QuaDRiGa models
in the PHYLAWS project [15], for either WIFI or LTE simulations.
Both Winner II and QuaDRiGa models are parameterized for some given scenar-
ios. However, we aim to understand how the security is impacted by simply changing
the channel features. Hence, in this chapter, we elaborate on the non-stationary
channel model previously presented in [72]. We hence present further developments
in order to better account for shadowing, which is a well-known feature of space vari-
ant channels beyond a few wavelengths. In order to account for channels varying
over macroscopic distances and impacted by shadow fading, such an effect must be
specifically involved in the model.
4.1 Shadowing
In narrow band systems, the total received power slowly fluctuates around the dis-
tance dependent path loss, following a log-normal distribution (i.e. in dB, a zero-
mean normal distribution with a shadow fading standard deviation σ). In fact, such
a phenomenon results from the obstruction of some paths due to the variation in the
surrounding environment (i.e. interacting objects) around either the mobile station
or the base station. As a consequence, in wide band systems, shadowing occurs per
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clusters that gather multipath components of similar delays and angular character-
istics [1, 52, 108, 109]. Measurements in outdoor urban environments showed that
each cluster undergoes independent log-normal shadow fading with different standard
deviation values [110].
While the correlation properties of the shadow fading process are targeted through
the literature for the design of macroscopic diversity and handover schemes [37], such
properties seem essential in the modeling of spatial variant channels in the context of
PhySec. Typically, two types of spatial correlations are defined: the auto-correlation
and the cross-correlation, both illustrated in Fig. 4-1. The former considers the cor-
relation between two links connecting the base station (BS) to two locations of the
mobile station (MS) at two different instances, while the latter corresponds to two
links connecting the same MS to different BS. Several shadow fading correlation mod-
els are proposed and addressed in the literature. A summary could be found in [111].
In particular, Gudmundson [37] proposed a distance-dependent exponential decay-
ing function to account for the spatial auto-correlation function, while the authors
in [54, 112] consider the angle difference between the links in the modeling of the
shadowing cross-correlation. Nonetheless, without loss of generality, we use in the
present work the term of shadow fading correlation without differentiating between
the auto-correlation and the cross-correlation [111].
Figure 4-1: Shadow fading auto-correlation (right) and shadow fading cross-
correlation (left) [1].
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4.2 Disc of scatterers based channel model details
In order to accurately study the security provided by the SKG technique against any
passive eavesdropper, we should address realistic cases of interest for the locations of
Alice, Bob and Eve. Alice and Bob can commonly be a cellular base station (above or
below roof tops of macro, micro or small cells), an indoor access point, or a terminal
(either a fixed or a mobile one). More critical is the relative position of Eve in
the Alice/Bob environment since this impacts the amount of correlated information
between the channels seen by the trio. While it is unlikely that Eve can be very close
to Alice/Bob when the latter is a BS, this is not fully impossible. Alternatively, Eve
can potentially be very close, moderately far or very far from Alice/Bob. This may
rely, respectively, on the wavelength, on the shadow fading distance or on the long
distance attenuation. In other words, the location of Eve with respect to e.g. Bob
may determine the distinct spatial characteristics between the channels seen by Bob
and Eve from Alice. These differences can be ascribed to differences in some or all the
multipath compenents (MPC) in terms of e.g. path amplitude and path direction,
even polarization.
Briefly speaking, the channel MPCs seen by Bob and Eve can change according
to the relative distance between them and also according to the environment. For
example, the propagation channel components are likely to be more sensitive to the
separation distance in a dense scattering urban environment than in a rural one.
Therefore, in order to study the effect of the lack of spatial stationarity between
Bob and Eve on the SKG, we consider a 2-D GSCM, where scatterers are uniformly
distributed within a disc [113, 114] centered at Bob (Fig. 4-2). Eve is located within
the disc at a distance d from Bob. The maximum separation distance is kept to a
value low enough to avoid edge effects due to the finite size of the disc. Furthermore,
the transmitter, Alice, is supposed far away from the disc so that we can consider
rays arriving from a single direction ~KA to the local scatterers. This situation occurs
mostly in urban macro-cells, when the BS is located over rooftops and the angular
scenario at the BS level is very directional. Each terminal is considered to be in non
line-of-sight condition with respect to Alice. Hence, all the rays received by Bob/Eve
originate from the scatterers, acting as secondary sources. We also assume that Bob
and Eve are both equipped with an omnidirectional antenna.
In GSCMs, interacting objects over which the impinging wave is either reflected,
diffracted or scattered are represented by discrete scatterers distributed in the sur-
rounding medium. The scattering coefficient assigned to each scatterer may be mod-
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Figure 4-2: Geometrical representation of the communication scenario.
eled according to the physical interaction type, as shown in [52, 108] where the au-
thors differentiate between the LOS path, the specular interactions (i.e. reflection
and diffraction) and the diffuse scattering. However, for the sake of simplicity, we do
not consider in the present work a specific physical mechanism but a more general
one, where the impinging wave is re-radiated in different directions. Accordingly,
each scatterer is assumed to act as a non-omnidirectional lossy re-transmitter, which
is statistically independent from the others. Hence, Bob and Eve may not see the
same power of rays. Moreover, in order to account for the shadow fading correla-
tion between Bob and Eve, we assume that each scattered path emitted from the
same scatterer is spatially correlated according to the following correlation coefficient
[54, 112], which is based on an angle rather than a distance:
ρi = 0.5 + 0.5 cos{∆φi} (4.1)
where ∆φi is the angle of departure difference at the ith scatterer, as shown in Fig. 4-
2. More clearly, if SBi and SEi are the shadowing gains of the rays emitted by the
ith scatterer towards respectively Bob and Eve,
E{SBiSEi} = ρi. (4.2)
This may be achieved when:
SBi = aBi (4.3)
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and
SEi = ρiaBi +
√
1− ρ2i aEi (4.4)
where the shadowing coefficients aBi and aEi are i.i.d. and follow a normal distribution
with zero-mean and a standard deviation σ in dB. The correlation ρi accounts for the
similarity/difference of the surrounding interacting objects around Bob and Eve. This
is not revealed in the distance decay exponential model [37] which is rather preferred
for especially closer receivers.
According to the scatterers distribution, physical path structures towards Bob/Eve,
including directions, are determined from a simple geometrical relationship; hence,
the multipath fading channel can be computed. Therefore, the narrow band single
input single output (SISO) channel seen by Bob/Eve is defined as follows:
hX =
NS∑
i=1
10SXi/20
dXi
exp[j(KdXi + ~KA.~ri)] (4.5)
where NS, dXi and ~ri are respectively the number of scatterers within the disc, the
distance from an ith scatterer to X (Bob/Eve) side and the ith scatterer coordinate.
Moreover, K = 2pi/λ and ~KA are respectively the wave number and the wave vector
of the plane wave emitted by Alice towards the disc. This equation also expresses that
the power of the incoming wave from Alice is diffused by scatterers and attenuated
by free space propagation according to the separation distance towards Bob/Eve
[52, 108, 115, 116]. We note that, while we implement in our model the shadow
fading correlation per diffused scattered paths, such correlation is applied merely for
both LOS path and specular interactions in [52, 115].
In order to account for the channel estimation errors and noise, the channels are
assumed corrupted by noise (see Eq. 2.10), as hˆX = hX + nX where nX is the noise
estimation which can be modeled as zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable
with variance σ2n. X denotes here A (Alice), B (Bob) and E (Eve). Moreover, the
noise at the different terminals is assumed independent.
Usually, the shadow fading is accounted for once the small-scale fading (SSF)
is removed by averaging [37]. However, in the context of PhySec, SSF is essential
in providing randomness from which robust keys may be extracted. Therefore, we
model both small scale fading and shadow fading (per path), where SKG metrics are
assessed from SSF statistic while maintaining fixed the shadow fading parameters.
Then a statistic on the SKG metrics may be derived owing to the shadow fading
statistic. More clearly, we define how the random variables change according to these
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two fading types, as follows:
• Shadow fading statistic: It is defined by different realizations of the environ-
ment, characterized by the macroscopic scatterers positions and the shadowing
coefficients (aBi and aEi). This statistic leads to get a set of keys, or equivalently
to get a set of each SKG metric, e.g. a set of IK or IV K values.
• SSF statistic: For a fixed shadow fading realization, where the macroscopic
environment around Bob and Eve is fixed, scatterers are allowed to randomly
move on a square grid of surface 5λ × 5λ centered at the fixed macroscopic
position, providing SSF channels through varying phases over 0 to 2pi. In other
words, SSF is provided by maintaining the same paths amplitudes and changing
the phases according to the small scale spatial movement of scatterers. This
SSF statistic is essential in order to generate a single key, or equivalently to get
a single value of each SKG metric.
4.3 SKG performance evaluation
Table 4.1 presents the simulation parameters values. We assume that all terminals
have the same SNR and that 250 scatterers are distributed uniformly within the
disc, unless differently stated. The maximum separation distance is 1000λ providing
equivalent statistics for both Bob and Eve. Each statistical quantity (correlation co-
efficient, information theoretic key bound and BER value) is computed from an SSF
statistic with 250 realizations. Then, statistical distributions for these quantities are
obtained from the combined macroscopic scatterers randomness and the shadow fad-
ing parameters randomness, with also 250 realizations. Thus, with 62,500 realizations
in total, the results are considered quite accurate.
Table 4.1: Simulation parameters.
Frequency 2 GHz
SNR 15 dB
Disc radius 5000 λ
Scatterers number NS 250
57
4.3.1 Channel correlations
As a qualitative assessment of SKG performance, we compute both the complex
channel correlation (ρBE) and the envelope power correlation as in Eq. 3.13, involv-
ing respectively the complex channel coefficients seen by both Bob and Eve, and their
powers. Fig. 4-3 shows the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of complex chan-
nel correlation coefficients for both shadow fading standard deviation σ = 3 dB and
σ = 10 dB, and for several separation distances d between Bob and Eve.
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Figure 4-3: CDF of complex channel correlations.
Obviously, as Bob/Eve’s separation distance d increases, the complex channel
correlation |ρBE| decreases. Indeed, this is ascribed to the fact that Bob and Eve do
not see the same interferences as d increases since they experience different multipath
structures, in particular the phase. Moreover, for NS = 250, the average distance
between scatterers is almost 600λ. For d > 600λ, the interferences seen by Bob and
Eve become independent and |ρBE| vanishes.
Furthermore, we notice that |ρBE| increases when σ increases. Usually, increasing
σ yields more rapidly channel decorrelations (e.g. σ is higher in NLOS channels than
in LOS one, since the former may undergo more severe shadow fading). However, this
is not the case here. This is due to the fact that the shadow fading is implemented
per path and with the same standard deviation. In fact, the tail of the log-normal
distribution, especially for σ = 10 dB (Fig. 4-4), indicates relatively rare instances
in which there is a dominant scattering coefficient (i.e. 10SXi) with a relatively high
power. Such a power may be either amplified if the scatterer is very close to the
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terminal or attenuated in the opposite case, and thus owing to the free space atten-
uation. As a consequence, the model is able to reproduce both Rayleigh and Rician
distributions. The proportion of these two distributions is impacted by the value of
σ. When σ increases, the proportion of Rician channels increases. We here consider
that channel amplitudes are Rician distributed if the Rician K factor is greater or
equal to 1. The results show that almost 18% of the channels are Rician for σ = 3 dB
whereas we have 30% for σ = 10 dB. Indeed, we find that the correlation increases
for Rician channels, where a dominant predictable path exists. This is also the reason
why we still have large correlation values for large separation distances.
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Figure 4-4: Log-normal shadowing per path for both σ = 3 dB and σ = 10 dB.
Fig. 4-5 depicts the CDFs of the power correlations for several Bob-Eve distances,
for both σ = 3 dB and σ = 10 dB. As expected, the power correlation decreases when
d increases. When Eve goes away from Bob, they see different multipath components,
leading to a decrease in both complex and power envelope correlations. Moreover,
due to the high proportion of Rician channels for σ = 10 dB, the variance of the power
correlation is the largest in this case, which can be explained by more correlations
resulting from less significant scatterers in the presence of a dominant path.
4.3.2 Vulnerable key rate
According to the chosen SNR, the maximum number of key bits IK is nearly equal to
4.05 per channel observation. Fig. 4-6 shows the statistics of the relative vulnerable
key rate IV K/IK as a function of several separation distances d between Bob and Eve,
for both σ = 3 dB and σ = 10 dB. We recall that these statistics are computed over the
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Figure 4-5: CDFs of the power envelope correlations.
250 shadow fading realizations. The average and the variance values of the IV K/IK
statistics are shown respectively in Fig. 4-7 and Fig. 4-8. While all these results only
consider the case of NS = 250 scatterers within the disc, Fig. 4-7 considers also the
case where NS = 100.
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Figure 4-6: CDF of relative vulnerable key bits.
The results presented in both Fig. 4-6 and Fig. 4-7 show that IV K/IK decreases as
either d increases or σ decreases. These results are consistent with those obtained for
the channel correlations, revealing the strong relation between IV K and the spatial
channel correlations between Bob and Eve. For the smallest value of d (i.e. d =
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0.1λ), Bob and Eve nearly see the same MPCs with high shadow fading correlation,
which results in relatively high vulnerability. When Eve moves away from Bob while
remaining very close (i.e. d ≤ λ/2), the channel phase shifts decorrelate rapidly,
yielding a high decrease in the vulnerability rate. Then, with larger values of d, it is
apparent that the decrease on IV K/IK is quite progressive owing to the long distance
spatial memory of the channel, even for relatively different structures of MPCs seen
by Both Bob and Eve. Finally, as d gets larger values, the angle difference at each
scatterer ∆φi increases, yielding a less shadow fading correlation and subsequently
IV K/IK vanishes.
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Figure 4-7: Averaged BER and vulnerable key bits as function of the separation
distance d between Bob and Eve.
Furthermore, if the density of scatterers NS decreases, the effective number of
scatterers (i.e. the number of scatterers with relatively significant power) seen by Bob
and Eve decreases, resulting in more vulnerability. Moreover, regarding the variance
of IV K/IK shown implicitly in Fig. 4-6 and explicitly in Fig. 4-8, the security behavior
changes according to each environment realization with more significant variation for
moderate d values and for large σ values. This heavily relies on the effective number
of scatterers that contribute to the most channel power and also to their relative
position with respect to Bob/Eve which affect the shadow fading correlation. Briefly
speaking, good security performance is provided for dense multipath propagation
channels corresponding to the lower tail of the CDFs, whereas it is degraded for
environments where a predictable dominant path exists corresponding to the higher
tail of the CDFs.
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Figure 4-8: The statistical variance of IV K/IK as a function of d.
4.3.3 CQA performance
Alice, Bob and Eve quantify their complex channel coefficients into stream bits by
extracting 1 bit from each I and Q parts (i.e. M = 4 quantization regions provide 2
bits), according to the channel quantization alternating (CQA) algorithm explained
in Section. 3.2. Fig. 4-9 shows the CDFs of the bit error rate (BER) of Bob/Eve
keys, for different values of σ and d, while Fig.4-7 shows the average values of the
BER in addition to the IV K/IK . Although we have almost the same average value
of the BER for different values of both d and σ, the behavior changes from one
environment to another, as shown implicitly by the variance of each CDF, see also in
Fig. 4-10. While σ does not impact the mean of the BER whatever d, it impacts the
variance of the BER as shown in Fig. 4-10. It is interesting that the BER variance and
the variance of IV K/IK have partly similar behaviors. Large values of σ favour few
dominant scatterers, which results in more variability from one realization to another
and consequently a higher variance on both related parameters.
When Eve goes away from Bob, the security is enhanced since the mean BER
converges towards 0.5, which is consistent with the behavior of the average IV K/IK .
Actually, the BER simply expresses the raw difference between the key bits directly
extracted from the channel coefficients seen by Bob and Eve. The algorithm doesn’t
attempt to develop more powerful strategies in order to exploit the common charac-
teristics between these channels. This is the reason why the remaining vulnerability
expressed in IV K beyond about one wavelength distance between Bob and Eve, is not
reflected in the mean BER. However, we still see it in the BER variance.
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Figure 4-9: CDF of BER between Bob and Eve.
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Figure 4-10: The statistical variance of BER as a function of d.
4.4 Conclusion
The GSCM model described above provides a realistic approach to channel richness
(tunable through the number of scatterers) and shadowing, in addition to simple
free space attenuation. This has been described by an extra log-normal attenuation
and an angular dependent decorrelation between the shadow fading coefficients. The
observation that, in spite of these features, the complex correlation coefficient between
Bob and Eve’s channels decreases relatively slowly with their distance (Fig. 4-3)
demonstrates the role of long distance common characteristics. This expresses a
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“spatial memory” of the channels, which is responsible for a tail in the number of
vulnerable key bits (Fig. 4-7), as computed for Gaussian statistics generated from SSF
channels for both Bob and Eve. This memory is not seen for the direct comparison
between Bob and Eve’s generated keys, making use of CQA. This means that such
an algorithm, operating directly in the I-Q complex plane, is based on major changes
of the channel as regards key confidentiality, but it cannot guarantee that a very
clever Eve would not capture some of this long distance memory to acquire partial
information on Bob’s key.
Another unexpected feature is the enhanced correlation between channel coeffi-
cients for high shadowing coefficients, which may sound strange at first sight. This is
basically an outcome of the model, which can be explained by the fact that under high
shadowing, farther distant scatterers are less visible (the dominant ones, producing
shadowing, mask them), which effectively reduces the channel richness. Although sur-
prising, the observation is not meaningless. For instance, for an indoor scenario with
thick absorbing walls, the channels are less rich and more spatially correlated than
with partly transparent ones, where outside scatterers will contribute to multipaths.
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Chapter 5
Security behavior through ray
tracing channel models
The model developed and discussed in Chapter 4 is mainly intended to investigate
the role of important physical phenomena, such as small scale fading and shadow
fading, on the security performance provided by SKG. However, its role is not to
be “realistic” with respect to the variety of possible environments concerned by the
practical use of SKG techniques. In particular, as opposed to what is commonly
done in radio channel modeling (see, e.g. Section 2.1.4), the parameters have not
been, and are not intended to be, determined from channel measurement campaigns.
A complementary approach, in this respect, is addressed in the PHYLAWS project
[15], where the Winner II and its extension QuaDRiGa are considered for PhySec
simulation purposes in LTE networks.
This being said, it is of interest to investigate SKG performance in a variety of
environments and see what relation can be drawn between the characteristics of the
channels and SKG security performance. Examples of site specific channel models are
well known to be ray-tracing (RT) or ray-launching (RL) techniques, which compute
the wave paths between the transmitter and the receiver deterministically, based on
ray approximation (plane waves) and basic theory of the fundamental propagation
events (reflexion, diffraction, transmission and the like). The main advantage of RT is
that it takes into account the true scatterers, such as buildings, into the computation
of rays between Tx and Rx. Its main drawback is the heaviness of computations, and
above all the great difficulty in reproducing in the numerical model of the propagation
environment the true and fine features of reality.
In this chapter, we present results on RT-RL simulations, which had been obtained
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from a previous national (French) project and are re-used in the present SKG context.
This may provide valuable added value and insight with respect to the model of
Chapter 4, as well as of measurements results from the literature.
5.1 Environments and characteristics of the simu-
lations
The radio wave propagation simulation software used here employs the Volcano tool
commercialized by Siradel [117], which is a 2.5D ray-based method. Ray launching in
the horizontal plane is used for determination of the multipaths angles of departure
and arrival, while a modified Deygout method combined with a uniform theory of
diffraction are used for each of these paths in the elevation plane [118]. An extension
to this commercial tool has been privately provided by the comapny, in order to
incorporate to some extent diffuse propagation. Indeed, it is well known that diffuse
scattering (DS) plays an important role in the radio channel, up to a proportion that
depends on the geometry, density and features of the scatterers. It is commonplace to
consider that the energy carried through diffuse scattering can take between 20 % and
80 % of the whole energy in a channel impulse response (CIR). The DS is included
using a model based on the Effective Roughness approach [119, 120]. Each wall surface
is divided in a multitude of facets (tiles). Each of those radiates a scattering wave
whose amplitude depends on a scattering coefficient S and on a directive scattering
pattern, centered around the direction of specular reflection. An example of ray traces
in the absence and in presence of DS can be seen in Fig. 5-1 for an indoor case.
The parameters involved in the reflexion/diffraction have been chosen according
to proposed ones by the Volcano tool, based on a large set of previous measurement
campaigns and parameters calibration achieved by SIRADEL. Indoor locations of
mobile terminals (MT) are not taken into account, while the attenuation by vegetation
is considered within the simulations. The simulation frequency used in the present
analysis is 5.5 GHz.
The considered environments are locations in Paris and around, particularly:
• “Carrousel du Louvre (Paris)” (Fig. 5-2(a)) with two heights1 for the base sta-
tion antenna (Louvre4: 4 m and Louvre48: 48 m). The investigated zone had
a size of 1200m x 360m and contained 4011 terminals positions (10m as spatial
1The heights are computed from the ground level.
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Figure 5-1: Example of an (indoor) deterministic simulation without (up) and with
(down) diffuse scattering.
resolution).
• “Avenue de Paris (Versailles)” (Fig. 5-2(b)). The BST had a single antenna
height (19 m), the investigated zone was of size of 850m x 60m and contained
2193 terminals positions (5m as spatial resolution).
Moreover, for the sake of comparison, we dedicate a scenario without diffuse scatter-
ing (WDS) implementation, which is the scenario Louvre48-WDS. It has the same
description as Louvre48 except for the spatial resolution, which is 5m, and thereby
of the number of terminals positions (15756).
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(a) Louvre
(b) Versailles
Figure 5-2: The digital 2D maps highlighting the simulated area.
5.2 Propagation channel characteristics
5.2.1 Channel model
A ray tracing tool generally computes almost all electromagnetic waves propagating
from the base station to a single or several receivers at different locations, taking
into account the relevant propagation mechanisms such as reflection on walls and
diffraction by building wedges and corners. Each received ray at position r is then
characterized by its gain βi, its time delay τi, its azimuth
2 angle of arrival (AoA) φi
and its azimuth angle of departure (AoD) θi. The base station (BST) is at location
rt. The combination of all computed Npath paths allows to calculate the parameter
2We do not consider elevation angles since the Volcano tool is a 2.5D tool.
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of interest, i.e. the channel impulse response (CIR), as follows:
h(r, τ) =
Npath∑
i=1
βi exp{j(kRi.r− kT i.rT )}δ(τ − τi) (5.1)
where the wave vector at the receiver is defined as kRi =
2pi
λ
[cosφi sinφi] while it is
defined at the transmitter side as kTi =
2pi
λ
[cos θi sin θi]. λ is the wavelength.
The channel transfer function is then obtained by performing a Fourier transform
on the CIR, as follows:
H(r, f) =
Npath∑
i=1
h(r, τi) exp{−2pifτi} (5.2)
We notice that the measured channels are space-varying and thereby the number of
paths Npath changes from one location to another as well as the parameters of each
multipath component (MPC).
Given that commercial receivers have limited performance, we just consider ter-
minals’ positions where the path loss verifies PL < 125 dB. Naturally, it is useful
to restrict the analysis to the locations where the predicted received power does not
fall below the receiver noise level. Moreover, we consider a receiver with a limited
bandwidth of 200 MHz, which results in a time delay resolution of 5 ns. Accordingly,
the paths falling into the same delay bin ∆τ are vectorially added in the i-Q domain.
Furthermore, the frequency separation is set to ∆f = 312.5 KHz, corresponding to
the interval between subcarriers in the IEEE 802.11.ac standard, which results in
a maximum excess delay of 3200 ns, beyond which all computed paths are simply
discarded.
5.2.2 Small scale fading statistics
As discussed throughout this dissertation, random channel fluctuations provided by
SSF are essential for robust SKG. Since MPCs are predicted on positions separated
by at least 5 m, which does not support SSF statistics, we need to reconstruct SSF
channels. For that reason, we adopt the plane wave assumption and consequently,
simply compute CIRs by deterministically shifting the phase of each path according
to the distance. In this context, channel responses are estimated over a local area
modeled by a 5λx5λ square grid, with a step of λ/5, centered at each terminal position.
Subsequently, the Rician K factor is computed by fitting the amplitude statistics into
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a Rician distribution, which includes pure Rayleigh fading for the extreme case where
K = 0. Since an ideal Rayleigh distribution can never be achieved in practice,
channels with K ≤ 1 are here assumed to follow Rayleigh fading.
Table 5.1 presents the number of retained channels as well as the ratio of Rayleigh
channels with respect to the former number. We notice that the ratio of Rayleigh
channels is very small, whatever the considered scenario. This is due in part to the
nature of the propagation environment, e.g. an open space for the Louvre environ-
ment. This may also in part be due to limitations on RT simulations, such as 1) the
limited number of physical interactions, 2) the simplified model of diffuse scattering
and 3) the simple description of the required maps (e.g. EM maps and geometrical
maps).
Table 5.1: Statistics of the computed channels.
Scenario retained channels Rayleigh (%) Rayleigh passing K-S test (%)
Louvre48 2605 11.44 8.68
Louvre4 1922 12.75 5.2
Versailles19 1469 6.19 4.56
Fig. 5-3 displays, for each scenario, a 2D map localizing the BST as well as the
total receiver positions, including LOS and NLOS conditions. Moreover, we marked
receiver positions where K ≤ 1. Regarding the Louvre environment, we find that, for
higher antenna height (i.e. 48 m), receivers with K ≤ 1 are located behind or on the
corner of buildings, as seen in Fig. 5-3(a). However, for a smaller antenna height (i.e.
4 m) as shown in Fig. 5-3(b), the aforementioned positions are difficult to reach with
several interfering paths, while channels with K ≤ 1 are distributed in the open area
as the receiver goes farther from the BST, yielding more attenuation in the dominant
path. Regarding the scenario Versailles19, the positions with K ≤ 1 are concentrated
behind buildings.
5.2.3 Delay and angular spreads
Both RMS delay spread (RMS-DS) στ and angular spread σφ, given respectively in
Eq. 2.5 and Eq. 2.8, are computed by just considering paths within 20 dB from the
highest peak of the power delay profile (PDP) and the angular power spectrum (APS).
We note that these spreads are evaluated at the MT side. Fig. 5-4 plots the statistics
of the RMS delay spread for the 4 scenarios, differing between Rayleigh and Rician
channels. Intuitively, Rayleigh channels provide RMS delay spreads higher than those
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Figure 5-3: The measured receiver locations in 2D maps.
observed in Rician fading, owing to the presence of a dominant path in the latter case.
In particular, at 80% of the CDF, the maximum of the RMS-DS (90 ns) of Rician
channels is less than the minimum (104 ns) of that of Rayleigh channels.
We focus our analysis on Rayleigh channels, which are of particular interest in
generating randomness used to establish secret key bits. Accordingly, we consider
now the RMS-DS of channels having K ≤ 1, presented in Fig. 5-4(a). Given that
time dispersion relies on geometric relationships between transmitter, receiver and
the surrounding physical area, we remark that a higher antenna provides more time
dispersive paths, when considering the Louvre scenarios. Indeed, as already discussed,
the locations of Rayleigh channels differ between Louvre48 and Louvre4, where for
the former more diffused paths result from the interaction with buildings. Further-
more, channels without diffuse scattering implementation obviously show smaller de-
71
0 200 400 600 8000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
RMS delay spread (ns)
CD
F
 
 
Louvre48
Louvre4
Versailles19
Louvre48−WDS
(a) Rayleigh channels (K ≤ 1).
0 200 400 600 8000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
RMS delay spread (ns)
CD
F
 
 
Louvre48
Louvre4
Versailles19
Louvre48−WDS
(b) Rician channels (K > 1).
Figure 5-4: RMS delay spread statistics.
lay spread values. Furthermore, the scenario Versailles19 reaches the smallest RMS-
DS since the avenue is narrow relative to the large open area of the Louvre. The path
lengths are smaller for the former scenario [121]. Nonetheless, small values of στ may
due to limitations in the RT simulations.
Some examples of PDPs corresponding to particular values of στ are shown in
Fig. 5-5. Considering the plots from right to left, the RMS delay spreads are re-
spectively 15 ns, 360 ns and 728 ns. Particularly, we point out that, although the
left PDP offers the highest delay spread, the channel presented by the middle PDP
is the richer in MPCs within even the 10 dB threshold. Furthermore, we note that
the discontinuous character of the PDPs stems from the discrete channel simulations
but also from the limitations of the RT tool, which is not able to reproduce the full
multipath density of a real channel.
Fig. 5-6 shows the statistics of the angular spread computed in the different sce-
narios for either Rayleigh or Rician channels. The same analysis as that done for the
RMS delay spread can be made here. We recall that angular spread is statistically
larger for Rayleigh than for Rician channels. Among the Rayleigh fading channels,
Louvre48 offers higher angular spreads than Louvre4 owing to the relevant antenna
height in the former scenario. We notice also the relevance of implementing diffuse
scattering in enriching the radio propagation in more dispersive paths. Furthermore,
some examples of APS are plotted in Fig. 5-7, focusing on particular values of the
angular spread, corresponding to channels with K ≤ 1.
In the following, we just retain Rayleigh channels that pass the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) test in order to adequately calculate the theoretical key bounds. The
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Figure 5-5: Some examples of PDPs corresponding to Louvre48 (right: στ = 15 ns,
middle: στ = 360 ns, left: στ = 728 ns).
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(a) Rayleigh channels (K ≤ 1).
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(b) Rician channels (K > 1).
Figure 5-6: Angular spread statistics.
K-S test relies upon the computation of a statistical parameter, which is the maximum
distance between the CDF of the empirical channel F (h) and that of a reference
distribution, here being the Rician distribution F (hRice). Explicitly, the K-S statistic
is expressed as DKS = max(|F (h)− F (hRice)|). The goodness of fit is revealed once
DKS is compared to a threshold according to a given significance level (α = 5% being
a commonly used value). Although we use the Rician statistic in the test, we just keep
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Figure 5-7: Some examples of APS corresponding to Louvre48 (right: σφ = 5.3 degree,
middle: σφ = 71.3 degree, left: σφ = 115 degree).
channels having K ≤ 1. We point out that the number of channel passing the K-S
test, presented in Table 5.1, is not so high and thereby reveals the limited number of
significant scattered paths seen by most measured points, as already discussed above
in Section 5.2.2.
5.3 SKG from frequency variability
In order to assess the benefit brought by the frequency variability of an OFDM channel
to wireless security, we consider in particular the effect of the increasing bandwidth
with an increasing number of sub-carriers Nf and a fixed separation frequency ∆f ,
as considered in Section 3.3.2 and illustrated in Fig. 3-8 (a). We recall that the
BW is directly proportional to the number of investigated sub-carriers, i.e. BW =
Nf∆f . We consider an OFDM channel with BW = 20 MHz, typical of the 802.11
standard, and a frequency separation of ∆f = 312.5 KHz, which results in 64 total
sub-carriers. We also recall that the frequencies are always equally spaced within the
BW. We note that the security is addressed from both legitimate terminals side and
the eavesdropper side.
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5.3.1 Available key bits
5.3.1.1 BW impact by investigating more sub-carriers
Fig. 5-8 plots IK as a function of Nf for each position showing a Rayleigh amplitude
that passes the K-S test. In accordance with results presented in Section 3.3.2, it is
shown that IK increases with the BW (or Nf ) in a sub-linear manner, which reveals
that the main channel DoFs (i.e. the rays carrying the major energy) are resolved
with a BW less than the total BW of 20 MHz. The curves here show non linear
behavior with respect to results reported in Fig. 3-9, since the deterministic channels
are more complex, so that the ray powers are not distributed over all the delay bins
according to the simple exponential power decay profile. Moreover, some PDPs may
show clustering effect.
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Figure 5-8: Evolution of IK with respect to the number of frequencies Nf .
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We stress that the variance of IK within each environment and for each value of
Nf is relatively large, especially for high values of Nf . This means that the length
of the common generated key is strongly related to the channel characteristics of
each measured location. Among the relevant parameters to characterize a channel
CIR is the delay spread. Hence, we plot in Fig. 5-9 the variation of IK with στ ,
for both two and 64 sub-carriers. Obviously, IK increases as the RMS delay spread
increases, revealing that more random information can be shared between Alice and
Bob, especially when the used BW is large. These results are consistent with those
presented in Fig. 3-12, except for the decreasing behavior in IK beyond στ = 400 ns
and for Nf = 64. Such a behavior results from the clustering aspect seen in the PDP,
where e.g. two far clusters yield an increase in the apparent coherence bandwidth
while the channel DoFs or the number of independent paths is small. For a clear
illustrative scheme, we can relate the PDPs plotted in Fig. 5-5, according to their
labels, to their corresponding (στ ,IK). In particular, if we compare the PDPs labeled
(2) and (3), although (2) is characterized by a smaller delay spread, it is richer in
MPCs, yielding more randomness to be exploited in SKG.
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Figure 5-9: IK as a function of the RMS delay spread (στ ) for the scenario Louvre48.
5.3.1.2 Impact of the radio environment
Also from Fig. 5-8, we can study the impact of the physical environment on the
security. First, we notice from Table 5.1 that the percentage of Rayleigh channels
(either passing or not the K-S test) is very low for these outdoor environments. This
results in a smaller chance to be secure in such environments. Indeed, as seen in
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Section 3.1.1, Rician channels are less favorable to SKG than Rayleigh ones, since 1)
some efficient methods are required to predict and remove the nonfading part of the
radio channel and 2) the remaining power of the random channel part may be very
small. Then, if we compare the behavior of IK for the different scenarios and especially
for Nf = 64, we notice that the highest values of IK are reached in Louvre48, where
the channels seem to be the richest in DoFs, or equivalently, significant MPCs. This
is consistent with the discussion made above in regards of the στ statistics, presented
in Fig. 5-4.
5.3.1.3 Impact of the diffuse scattering
In order to highlight the crucial role played by the diffuse scattered paths on the
robustness of generated keys, we compute IK for scenarios where the channels are
predicted with and without implementation of diffuse scattering. An explicit com-
parison is shown in Fig. 5-9 where IK is evaluated with respect to στ for both scenarios
Louvre48 (with implementation of diffuse scattering) and Louvre48-WDS (without
implementation of diffuse scattering), while Fig. 5-10 plots IK versus Nf for channels
excluding from diffuse scattering contributions. First of all, we stress that the ratio of
Rayleigh channels significantly decreases when any contribution from scattered paths
is considered, yielding less opportunities to achieve secure communications. Secondly,
we obviously see that smaller values of IK are reached in the scenario Louvre48-WDS.
However, we still have some values of IK that are comparable with scenarios where
diffuse scattering is implemented, and this relies on specific surrounding environment
where an important number of specular reflections and edge diffraction exist. Briefly
speaking, these results show the relevance of diffuse scattered paths to sustain wireless
security in a PhySec context.
5.3.1.4 BW impact by investigating a fixed number of sub-carriers
Fig. 5-11 compares the statistics of IK when 64 sub-carriers are uniformly distributed
within a BW of either 20, 40, 80 or even 160 MHz. For a fixed number of sub-
carriers, the number of resolved delay paths is the same, whatever the BW. As the
BW increases, the effect of overlapped paths reduces, yielding more information to be
exploited in the shared key between Alice and Bob. Hence, the key length increases
with the BW, provided sufficient channel DoFs are available. More clearly, while the
lower tails of the distributions correspond to lower delay spreads and consequently to
poor channels, the higher tails correspond to larger delay spreads and consequently
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Figure 5-10: IK as a function of Nf for the scenario Louvre48-WDS.
to richer channels in MPCs, as deduced from Fig. 5-9. As a consequence, IK takes
benefit from the increase in BW for higher tails rather than in lower tails. Moreover,
for the same reasons, it seems that IK at BW = 80 MHz and BW = 160 MHz are
relatively close to each other revealing that most paths are almost perfectly resolved
at a BW less than 160 MHz.
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Figure 5-11: The impact of BW on IK for Nf = 64 and for the scenario Louvre48.
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5.3.2 Evaluation of the degree of secrecy
After discussing the behavior of IK with respect to the channel features, it is relevant
to assess the amount of information revealed to Eve according to her situation. To
this end, we consider a set of Bob-Eve separation distances d, ranging from 0 up to
259λ. Since the RT computes the channel characteristics over a grid of 5 m3 as a step,
the channels at d = 183λ and d = 259λ are computed based on RT output while,
however, it is not the case for d ≤ 10λ. For d ≤ 10λ, Bob and Eve are supposed
to be located in the same local area, so they share the same MPCs. Hence, the
channels at these distances may be computed by adopting the assumption of plane
waves. Furthermore, we assume that Bob and Eve are moving, in the same manner,
in the 5λx5λ centered square grid in order to build a statistical distribution over
which the vulnerable key rates are computed. Moreover, only the channel measured
by Eve when Alice is the transmitter is supposed to contain correlated information
with the propagation channel between Alice and Bob. We note that the vulnerability
is discussed by investigating merely the scenario Louvre48.
Fig. 5-12 depicts the distributions of relative vulnerable key bits IV K/IK as a
function of Bob-Eve separation distance d and also with different values of Nf . It is
straightforward that IV K/IK decreases as the distance increases owing to the mul-
tipath interference in small-scale distances and to the change in the structure of
multipath components at larger distances, as already discussed for the disc of scat-
terers model in Chapter 4. Fig. 5-13 shows that the angular spread is critical for the
vulnerability when a single frequency is investigated, especially for d = 0.1λ where
the variance of the relative vulnerable key bits is large. Hence, more secure key bits
may be obtained in scenarios where a large angular spread is provided. On the other
hand, by increasing the bandwidth, or equivalently Nf , IV K/IK increases. Hence, an
increase in the channel DoFs brings an advantage for the legitimate terminals in terms
of IK , it also brings an advantage for Eve who is potentially able to capture higher
portion of key bits. Similar results are shown in [58, 72], when exploiting the richness
available in MIMO channels. We stress that for WB channels (i.e. large values of
Nf ), the vulnerability does not rely merely on the angular spread since other factors
such as the delay spread are also critical in this case.
3A distance of 5 m corresponds to 183λ.
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Figure 5-12: CDF of IV K/IK depending on Nf and on Bob/Eve distance (Louvre48).
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Figure 5-13: IV K/IK as a function of the angular spread, for Nf = 1 and d = 0.1λ.
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5.4 SKG from space variability
We aim in this section to briefly assess the robustness of the extracted key, when
exploiting the space variability of the channel. For that reason, we consider a 8x8
square array antennas with λ/2 inter-element spacing for Bob, while keeping Alice
with a single antenna. In this case, the channel vector is constituted by these 64
space-varying parallel channels. The frequency domain, with BW = 500 MHz and
Nf = 2500, is used to form the statistics over which IK is computed. Again, we just
consider the scenario Louvre48.
5.4.1 Available key bits
Fig. 5-14 shows IK as a function of the angular spread σφ. Obviously, IK increases
with σφ until a certain value beyond which IK decreases. Indeed, the same behavior
is shown in Fig. 5-9 where the frequency variability is considered. This decrease in
IK can be ascribed to the clustering effect presented in the angular power spectrum,
in relation to the APS plots in Fig. 5-7.
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Figure 5-14: Space variability: IK as a function of the angular spread.
The comparison between the key extraction from 64 parallel sub-channels pro-
vided in either the space or the frequency domain is displayed in Fig. 5-15. It turns
out that the lower tails of the CDF correspond to small values of either the angular
spread or the RMS delay spread, when dealing with space domain or frequency do-
main SKG, respectively, while the higher tails correspond to larger spreads. In poor
channel conditions, corresponding either to small values of στ or of σφ, the space
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variability appears to contain more random information. Nevertheless, in general, IK
takes almost the same values in the two domains, which indicates that these sources
of variability statistically offer the same amount of random information in the inves-
tigated environment.
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Figure 5-15: Space vs. frequency variability.
5.5 Conclusion
RT simulations constitute an interesting tool in order to assess SKG performance,
especially if we want to be “site-specific”. The difficulty, which is uncommon for most
users of RT tools, is that high performance SKG comes with the full exploitation
of the DoF, which must be properly rendered in the simulation framework. Since
much of the wireless power is carried by diffuse scattered waves, this puts strong
requirements on RT tools in including diffuse scattering. The problem is two-fold:
(i) diffuse scattering must be correctly included from the point of view of the laws of
physics ; (ii) the extra amount of computations can be expected to be large, based
on the dense character of the multipaths structure.
Given these cautionary comments, the work carried out in the present chapter has
concentrated on a few scenarios for which a data base of RT simulations including
DS was available. A systematic evaluation of the secret key rate vs. the number
of frequency sub-carriers was conducted with parameters suited to the IEEE 802.11
standard (WIFI), qualitatively confirming the results of Section 3.3.2 in terms of a
sub-linear dependence of the number of available key bits vs. Nf , well below the i.i.d.
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case. IK tends to increase with the RMS-DS, up to a saturation. IK also tends to
increase with the BW, although in a sub-linear dependence.
The “spatial memory” of the channel, surmised from the results of Chapter 4, has
been observed on RT results, most likely because the considered scenarios cover rather
wide areas with slowly varying multipaths, resulting in a significant vulnerability
(from Eve’s point of view) of Alice-Bob keys. This implies the necessity to devise
privacy amplification schemes that remove the common information between Eve
and Alice-Bob for moderate distances.
Finally, for the parameters and considered scenarios, the spatial and frequency
based SKG performance appear to be equivalent, as observed from the similarity
between the statistical distributions of the secret key rate. This issue will be further
investigated in the measurement results of Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Security performance in measured
channels
In this chapter, we intend to test the performance of SKG schemes, especially when
exploiting the channel degrees of freedom (DoF), in indoor empirical channels, at
both 2.4625 GHz and 5.4 GHz bands (i.e. the typical WIFI bands). We first start
by describing the measurement campaign in Section 6.1. Then, in Section 6.2 and
Section 6.3, we test the security performance relatively to the CQA algorithm as well
as to the electromagnetic propagation features, in terms of key agreement between
the Alice/Bob/Eve trio and in terms of key randomness. Subsequently, we exploit
these measurements in Section 6.4, towards achievable key rates according to mutual
information computations. Finally, the results are compared and discussed in the
conclusion.
6.1 Measuring systems and scenarios
Measurements have been performed in the premises of Telecom ParisTech (TPT),
which is a century old engineering education building with a highly heterogeneous
internal structuring due to many refurbishing events over the years. A 4-port vector
network analyzer (VNA: Agilent ENA E5071C) has been used to record channel
coefficients over 4 GHz of bandwidth (2-6 GHz) with 2.5 MHz as frequency step.
This step, which translates into a maximum channel response delay of 400 ns, is
enough to avoid aliasing, given the instrument noise floor and the typical delay spread
of multipaths in the concerned environments. Table 6.1 presents the VNA setup
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parameters. One port of the VNA has been devoted to Alice, as transmitter, whereas
the three remaining ports have been devoted to Bob/Eve, as receivers. Each port
was equipped with an identical UWB bicone antenna with 2 dBi gain, specifically
designed for the frequency stability of the radiation pattern [122]. The VNA has
been calibrated with a “full 4 ports” method including the (highly phase stable)
cables, resulting as output at each frequency in the full 4x4 matrix of the complex
channel coefficients including all antennas.
Furthermore, the measurements were carried out in a time period where few people
were present (mainly during week-ends, evenings etc.). Given the conditions of the
measurements (in particular the time duration of a frequency sweep), there is no
doubt that the time stability was largely sufficient for the needs of the experiments.
Table 6.1: VNA setup parameters.
Parameter value
Start frequency 2 GHz
Stop frequency 6 GHz
Frequency points 1601
IF Bandwidth 5 KHz
Transmitted power 10 dBm
Dynamic range 96 dB
Typical noise floor -86 dBm
The measurements have been carried out in classrooms and in an auditorium,
in order to have indoor scenarios of sufficiently different characteristics, including
identical or different heights for the terminals; LOS or NLOS propagation condition
and also different room sizes. Fig. 6-1 shows the floor plans of both classrooms and
auditorium where the environment is mainly constituted of concrete, plywood and
partition walls. In the classroom scenario, the terminals have been placed at the
same height (1.3 m from the ground) whereas in the auditorium they have been
placed at different heights as seen in Fig. 6-2 and Fig. 6-3. The location of Alice
was fixed for each of the two environments whereas the remaining three antennas
have been moved across the area in a set of irregular locations, mostly within the
room but also in the adjacent corridor or in an adjacent room. More clearly, the
antennas representing Bob had 51 different positions in the classrooms scenario and
42 positions in the auditorium scenario, where only 25 total positions were in NLOS
condition with respect to Alice. The NLOS scenario encompasses either room-to-room
or room-to-corridor propagation conditions, as shown in Fig. 6-1.
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Figure 6-1: TPT measurement floor plans: (left) classrooms and (right) auditorium.
Figure 6-2: A sketch of measurement run in TPT classrooms scenario.
In each measurement run, the three receivers representing Bob are steady while
the transmitter representing Alice is spatially scanned over a square grid of 11x11
points (30 cm side and 3 cm step) confined to a small area, so as to capture fast
fading. More clearly, since the grid step is about half a wavelength at 5 GHz, we
can expect to achieve close to statistically independent channel coefficients owing
to spatial fading. The total 4 GHz bandwidth (BW ) enables us to investigate in
this paper the security performance of wide band (WB) channels centered at either
2.4625 GHz or 5.4 GHz (typical of the WIFI band) with e.g. a bandwidth either of
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Figure 6-3: A sketch of measurement run in TPT auditorium scenario.
20, 40, 80 or even 160 MHz, according to the series of WIFI (IEEE 802.11) standards
(Appendix B).
6.2 Evaluation of errors between Alice, Bob and
Eve keys
This section is dedicated to assess the quality of the key from the view point of the
key similarities or differences between the Alice/Bob/Eve trio, for both NB and WB
channels centered at 5.4 GHz band. The keys are derived from the noisy complex
channel coefficients, through the CQA algorithm. Eve also employs the same algo-
rithm and exploits all the public information exchanged between Alice and Bob, i.e.
the quantization map QM.
The VNA measurements were carried out in excellent dynamic range conditions,
owing to the VNA measurement principle. For that reason, the correlation coefficient
between the Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice channels is almost always equal to 1, indi-
cating a high degree of reciprocity (very high signal to noise ratio (SNR)). Therefore,
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we added independent artificial noise in the form of a zero-mean circular complex
Gaussian random variable to study the effect of noise on security performance. The
BER is computed over keys extracted from both the spatial domain (i.e. the 121 spa-
tial positions of Alice over the grid) and the frequency domain (i.e. Nf sub-carriers).
The BER is then averaged over 500 channel realizations where only the noise is the
random variable. All the terminals are supposed with an equal SNR.
6.2.1 Dependence on the mapping
Fig. 6-4(a) and Fig. 6-4(b) show the variation of the BER between the keys generated
by Alice (A) and Bob (B) with respect to the SNR, the number of QRs M and for
LOS and NLOS propagation conditions. Instead of averaging the BER over all Bob
positions representing either LOS or NLOS conditions with respect to Alice, we just
choose certain positions in order to reduce the simulation time. In the LOS case, two
scenarios for Bob are considered. The first one, named close LOS, corresponds to a
separation distance of 1.5 m with respect to Alice, while the second, named far LOS,
corresponds to a separation distance of 6.5 m. In the NLOS scenario, Bob and Alice
are located in two adjacent rooms belonging to the classroom environment. Fig. 6-
4(a) and Fig. 6-4(b) consider, respectively, NB channels (Nf = 1) and WB channels
(Nf = 9 sub-carriers separated with ∆f = 10 MHz). It is clear that the BER
is improved by increasing the SNR and by decreasing the number of QRs, leading
to less sensitivity on noise. Moreover, the BER is almost similar for NB and WB
channels since, in the latter, the sub-carriers have almost the same average SNR.
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Figure 6-4: Alice-Bob BER vs. SNR and M .
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Figure 6-5: Secret key rate η for both NB and WB (Nf = 3) channels.
Fig. 6-5 shows the values of the efficiency η (i.e. effective key rate) for both NB and
WB channels where in the latter Nf = 3. These values are always improved with the
SNR, while an increase in M intuitively yields an increase in the efficiency. Further-
more, a WB channel is preferred since it provides the largest value of η. However, this
is relevant merely in the case of decorrelated sub-carriers, from which result decor-
related bits, which is a feature not expressed by η. Therefore, in practice, Alice and
Bob should be aware of the channel coherence bandwidth in order to appropriately
choose the sub-carriers used as the shared source of randomness.
6.2.2 Alice-Bob disagreement vs. a simple channel model
In Fig. 6-6, we show the CDF of the bit disagreement between Alice and Bob, ag-
gregating all locations while distinguishing between LOS and NLOS cases. This is
done for different values of the SNR but only for M = 4 and for NB channels. We
clearly see that LOS propagation is statistically more favorable, from the point of
view of Alice and Bob’s agreement between key bits, especially when there is a dom-
inant component and at high SNR. This can be understood from the fact that, for
a given SNR, the stochastic character of the fading channel coefficients is higher in
NLOS than in LOS. This results in a larger number of channel coefficients with low
instantaneous SNR in the former case.
If both Alice and Bob are in the same room, a LOS path may dominate the mul-
tipath channel between them. Since the channel variation is due to Alice movements
over the square grid, the LOS phase is not constant. Given the regular movements
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Figure 6-6: Comparison of the BER A-B computed over both the measurements and
the model, for SNR=10, 15 and 20 dB.
of Alice and the Bob positions set, we are able to reproduce the channel by modeling
the LOS component as follows:
hLOS =
√
GtGr(
λ
4pid
)2 exp j
2pi
λ
d (6.1)
where the amplitude is computed according to the Friis equation, given the antenna
gains at both the transmit (Gt) and the received (Gr) sides. d is the distance between
Bob and a position of Alice on the grid. The fading multipath components are
then modeled as zero-mean circular Gaussian distribution (resulting in a Rayleigh
multipath channel) of power equal to the total measured NLOS power and added to
the LOS component. This procedure ensured that the K factor of the Rician statistics
observed in the presence of a significant LOS component was correctly reproduced.
Then again, the fading components model is used to model the channel when NLOS
condition is provided.
Fig. 6-6 compares the behavior of the SKG from both empirical channels and the
simple channel model, for NB channels. The results show a good fit between the BER
distributions of the measured and modeled channels, especially in LOS. In the NLOS
case, the discrepancies affect the tails of the distributions, which can be ascribed
to the fact that the model (Rayleigh distribution for the multipaths contribution)
imperfectly describes the limited number of significant paths in the concerned indoor
environment. Similar results can be found for the WB case since the sub-carriers have
the same behavior regarding the BER.
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6.2.3 Security performance with respect to Eve
Eve is assumed to be a passive attacker. She is able to measure the radio channel
between herself and Alice hea as well as with Bob heb. Each terminal is considered
at each time as either Bob or Eve. Furthermore, Eve is assumed to also apply the
CQA algorithm on her channel observation in the hope to derive a secret key close to
Alice-Bob’s by exploiting her own channel estimates hea and heb. The BER between
the keys constructed by Alice and Bob and that derived by Eve is then evaluated.
The results are shown in Fig. 6-7 for M = 4, SNR = 15 dB and NB channels.
It can be seen that, based on this simple comparaison between the keys, making
use of the heb channel by Eve does not give her a strong advantage, since the BER
is around 0.5. This is due to the fact that this channel is almost constant and does
not reveal significant information about the key. On the other hand, the channel hea
is more critical since it is a time-varying channel, depending on Alice movements.
Furthermore, a LOS condition between Bob and Eve (LOS B-E) may reveal more
information about the secret key than the NLOS case (NLOS B-E). Indeed, in indoor
environments, LOS B-E means that Bob and Eve are in the same room and maybe
very close, and they are surrounded by almost the same interacting objects, which
results in a high probability that they experience correlated channels. Nevertheless,
by increasing M , the leakage information to Eve decreases as shown in Fig. 6-8, where
only the BER from hea is considered and for LOS B-E.
Of course, this direct comparison is not a proof of the inability for Eve to access
Alice-Bob’s common key. It just shows that Eve’s job will not be simple and she must
call for more sophisticated means and make use of any extra information she can get
to guess the legitimate users’ key. The number of vulnerable key bits, deduced from
information theory, will be presented in Section 6.4.3 below.
6.3 Channel degrees of freedom for SKG
Since the efficiency η does not consider the randomness character of the key, we
assess in this section this key quality through the statistical NIST tests described in
Section 3.1.4. We also investigate the impact of the space, time, frequency and joint
space-frequency degrees of freedom on the SKG performance, given that these DoFs
may provide more available shared bits. The relevance of such an investigation is also
discussed in Section 3.3.
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Figure 6-7: BER of Eve key bits for M = 4 and for NB channels.
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Figure 6-8: BER of Eve key bits from hea, for LOS B-E and for NB channels.
6.3.1 Space vs. time variability
In TPT measurements, the spatial variability is provided by the movement of Alice
over the 11x11 square grid as explained in Section 6.1, which is equivalent to the
first type of time variability. These 121 antenna positions allow testing the SKG
performance provided by spatial/time degrees of freedom, where Alice’s antenna can
take random positions over the grid. In this way, we obtain NS complex channel
coefficients, exploited to construct a (N = NS log2M)-bits key at a given frequency.
Hence, we randomly choose to construct 60 sets of random Alice positions for each
Bob’s position and for each available frequency in the 20 MHz-bandwidth. A statis-
tical distribution can then be computed over Bob’s positions, over the frequencies in
the 20 MHz-bandwidth and over the 60 random sets of Alice positions.
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6.3.2 Frequency variability
In order to investigate SKG performance in frequency variant channels, the data has
been processed almost consistently with the 802.11a/g/n/ac standard, i.e. in order
to obtain complex channel coefficients at the required number of sub-carriers for each
BW. For that purpose, TPT campaign measurements were frequency interpolated,
which was feasible since the effective maximum delay was well below the inverse
of the BW (in other words, the frequency gap between sub-carriers is well below
the coherence BW). Moreover, for the same WIFI standard consistency, we discard
the channel coefficients at frequencies dedicated either for guardband interval or to
transmit pilot bits, and we keep only those at data transmitting frequencies. Table 6.2
shows some frequency channel characteristics for each bandwidth and according in
general to the 802.11 standard, where we denote by FFT the fast Fourier transform.
Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity, we do not respect the exact features of each
802.11 standard, which are recalled in Appendix B).
Table 6.2: Frequency channel characteristics for each BW.
BW occupied FFT Number of sub-carrier separation
(MHz) BW (MHz) size sub-carriers (MHz)
20 16.25 64 52 0.3125
40 33.75 128 108 0.3125
80 73.125 256 234 0.3125
160 146.25 512 468 0.3125
Given these parameters, not all the sub-carriers need be used to generate keys of
enough bit length, then comes the question: how to choose the sub-carriers? Intu-
itively, more correlation is likely to occur when the frequency difference between two
channel coefficients is reduced. Unless the ratio between the number of available and
the number of required sub-carriers is integer, there is no unique and obvious way to
choose the sub-carriers used in the SKG process. Hence, Alice chooses randomly a
set of Nf frequency sub-carriers, from which (N = Nf log2M)-bits key is extracted,
and she sends publicly this set to Bob. Although this information is transmitted also
to Eve, it is not very relevant since it does not indicate any information about the
key bit value. Finally, a set of secret keys is obtained over Bob’s positions, over the
121 positions of Alice and over the random sets of sub-carriers (arbitrarily taken to
be 10 sets).
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6.3.3 Joint space-frequency variability
Intuitively, the smaller the coherence bandwidth, the more efficient will the SKG be
able to exploit frequency variability. Unfortunately, the coherence bandwidth changes
from an environment to another and is out of control. SKG performance should be
achieved also in environments where the coherence bandwidth is small, which is a
difficulty when no sufficient spatial variability is provided. As a way of mitigation
we here consider the possibility to exploit jointly the space and frequency DoF, so
to relax the requirements on each of both individually. A potential use case is that
of MIMO systems (such as IEEE 802.11n/ac), providing spatial variability, together
with OFDM technology providing frequency variability.
Based on the features of the TPT campaign, spatial variability is provided by
considering either each two consecutive Alice positions on each row of the grid or
each four-square consecutive Alice positions on each two consecutive rows of the grid,
as an array antenna resulting respectively in either 110 sets of 2-array antennas or in
100 sets of 4-square array antennas. More clearly, the following vector
V = [X11 , · · · , XNant1 , · · · , X1i , · · · , XNanti , · · · , X1Nf , · · · , XNantNf ]
is used to construct a single key of length N = NantNf log2(M) where Nant is the
number of array antennas. X1i , · · · , XNanti together form an Nant-array antennas at
the sith chosen frequency. Finally a set of keys is obtained over Bob’s positions, over
the sets of Nant-array antennas and over the 10 sets of randomly chosen sub-carriers.
6.3.4 Results
In the following, we use a fixed key length (N = 128) in the key randomness quality
evaluation, with the exception of the pure spatial variability case where a comparison
between different key lengths is carried out. For each channel variability type, a
statistical distribution over the extracted keys is formed in order to compute a mean
pass rate using the NIST tests. Table 6.3 shows the number of tested keys for each
type of channel variability.
Whatever the source of channel variability used to generate the key, our results
show that all the keys pass the mono-bit frequency test. This is due to the statistically
equal quantization intervals on each I and Q, used to transform channel coefficients
into discrete sequences of bits through CQA. Consequently, all the strings (of length
95
Table 6.3: Size of key set vs. the variability type.
Variability
Number of keys
LOS NLOS total
Space 36720 13500 50220
Frequency 82280 30250 112530
Joint Nant = 2 74800 27500 102300
space-frequency Nant = 4 68000 25000 93000
log2
√
M) have the same probability to occur and equivalently, the probability to have
either bit 0 or bit 1 is 1/2. Therefore, we exclude the mono-bit frequency test when
we compute the mean pass rate.
For N = 128 and according to Table 3.1, the approximate entropy (ApEnt) test
can be applied with a bit string of length m = 1, while the serial test with both m = 3
and m = 4. Accordingly, a 128-key bits passes the ApEnt test when overlapping
strings of length 2 bits are equiprobable (i.e. uniform). For the serial test, the
result depends on the uniformity of overlapping strings of length 4, 3 and 2 bits.
When quantizing the CSIs into M quantization regions according to CQA, 1) the
non-overlapping strings of length log2
√
M bits, derived from the I/Q domains, are
equiprobable; 2) the uniformity of the strings of length log2M bits, which result from
the concatenation of the log2
√
M bit strings quantized from the I and Q domains,
depends on the correlation between the I and Q domains; 3) the uniformity of the
non-overlapping strings relies on the channel samples correlation. Consequently, the
percentage of sequences passing the ApEnt test is very high for M = 16 whatever the
channel variability type, while that of the serial test is smaller especially for frequency
variability with BW = 20 MHz (starting from a percentage of 0.3533). For M = 4,
the success to the ApEnt test depends mainly on the correlation between I and Q of
the channel coefficients. It also depends on the correlation of the used subsequent
channel coefficients. Therefore, the worst case is considered for LOS case exploiting
frequency variability with BW = 40 MHz, and thus with a percentage of 0.7273.
Moreover, small mean pass rates for M = 4 stem from the approximately complete
failure of serial tests.
6.3.4.1 Spatial variability
Key length effect : Fig. 6-9 represents the mean pass rate of key sequences passing
the chosen selection of NIST tests, for both N = 128 and N = 242. The spatial
channel variability is used here to construct keys of N bits with M = 4. NS = 64 and
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NS = 121 channel samples are needed to respectively construct a 128-bits key and
242-bits key. Whatever the used frequency, it is shown that shorter keys better profit
from the channel randomness. While maintaining the same M , we need more channel
samples in order to construct a longer secret key and consequently the probability to
have more correlated samples increases, yielding bits with more correlations.
Figure 6-9: Mean pass rate exploiting spatial variability for both N = 128 and
N = 242.
Carrier frequency effect : Fig. 6-10 shows the mean pass rate for N = 128,
for both 5.4 GHz and 2.4625 GHz bands, and with respect to LOS/NLOS cases.
The impact of carrier frequency is not really meaningful in Fig. 6-9 and Fig. 6-10
since the mean pass rates are very high, i.e. nearly 1, in good part owing to the
random positions taken by Alice over the grid. Nonetheless this impact may be
shown for the worst-case scenario corresponding to consecutive Alice positions over
the regular grid, and thereby the 5.4 GHz band offers more random keys than the
2.4625 GHz band. Indeed the distance between two adjacent Alice positions on the
grid corresponds almost to λ/2 at 5.4 GHz and to λ/4 at 2.4625 GHz, while λ/2
typically corresponds to the coherence distance over which channels are statistically
well decorrelated in omnidirectional scenarios, resulting in extracted bits with a good
level of independence.
LOS/NLOS effect : The key randomness is enhanced in NLOS propagation
conditions, as shown in Fig. 6-10, due to the lack of a dominant path yielding then
more fluctuation of the channel transfer function than in LOS cases.
Briefly speaking, it is noteworthy that in all cases the mean pass rate is very high,
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Figure 6-10: Mean pass rate exploiting spatial variability with respect to LOS/NLOS
and for N = 128.
indicating that the spatial degree of freedom is suitable for random key generation.
As discussed above, spatial variability can be translated into time variability through
a random movement of Alice in space, providing adequate key randomness. As an
extra advantage, such a time variant scheme would make it difficult for Eve to track
accurately Alice’s positions, reducing her ability to gather deterministic information
about the channel characteristics and to guess the sequence of bits.
6.3.4.2 Frequency variability
A quantitative measure of the key randomness behavior with respect to the frequency
variability domain can be found from the analysis of the root mean square (RMS)
delay spread στ and consequently of the coherence bandwidth, which typically varies
inversely to the RMS delay spread. For each position of Alice over the square grid,
a CIR is computed by taking inverse Fourier transforms of the frequency responses
recorded over 500 MHz bandwidth centered on either 2.4625 GHz or 5.4 GHz band
and filtered with a Hamming window. The power delay profile (PDP) P (τ) is then
the average of the 121 squared CIRs computed over the spatial grid (see Eq. 2.7 where
the time domain is replaced by the space domain). Only multipath components with
amplitude within 20 dB from the peak of each PDP are included in the computation
of στ , which is given in Eq. 2.5.
Fig. 6-11 shows two examples of normalized measured PDPs and their correspond-
ing frequency responses for both LOS and NLOS cases. It is clear that the NLOS
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PDP is richer in multipath components and thereby exhibits higher delay spreads
than the LOS one, having a few dominant peaks at short delays. This observation
is validated in Fig. 6-12 where στ is plotted against the distance between Alice and
Bob, both for LOS and NLOS cases.
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Figure 6-11: Examples of PDPs and channel transfer functions.
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Figure 6-12: The variation of the RMS delay spread with the distance.
We assess the key randomness exploiting frequency variability by maintaining the
same key length as in most analysis above, i.e. N = 128 bits. To this end, we fix the
number of sub-carriers Nf used for SKG according to M , i.e. Nf = 64 for M = 4
and Nf = 32 for M = 16. Fig. 6-13 shows the variation of the mean pass rate as a
function of the distance between Alice and Bob at 5.4 GHz band, by differentiating
between LOS and NLOS for different bandwidths and both for M = 4 and M = 16.
We stress that unfortunately 128 key bits cannot be extracted by exploiting the
frequency variability in BW = 20 MHz when M = 4. Fig. 6-14 considers the impact
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Figure 6-13: Mean pass rate as a function of the distance for 5.4 GHz and for frequency
variability.
Figure 6-14: Mean pass rate exploiting frequency variability for BW = 40 MHz and
M = 16.
of the carrier frequency on the key randomness behavior for BW = 40 MHz and
M = 16.
Both LOS/NLOS and distance effect : Fig. 6-13 shows that the higher the
separation distance between Alice and Bob, the higher the mean pass rate, especially
for LOS channels or for small values of M . Moreover, NLOS channels provide sta-
tistically more random secure key bits as seen in both Fig. 6-13 and Fig. 6-14. The
same behavior is noticed in Fig. 6-12 with respect to the delay spread. Hence, the
improvement of the mean pass rate is explained by an increase of στ indicating a
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reduction in the coherence bandwidth, which yields less channel correlations for close
frequency responses. Furthermore, the advantage of NLOS channels over the LOS
ones in providing random keys comes from the multipaths richness of the former:
the lack of proper Rayleigh fading reduces the channel variability in the frequency
domain and creates insufficient randomness for a satisfactory success to NIST tests.
Nonetheless, στ takes relatively small values ranging from 5 ns to 30 ns, due to the
open and little cluttered environment of TPT investigated locations. These values
are consistent with typical ones for indoor environments, see e.g. ref. [123]. An
improvement in mean pass rate is thus expected for richer scattering environments.
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Figure 6-15: Example illustrating SKG from channel responses, for M=4.
Bandwidth effect : Larger available bandwidths yield larger separation of the
sub-carriers used for SKG and consequently smaller correlations. This results in
improved key randomness, as seen in Fig. 6-13. Fig. 6-15(a) and Fig. 6-15(b) illustrate
two examples of key generation from respectively very close and very far spaced
channel responses, for M = 4. It is clear that more randomness is provided by the
case where the channel coefficients are very far spaced, where SKG profits from the
whole bandwidth, while the efficient bandwidth is reduced in the other case yielding
a key with poor randomness.
Carrier frequency effect : As seen in Fig. 6-14, the carrier frequency affects
the key randomness behavior just for LOS channels, where higher mean pass rates
are seen for the smallest carrier frequency (i.e. 2.4625 GHz). This is explained by
the decrease in the coherence bandwidth, or equivalently by the increase in the RMS
delay spread, when the frequency gets lower, as shown in Fig. 6-12(a). Furthermore,
as displayed in Fig. 6-12(b), στ does not change with the frequency for NLOS channels.
The behavior of στ with the carrier frequency is consistent with results obtained in
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[124, 125]. However the difference in mean pass rates is weak, implying that there is
no strong preference between the low and high WIFI band from this point of view.
Still, the fact that the low band is limited to 20 MHz bandwidth while the high band
reaches 160 MHz provides a clear advantage of the latter for SKG, given the above
results.
6.3.4.3 Joint space-frequency variability
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Figure 6-16: Comparison of key randomness in different channel variability at 5.4
GHz.
Fig. 6-16 compares the mean pass rate for the three types of channel variability
in the 5.4 GHz band for both M = 4 and M = 16. The full space variability provides
the most robust keys and thereby the most suitable source for SKG. However, such
a scheme would either require the terminal mobility over all the scanned positions
before generating a key or would need that many antennas in a stable scenario.
Therefore we now assess the security provided by joint space-frequency variability, for
both Nant = 2 and Nant = 4, which relaxes such requirements. Indeed, this scheme
provides more random keys, especially with Nant = 4, than the pure frequency domain
variability, which stems from the larger average difference between frequency channels
and the resulting reduced correlations between channel coefficients. Simply stated,
for fully decorrelated antenna signals, the increase in Nant reduces the bandwidth
requirements. This is a very encouraging result for the effectiveness of SKG toward
physical layer security. Since many wireless devices (for 3G, 4G, WIFI...) tend to
be multi-antenna systems, such a solution will certainly be more and more feasible
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in the short term future. We also stress the importance of increasing M , which well
improves the key randomness, despite the requirement of a higher SNR.
6.4 Information theoretic bounds on key length
In order to account for both the key agreement and the key randomness, it is crucial
to evaluate the mutual information between channels. To that aim, the radio chan-
nels are required to be jointly Gaussian. However, in real channels, the central limit
theorem may not hold owing to limitation in the number of dispersive paths. There-
fore, we test the Gaussianity of the channels with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test
and then, we just compute available key rate IK and vulnerable key rate IV K for the
channel coefficients that passes the test.
In this section, the results are obtained for SNR = 15 dB and for a central
frequency of 5.4 GHz.
6.4.1 SKG from frequency variability
The frequency variability scheme adopted in this section is the same as that repre-
sented in Fig. 3-8(a) in Chapter 3. By increasing the number of sub-carriers Nf , the
BW increases linearly while the frequency separation ∆f is fixed. The 121 positions
of Alice over the square grid form the statistics over which mutual information is
computed for each position of Bob. Moreover, the channel vector results from the
aggregation of Nf frequencies around the central frequency, as already done for out-
door environments. The impact of investigating Nf sub-carriers with different ∆f is
depicted in Fig. 6-17, by distinguishing between LOS and NLOS conditions.
As already shown in the previous chapters and also here above, investigating more
sub-carriers with larger ∆f yields an improvement on the SKG process. In contrast
with results shown for outdoor deterministic channels, we notice here that the curves
are more linear, which could be explained by the fact that the empirical CIRs are very
dense in multipaths, and subsequently, we need a BW much higher than 160 MHz
in order to exploit the most random information contained in the CIR. Furthermore,
IK is greater in NLOS cases than in LOS ones, which is an intuitive behavior heavily
related to that of the delay spread shown in Fig. 6-12. These results are consistent
with those presented in Fig. 6-13 and Fig. 6-5, where respectively, the mean pass rate
and the efficiency increase with the BW.
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Figure 6-17: IK as a function of Nf and the BW.
6.4.2 SKG from space variability
Regarding the space variability, the channel vector is constructed by Alice positions
over the grid, providing a virtual antennas-array. We consider three specific cases: a
linear antenna array formed with two successive positions over the grid (Nant = 2),
and two square antenna arrays with both Nant = 4 and Nant = 64. The statistics
necessary to compute the statistical quantity IK are the frequency variability com-
puted over a BW of 500 MHz with a separation of 2.5 MHz. For each position of Bob,
a distribution of IK values may be obtained by shifting the array in order to cover
all the possibilities over the Alice’s grid. The results are shown in Fig. 6-18, also by
distinguishing between LOS and NLOS cases.
Again, increasing the channel DoFs yields an increase in the shared available key
bits between Alice and Bob. Furthermore, NLOS channels provide greater values of
IK than LOS, although the channels in both cases are Rayleigh fading. This relies on
the angular spread of the paths which seems to be greater in NLOS channels. In the
same context, the authors in [58] proved that NLOS channels are prone to provide
more randomness than LOS ones undergoing Rician fading, where the dominant path
should be removed, which will yield a decrease in the power (i.e. SNR). Moreover,
the authors in [58] tested SKG performance by performing indoor measurement cam-
paigns at 2.55 GHz band and using MIMO channels. Specifically, at the same SNR
of 15 dB, IK in [58] attains values (i.e. ranging from 40 to 100 bits) larger than
that reached in our measurements (IK varies between 40 to 80), even with smaller
degrees of freedom (32 instead of 64 DoFs). This may be ascribed to the fact that
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Figure 6-18: IK vs. Nant from space variability.
they use MIMO channels, exploiting the angular spread at both the transmitter and
the receiver sides, while in our case, we just exploit the channel diversity at a single
side of the channel, i.e. at Alice (multiple input single output: MISO).
Although the randomness provided in the space domain is always better than that
provided in the frequency domain (fig. 6-16), according to NIST, the two domains
contain, according to IK , the same amount of randomness if higher BWs, i.e. 40 or
160 MHz are exploited.
6.4.3 Relative vulnerable key rate
We intend here to evaluate the relative vulnerable key rate IV K/IK for NB single
antenna channels. Each terminal is considered as either Bob or Eve. Mutual infor-
mation is computed over the 121 Alice’s positions. IV K is evaluated by considering
just the channels measured by both Bob and Eve when Alice is the transmitter since
the latter is responsible of the time channel variability. Fig. 6-19 depicts IV K/IK
against the separation distance between Bob and Eve. It is obvious that the relative
vulnerable key rate decreases as the distance between Bob and Eve increases. Eve
may still obtain little information correlated with the channel measured by Bob even
at large distances with respect to λ (e.g. 55 λ). These results are consistent with
those obtained above in this dissertation, however they are in contrast with the ideal
Clarke scenario. In fact, this means that some paths may be correlated between Bob
and Eve and they are of relatively high power.
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6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a study of the SKG approach in indoor radio channels
at the WIFI bands.
Regarding the quantization CQA protocol, Alice and Bob should choose the ap-
propriate mapping scheme, given the SNR, in order to agree on the largest key size
while having a sufficient number of identical key bits. When this is done correctly,
the BER between Bob and Eve’s key bits after CQA is close to 0.5 and the propor-
tion of cases for which the BER deviates significantly from this target value is small
enough that downstream techniques such as privacy amplification should be sufficient
to guarantee a very good degree of confidentiality for Alice-Bob communication, un-
less of a very close or very powerful Eve. While we focus in this work on the channel
features by just using the CQA algorithm, the complete scheme of SKG, including
the reconciliation and the privacy amplification, is targeted in the PhyLaws project
either for indoor or outdoor channels and using either WIFI or LTE signals.
Notably, while the amount of random information is almost the same when ex-
ploiting either the space or the frequency variability in the outdoor environment, at
least from the RT results of Chapter 5, such an amount is poor when merely exploiting
the frequency domain in indoor environments. Indeed, the security performance when
exploiting the frequency variability relies on the statistics of the delay spread, which
is higher in outdoor environments than in indoor ones and reveals that channels in
outdoor environments are more frequency-selective and contains more random infor-
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mation. In other words, indoor environments such as those measured here will need
to use at least two antennas in order to capture a sufficient number of decorrelated
key bits (e.g. 128).
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Chapter 7
Complete Secret Key Generation
Scheme
While the previous chapters evaluate the robustness of the generated keys directly
after the channel quantization phase, we implement here the whole SKG strategy
(Fig. 2-6), including information reconciliation and privacy amplification. The in-
formation reconciliation phase allows Alice and Bob to agree on the same key bits,
by using error correcting codes such as LDPC codes [7, 61, 62, 65] and BCH codes
[55, 126]. The last step, i.e. privacy amplification, consists of randomizing the key
and removing information leaked to the eavesdropper.
We discuss the robustness of the proposed PhySec scheme by using secure sketch
based on BCH codes for information reconciliation and hash functions for the privacy
amplification, as proposed in [126]. To this end, we consider the indoor measured
channels, presented in Chapter 6. We restrict the analysis to WIFI signals centered
at 5.4 GHz band, while in the PHYLAWS project, both WIFI and LTE signals are
processed through both indoor and outdoor measurements [126].
Furthermore, we discuss how the definition of the quantization maps may affect
the generated key robustness. More precisely, since the CQA algorithm statistically
defines the maps, how much statistical data (relatively to the key length) is required
in order to achieve high key quality in terms of reliability and randomness.
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7.1 Quantization
As admitted throughout this dissertation, the channel coefficients are quantized into
bit streams through the CQA algorithm, where two alternative maps are defined in
the I/Q domain. The maps are statistically determined after aggregating certain
channel samples. Thus, the question is: how many channel samples are necessary to
obtain reliable random keys?
We propose, relatively to the key length, two different sizes/densities of channel
samples that may be used in the learning phase (the quantization maps definition):
1. The first method, called single key-single map (SKSM), consists in merely
considering channel observations that are used in the construction of the key.
In other words, SKSM just uses the same channel observations as those used
to construct a given key. For example, quantization maps may be formed over
just e.g. 64 channel coefficients when the number of quantization regions is 4
(M = 4), and for a key of 128 bits. The benefit of such a method is that it is fast
and nearly simultaneous with the construction of the key. The drawback is an
anticipated lesser robustness, since few observations imply more disagreement
between Alice and Bob maps.
2. On the contrary, the second way to build a map, called multiple key-single
map (MKSM), consists of accumulating a lot of channel samples, where most
of them are not used in a unique key construction. In other words, several keys
may be constructed from different observations, while all observations are used
in the definition of an unique map. The drawback of such an approach is that
the learning phase may be slow, however we may expect a better agreement
between Alice and Bob maps, owing to the larger number of observations. Such
a scheme is here implemented by accumulating all the channel samples available
for the 121 Alice positions and the 108 sub-carriers, thus for each position of
Bob1.
7.2 Information reconciliation
Information reconciliation aims to suppress the remaining mismatches between Alice
and Bob keys, by employing an error correcting code. In the PHYLAWS project,
1The SNR is averaged over all these channel samples, which are used to define the quantization
map.
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keys reconciliation is implemented through the use of secure sketch based on error
correcting codes [127]. Without loss of generality, we suppose that Alice is the leader
so that her computed key (Ka) is considered as the secret key, while Bob attempts to
retrieve Alice’s key using the key (Kb) he extracts from his own channel measurements.
The protocol can be described as follows:
Alice
• selects a random codeword c from an error correcting code
• computes the secure sketch s = Ka ⊕ c
• sends s to Bob over the public channel
Bob
• subtracts s from its computed key Kb: cb = Kb ⊕ s = Kb ⊕Ka ⊕ c
• decodes cb to recover the random codeword c and gets cˆ
• estimates Ka by computing: Kˆa = cˆ⊕ s
Full reconciliation occurs when Bob perfectly retrieves the random codeword cho-
sen by Alice (cˆ = c). As a result, Alice and Bob agree on exactly the same key
(Kˆa = Ka). The public transmission of the secure sketch, which allows the exact
recovery of the key, may reveal some information to Eve, even though it does not dis-
close the exact value of the key. Indeed, similarly to Bob, Eve uses the secure sketch
to retrieve the key Ka. Therefore, some amount of information may be revealed to
Eve during this phase. In order to suppress this information leakage and randomize
the key, a final step is required. This may be done through the Privacy amplification,
as described in the next section.
7.3 Privacy amplification
As already mentioned, we employ privacy amplification [67, 128] in order to achieve
a high key randomness, while decreasing the amount of vulnerable information. This
may be achieved through either hash functions or randomness extractor, which may
reduce the final key length by erasing redundant information. The efficiency of such
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a process may require some information about Eve’s knowledge in order to maximize
the conditional entropy of the generated key, as discussed in [67].
We made use of the privacy amplification scheme developed in PHYLAWS [126],
through the two-universal family of hash functions [67, 128]. We note that a class
of hash functions {g} is defined as two-universal if, from two distinct strings (i.e.
x1 6= x2), it is nearly impossible to obtain the same result (i.e. g(x1) 6= g(x2)) [67, 128].
What is particularly important here, is that with a suitable hashing scheme, this
property holds even though x1 and x2 (i.e. the keys) are extremely close (e.g. differing
by a single bit). In other words, even though Eve succeeds in obtaining nearly the
same key as Alice/Bob, after the privacy amplification step, her key becomes totally
different from Alice/Bob’s one. Thus, Alice and Bob publicly agree on a random
function (g), which, even known from Eve, reveals nearly negligible information about
the final key. This hash function, defined as g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}r, transforms a
partially secret key of length n into a highly secret but shorter key, with a length
r ≤ n.
Without loss of generality, we implement the privacy amplification by choosing a
specific function (g) from the two-universal family of hash functions. For that, we
interpret the shared key K as an element of the Galois field GF (2n), where n is the
number of bits of K. For 1 ≤ r ≤ n and for a random element a ∈ GF (2n), g assigns
to the key K the first r bits of the product a.K ∈ GF (2n), i.e. g : (K)n → (a.K)r. Let
us recall that the multiplication in the Galois field is a polynomial product, which can
be expressed as a convolution between bit sequences. Such an operation is performed
modulo an irreducible polynomial of degree n over GF (2n). Thus, a little difference
between two initial binary strings, even over just one bit, yields to a wide gap between
the resulting strings.
In practice, at each new key computation, Alice randomly choose a ∈ GF (2n) and
sends it to Bob over the public channel. Both Alice and Bob compute the galois field
product a.K ∈ GF (2n), which is considered as the final secret key.
More clearly, the hash mechanism spreads any bit error all over the final key
(a.K)r (i.e. first r bits of a.K), thus:
• When Eve applies the privacy amplification on her key (rather her reconciled
key), any remaining disagreement between her key and that shared between
Alice and Bob after the reconciliation step, implies quite different computed
keys (a.K)r, which make her key unusable.
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• From Bob point of view, he agrees on the same key generated by Alice once the
keys are perfectly reconciled during the information reconciliation phase. Thus,
the key is useful for legitimate users but not for Eve.
7.4 Results
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the key, in terms both of terminals
disagreement and key randomness, and after each phase of the secret key generation
process: 1) At the quantization phase, keys of 128 bits are generated using M = 4,
using either SKSM or MKSM; 2) A secure sketch based on (127, 92, 11) BCH code2
is then performed for information reconciliation, which requires to keep only the first
127 bits of the key. 3) Finally, the privacy amplification is applied with r = n = 127.
Although more privacy would be achieved with r < n, we made this choice since
it allows the comparison between key randomness quality before and after privacy
amplification, while using the same NIST tests.
According to the previous chapters, the keys are generated by exploiting different
channel degrees of freedom, e.g. in the space and the frequency domain, where the
parallel channels are randomly selected from the available set of channels. For the
frequency DoF, we investigate channels with a BW of 40 MHz. In addition to the
three phases of SKG, the results are discussed according to the way used to define
the quantization maps (i.e. SKSM vs. MKSM).
7.4.1 Alice-Bob disagreement
A successful SKG scheme allows Alice and Bob to agree on the same key, which
consequently may be useful for encrypting data. Thus, we intend here to verify the
agreement between Alice and Bob after considering the whole SKG scheme as well
as considering each step alone, as presented in Fig. 7-1. We note that these keys
are extracted by exploiting the space variability, while key statistics are constructed
over both Bob positions and different sub-carriers. Fig. 7-1 also compares the BER
between Alice and Bob keys between SKSM and MKSM, for different SNR (10 and
15 dB).
The information reconciliation phase allows Alice and Bob to perfectly reconcile
a certain proportion of the quantized bits, which intuitively increases with the SNR.
2Perfect reconciliation is performed when the keys differ by at most 5 bits.
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Figure 7-1: Disagreement between Alice and Bob keys.
More precisely, the keys are perfectly corrected once the BER after CQA is at most
4%, which results from a capability to correct at most 5 bits from 127 key bits.
This is consistent with the parameters chosen for the BCH code, with a Hamming
distance of 11. In order to increase the keys agreement ratio, we note that the
parameters of the BCH code could be adapted according mainly to the channel SNR,
and also to the required key length (e.g. increasing the Hamming distance for low
SNR). Furthermore, when increasing the capability of correcting mismatches, the
amount of redundant information (publicly exchanged) increases, which may reveal
some information to Eve. Such a vulnerable information may be removed during the
privacy amplification step, which outputs an exactly identical key for both Alice and
Bob once perfect reconciliation occurs. However, the cost to pay is the reduce in
the key length. Therefore, potential schemes require to perform perfect reconciliation
with the least amount of public messages.
By comparing the key agreement for both SKSM and MKSM shown respectively
in Fig. 7-1(a) and Fig .7-1(b), we observe that the proportion of perfect reconciliation
increases with the latter scheme, i.e. MKSM. For SNR = 15 dB, 99% of keys are
perfectly corrected when using MKSM, while it is 93% for SKSM. Indeed, when
building maps from a relatively big number of observations, Alice and Bob are able
to obtain approximately the same maps.
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7.4.2 Bob-Eve disagreement
Similarly to Alice-Bob disagreement, we present in Fig. 7-2 the BER between the
keys constructed by Bob and Eve after each step of SKG, for space DoF and for the
SKSM approach. Obviously, owing to space decorrelation, the BER is small after
quantization and becomes closer to 0.5 after the privacy amplification. Indeed, as
previously mentioned, the privacy amplification spreads the errors all over the key.
More precisely, the BER after privacy amplification is varying in a range centered
around 0.5, i.e. in [0.4; 0.6]. This may be ascribed to the statistical independence
between the keys generated by Bob and Eve, with a uniform distribution of bits. In
other terms, this may be described by keys following the binomial law, i.e. B(127, 0.5),
as shown in Fig. 7-3. We note that the results are similar for MKSM.
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Figure 7-2: Disagreement between Bob and Eve keys for SKSM.
7.4.3 Key randomness
The randomness of the generated keys was firstly assessed using the statistical NIST
tests in Chapter 6, where the keys were derived merely from CQA and no privacy
amplification was considered. We extend this randomness assessment in this section,
by considering the privacy amplification step and different definitions of the quanti-
zation map (SKSM ans MKSM). We note that we consider a key length of 127 bits,
even after the privacy amplification (r = 127). However, in practice, the key length
r should be reduced in order to erase most of the leaked information.
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Figure 7-3: Eve key BER after privacy amplification vs. the BER for keys following
B(127,0.5).
7.4.3.1 Results for the SKSM approach
We first consider the SKSM approach where the maps are defined from the channel
samples directly used to build each 128 bits key. We take back some results presented
in the previous chapter and compare key randomness right after the quantization
scheme to that after the final privacy amplification phase. Hence, Fig. 7-4 compares
the mean pass rates for keys in both cases, for M = 4 and BW = 40 MHz. Obvi-
ously, the privacy amplification improves the key randomness, whatever the channel
variability. It is observable also that the mean pass rates are not equal to 1, since
according to NIST, each key is characterized random if the proportion that passes the
test fall into a range of acceptable proportions, without the necessity of reaching 1.
As discussed in Section 3.1.4 and Section 6.3, the NIST tests are not able to judge
a perfect randomness of the key. They are rather able to evaluate a specific defect
according to a specific criteria, e.g. the tests described in Section 3.1.4. Therefore,
we resort to a visual interpretation of the key randomness, as admitted in [75]. More
clearly, two dimensional keys are plotted, as in Fig. 7-5.
Graphical representations of keys extracted by exploiting the spatial DoFs, the
frequency DoFs, the joint space-frequency DoFs for both Nant = 2 and Nant = 4 are
plotted respectively in Fig. 7-5, Fig. 7-6, Fig. 7-7 and Fig. 7-8. These keys are shown
for different Bob positions, using SKSM, and more importantly right after quantiza-
tion or after privacy amplification. It is clearly shown that a much better randomness
is provided by the complete scheme, either over each generated key (vertical axis) or
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Figure 7-4: Mean pass rates before and after privacy amplification, for SKSM.
over different keys at different Bob positions (horizontal axis). Let us now focus
on the randomness provided by the quantization since the more vulnerability, the
shorter the key after privacy amplification (although simulations are performed with
r = n). More clearly, Eve intelligence is exploited at the quantization phase in order
to maximize the mutual information between the channels, and consequently, reduce
the final key length (after the last step of SKG).
Consistently with Fig. 7-4, we see that the randomness is improved from frequency
variability to joint space-frequency variability, then to spatial variability. However,
the graphical representations still show some deterministic behaviors that would be
useful to Eve. In particular, in Fig. 7-6, the vertical keys show some long sequences
with the same bit value, which is due to the small channel coherence bandwidth or,
in other words, to the high channel correlations. Moreover, in Fig. 7-7 and Fig. 7-8,
deterministic behaviors are shown through the repetition of some string patterns of
certain length. Furthermore, we can notice that the keys are almost uncorrelated
from one position of Bob to another one. This means that it is possible for different
terminals to generate different keys.
Fig. 7-9 plots key matrices generated using the frequency variability, for each Alice
position over the grid, and for a given position of Bob. Thus, we consider both LOS
and NLOS radio channels between Alice and Bob. It is apparent, for keys generated
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Figure 7-5: Keys from spatial DoFs, for different Bob positions and for SKSM.
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Figure 7-6: Keys from frequency DoFs, for different Bob positions and for SKSM.
right after CQA, that slightly more randomness is present in the NLOS channels.
Nevertheless, both channels are very deterministic owing to the long sequences of
bit e.g. 1. In the LOS case (Fig. 7-9(a)), the variation of the bits from one key to
another is very periodic, such that the bit values is changing with respect to the LOS
path phase. After privacy amplification, it turns out that a very good randomness is
achieved in both cases, although a sharp eye would likely be able to capture subtle
structures characterizing weak randomness imperfections.
To summarize, for raw keys (i.e. right after CQA), most of the randomness is pro-
vided by the spatial variability. The joint space-frequency variability may be useful
since it leaks less information about the radio channel and it follows less deterministic
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Figure 7-7: Keys from joint space-frequency DoFs (Nant = 2), for different Bob
positions and for SKSM.
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Figure 7-8: Keys from joint space-frequency DoFs (Nant = 4), for different Bob
positions and for SKSM.
behavior, especially when increasing the number of investigated antennas. Further-
more, privacy amplification significantly increases the randomness of generated keys.
Despite that, the price to pay is in principle a small key length r < n (even it is not
considered in simulations), especially when more information is revealed to Eve during
the reconciliation step. Therefore, it is interesting to assess the amount of random-
ness available on raw keys (just after CQA), since Eve may exploit any deterministic
behavior to guess the key.
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Figure 7-9: Keys from frequency DoFs, over Alice positions and for SKSM.
7.4.3.2 Results for the MKSM approach
We here generate keys by defining once the quantization map using all the channel
samples provided by the spatial variability of the Alice grid and the frequency vari-
ability, resulting in a single map for each position of Bob. This is explained above as
the MKSM approach.
Fig. 7-10 shows the mean pass rates for keys generated using MKSM and when
exploiting both the space and the frequency variability. As expected, the random
character of the keys is enhanced after the privacy amplification phase. However,
the randomness before this step is very poor, especially when comparing with that
provided by SKSM (Fig. 7-4). This may be ascribed to the fact that using MKSM,
the number of bits equal to 1 and 0 in each key is not identical, which results in keys
with single value for example, especially for the frequency variability. This idea may
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be clarified through Fig. 7-11 and Fig. 7-12.
Figure 7-10: Mean pass rates before and after privacy amplification, for MKSM.
Fig. 7-11 and Fig. 7-12 illustrate key matrices computed respectively over the
space and the frequency variability. Such keys are quantized from maps computed
based on the MKSM approach. We still see high randomness degree for the spatial
variability, even slightly less than that shown for the SKSM. Also similarly to the
results presented above, the keys generated from the frequency variability are almost
deterministic owing to the long stream of identical key bits. However, the difference
is that the number of bit 0 and bit 1 is not identical for each generated key, as we can
remark for all the keys generated from the SKSM approach. In particular, we can
notice some keys formed with the same value of the bits. We note that the mid line
in Fig. 7-12(a) is ascribed to the way of concatenating the bit streams, i.e. here the
bits generated over the real values are first concatenated, then those of the imaginary
part.
Fig. 7-13 displays the key matrices generated for two specific positions of Bob, both
in LOS and NLOS conditions, where the frequency variability is exploited. Again, for
quantization, these channels are very poor in randomness. Moreover, the frequency
variability when using the MKSM approach is the worst. One point to notice, indeed,
is that MKSM is not perfectly suited to each generated key. While the map is optimal
as a whole, it is sub-optimal for the individual generated keys, for which each set
of channel observations does not necessarily respect the equal probability for sub-
intervals, as targeted by CQA (see Section 3.2.2).
121
12
7 
bi
ts
93 Bob positions
(a) Quantization
12
7 
bi
ts
93 Bob positions
(b) Privacy amplification
Figure 7-11: Keys from spatial DoFs, over Bob positions and for MKSM.
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Figure 7-12: Keys from frequency DoFs, over Bob positions and for MKSM.
7.5 Conclusion
We have implemented in the present chapter the whole scheme of SKG from reciprocal
radio channels. Although CQA is used throughout the dissertation to extract key bits
from the channel coefficients, we proposed two different approaches to compute the
maps (i.e. the SKSM and the MKSM approaches). Information reconciliation was
achieved with a secure sketch based on BCH codes, while privacy amplification was
applied through two-universal of family hash functions.
It has been shown that once the keys are perfectly reconciled, Alice and Bob
agree on the same key length after the privacy amplification. With respect to Eve,
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Figure 7-13: Keys from the frequency DoFs, over Alice positions and for MKSM.
the discrepancies between her key and Alice/Bob key increase after the privacy am-
plification. We also found that the graphical representation of the key matrices was
easier to interpret in terms of randomness imperfections than the performance figures
provided by NIST tests, especially for MKSM.
Furthermore, we have seen that the MKSM approach allows Alice and Bob to
easily agree on the same key bits, with a proportion higher than that enabled by
the other approach. However, more key randomness may be provided by the SKSM
approach. Consequently, we remark that a trade-off between key reliability and key
randomness results from the use of these approaches.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and perspectives
8.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have addressed the role of the radio channel in terms of its
impact on SKG performance. The work has been carried out as regards:
• The identification of important features of the radio channel regarding SKG.
• The selection of a few metrics intended to evaluate the performance quantita-
tively.
• The application of these metrics to modeled and measured channels.
Among the results, we have shown that, subject to an efficient exploitation of
the channel richness with an adequate algorithm able to capture the details of the
complex channel coefficients, suitably long keys could be obtained, either from the
sole frequency domain or from the combination of several domains, notably in the
space or Doppler domains.
Indoor environments are less prone to SKG, since such environments are naturally
rather time stable (low Doppler) and with large coherence bandwidths. However, by
exploiting also the spatial domain (e.g. 2 or 4 antennas), and with a wide enough
BW (such as 40 MHz and up to 160 MHz, as in WIFI variants), much can be done
to obtain suitably long keys.
In outdoor environments, the channel richness and the longer delay spreads favor
large degrees of freedom and small coherence bandwidths. This implies that it is
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relatively easy to construct suitably long keys, even though the effective DOF (seen
the secret key rates) are less than for i.i.d. sub-channels. This is even better, since
outdoor channels are expected to be more time variant, due to the Doppler incurred
by moving vehicles, a moving terminal or any other short or long distance time variant
disturbance.
Generally speaking, it is interesting to increase the number of sub-channels, even
when they are correlated, since this increases somewhat the total secret key rate.
However, this also means to devise clever schemes, able to produce long keys made of
independent bits from very long ones made of correlated bits. This is typically what
can be done in privacy amplification.
Nevertheless, it has been shown that information reconciliation and privacy am-
plification allow Alice and Bob to reliably share a key with a high randomness degree,
whatever the channel DoF. On the other hand, the privacy amplification may increase
the Eve key BER although some information are leaked during the earlier phases of
SKG. Furthermore, a trade-off between reliability and randomness has been shown
in relation to the statistical map computation.
8.2 Perspectives
Several important issues could not investigated in this task, owing to the specific
PHYLAWS objectives and, above all, to the available resources. Some of them would
require further efforts in order to consolidate the fundamental basis on SKG perfor-
mance. Others may be addressed according to a practical approach, based on the
observed performance in specific cases. This includes:
• The evaluation of secret key capacity in non Gaussian cases, i.e. when we want
to ascertain the vulnerability of key bits when Eve can take any possible position
around Bob, in other words well beyond a small scale area for which Rayleigh
fading ensures that the complex channel coefficients are Gaussian distributed.
Such an evaluation requires going back to the basics of mutual information (see
Eq. 3.5 and Eq. 3.6) and attempt to compute IK and ISK from such general
formulas, directly or approximately.
• The analysis of SKG performance in terms of antenna characteristics (e.g. an-
tenna radiation pattern). Although omnidirectional scenarios favor SKG owing
to the capability to capture dispersive paths, it has been shown in literature
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that specific design of antennas would be advantageous to create channel fluc-
tuations in static environment [55, 80, 81]. Furthermore, it seems interesting to
assess SKG for different kind of antennas, especially from Eve point of view.
• Deeply investigate SKG from the eavesdropper point of view. Throughout this
thesis, the passive Eve merely derives the key from her own measurements,
without any effort to get more insight about the Alice/Bob channel. This may
be done through ray tracing algorithms, provided diffuse scattering was suitably
implemented.
• Taking into account many non ideal features that would obscure the similarity
of channels seen by Alice and Bob, such as deviations from reciprocity. This oc-
curs in the radio frequency signal processing stages, in particular due to the non
linearity of certain devices and their non reciprocal character by nature (such
as amplifiers, which are commonly highly directional and non reciprocal). The
imperfect calibration of signal acquisition blocks, their variation with time, tem-
perature etc. are common causes of non reciprocity. While this can be modeled
[32, 129], another simplest way is to assessed the differences between channels
measured from both ways of the link in available devices. VNAs are extremely
performant equipments and it is commonplace that the non reciprocity is van-
ishingly small, owing to accurate calibration. However, in commercial wireless
equipments, much less is done in this direction, resulting in mismatched mea-
surements.
• Trying to pre-process the channel data, prior to extracting keys. One particular
benefit would be through the removal of dominant paths, responsible for the
Rician fading rather than Rayleigh and of more vulnerability. Advanced pro-
cessing might be useful, such as principal components removal [58]. However,
this would come at a price: the reduced power and consequently of the SNR. So
a trade-off should be sought in order to see to what extent the security would
be enhanced by this method.
• As seen in Chapter 7, privacy amplification phase is responsible of ensuring
security through increasing the key randomness and increasing the Eve key
BER. We have also mentioned that it implies key length reduction in order
to decrease the amount of information revealed to Eve during the earlier SKG
phase. Therefore, it is interesting to assess how much the key should be reduced
in order to ensure robust key generation.
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Résumé en Français 
1. Introduction 
Avec l’explosion des technologies sans fil et la multiplication des services associés, on a de 
plus en plus besoin de sécurité et de confidentialité. Bien que la cryptographie symétrique 
assure la confidentialité des données, elle est pénalisée par la gestion (i.e. la génération et la 
distribution) de clés qui doivent être tenues secrètes.  
Des études récentes indiquent que les caractéristiques intrinsèques de la propagation peuvent 
être exploitées afin de consolider la sécurité. Ces nouvelles techniques, agissant au niveau de 
la couche physique, assurent une sécurité du point de vue de la théorie de l’information. Plus 
clairement et contrairement à la cryptographie classique, l’espion est supposé jouir d’une 
capacité de calcul illimitée et supposé ne pas avoir des informations suffisantes pour lui 
permettre d’affaiblir la confidentialité. 
En particulier, le canal radio fournit une source d’aléa commune à deux utilisateurs à partir de 
laquelle des clés secrètes peuvent être générées. En effet, en raison de la réciprocité du canal, 
typiquement dans un système à multiplexage temporel, un émetteur et un récepteur mesurent 
presque le même canal de propagation, ce qui implique le partage de la même source. En 
outre, l’aléa est assuré par la propagation multi-trajets (Figure 1), qui aboutit à des 
interférences constructives/destructives et implique des propriétés de décorrélation dans les 
domaines temporel, spatial et/ou fréquentiel. Pour ces mêmes raisons, un espion ne parviendra 
pas à obtenir la clé partagée par les utilisateurs légitimes.  
 
Figure 1 Propagation multi-trajets 
Une clé de cryptage se caractérise par sa longueur, son caractère aléatoire ainsi que par son 
taux de sécurité. Une longue clé résulte de la concaténation de plusieurs symboles quantifiés à 
partir de plusieurs échantillons du canal. Néanmoins, les bits de la clé doivent être 
statistiquement indépendants afin d’assurer son caractère aléatoire. Cela dépend de la 
corrélation des canaux dans le domaine de variation considéré.  En outre, bien que le taux de 
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sécurité de la clé dépende de son caractère aléatoire, il nécessite aussi le minimum 
d’informations divulguées à l’espion. Cela concerne le scénario relatif de l’espion vis à vis 
des terminaux légitimes, par exemple la distance entre Eve et Alice/Bob.  
Le travail de cette thèse s’inscrit dans le cadre du projet européen PHYLAWS (PHYsical 
LAyer Wireless Security) qui a pour objet de renforcer la sécurité des systèmes actuels tout en 
exploitant les propriétés inhérentes de la couche physique. PHYLAWS vise ainsi à développer 
des techniques efficaces et flexibles, qui sont faciles à implémenter et consomment peu de 
ressources. Il concerne de nombreuses applications comme l’internet des objets ainsi que 
différents standards comme WIFI et LTE.  
On s’intéresse dans cette thèse, en particulier, au processus de génération de clés secrètes 
(« Secret Key Generation », SKG) à partir de l’aléa du canal de propagation. On vise à 
analyser la performance de la SKG en fonction des caractéristiques réelles du canal radio et 
ceci à travers différents types de canaux, i.e. des canaux simulés à partir d’un modèle 
stochastique du canal, des canaux simulés par tracés de rayons et des canaux mesurés. Cette 
étude de performance repose sur la qualité des clés générées à partir de l’exploitation des 
degrés de liberté du canal dans les domaines temporel, spatial et/ou fréquentiel et dans 
différents types d’environnement. D’autre part, il s’agit d’examiner la vulnérabilité de la SKG 
vis-à-vis du scénario de l’espion, tel que la distance entre l’espion et au moins l’un des 
terminaux légitimes dans un environnement donné. 
2. Méthodes d’évaluation de la SKG 
Soient Alice et Bob deux terminaux légitimes qui souhaitent communiquer en toute sécurité 
en présence d’un espion Eve (Figure 2). Les terminaux mesurent des canaux altérés par du 
bruit et des erreurs d’estimation qu’on suppose complexes Gaussiens (?̂?𝒙 = 𝒉𝒙 + 𝒏𝒙). Ces 
canaux peuvent être des vecteurs de sous-canaux mesurés dans le cas d’un système multi-
antennaires ou OFDM. 
 
Figure 2 Scenario de communication secrète en présence d'un espion 
L’approche de génération de clés secrètes s’accomplit en plusieurs étapes, comme montre la 
Figure 3. Après l’estimation du canal radio, les terminaux légitimes quantifient l’information 
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du canal (telle que la puissance, la phase ou le coefficient complexe) en un ensemble de bits 
constituant la clé. En raison du bruit additif et des erreurs d’estimation, les clés générées par 
Alice et Bob ne sont pas les mêmes. D’où la nécessité de l’étape de réconciliation qui aboutit 
à des clés identiques grâce à la mise en œuvre de codes correcteurs d’erreurs. En outre, les 
messages échangés publiquement entre les terminaux légitimes révèlent des informations à 
l’espion. L’amplification de confidentialité sert ainsi à réduire la vulnérabilité potentielle qui 
en résulte et à augmenter l’aléa de la clé, bien qu’aboutissant à des clés plus courtes. En effet, 
même si Eve obtient une clé très proche de celle d’Alice/Bob (par exemple avec une 
différence d’un seul bit), cette dernière étape amplifie l’erreur en la distribuant sur la totalité 
de la clé grâce à des fonctions de hachage. 
 
Figure 3 La stratégie complète de la SKG 
2.1.Métriques d’évaluation de performance de la SKG 
Théoriquement, la longueur de la clé que les différents terminaux peuvent partager se mesure 
en fonction de l’information mutuelle de leurs canaux. On définit ainsi la longueur de clé 
disponible comme étant la longueur maximale de la clé que les terminaux légitimes peuvent 
partager en toute fiabilité, i.e. 𝐼𝐾 = 𝐼(ℎ̂𝑎, ℎ̂𝑏). En tenant compte des observations faites par 
l’espion, on obtient le nombre de bits secrets, i.e. 𝐼𝑆𝐾 = 𝐼(ℎ̂𝑎, ℎ̂𝑏|ℎ̂𝑒 , ℎ̂𝑐), ainsi que celui de 
bits vulnérables, i.e. 𝐼𝑉𝐾 = 𝐼𝐾 − 𝐼𝑆𝐾. Dans le cas des canaux conjointement Gaussiens, 
l’information mutuelle est facilement évaluée à partir des caractéristiques du second ordre 
(matrices de corrélations). 
Considérons le cas d’un canal Gaussien avec du bruit additif Gaussien, qui est un canal 
aléatoire, l’évaluation numérique montre que 𝐼𝐾 est limité par le rapport signal sur bruit 
(« signal to noise ratio », SNR) (Figure 4). Par ailleurs, on considère un scénario de Clarke 
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pour avoir un premier accès au nombre de bits vulnérables. Le résultat montre qu’une distance 
d’une demi-longueur d’onde (λ/2) entre Bob et Eve est suffisante pour annuler la vulnérabilité 
(Figure 5). Ce scénario de Clarke est idéal et correspond à un canal où le nombre de trajets est 
infini. En revanche, la réalité est différente, comme on va le voir dans la suite.  
 
Figure 4 𝑰𝑲en fonction du SNR 
 
Figure 5 𝑰𝑽𝑲/𝑰𝑲 en fonction de la distance de séparation Bob-Eve 
D’autre part, les métriques concrètes résultent de l’évaluation de clés binaires après 
l’implémentation de la stratégie de la SKG, que ce soit après la quantification ou dans les 
étapes postérieures. On obtient alors un taux d’erreur binaire (« bit error rate », BER) résultant 
de la comparaison directe entre les clés générées. En outre, le caractère aléatoire des clés est 
évalué à travers un ensemble de tests statistiques développés par l’Institut National de 
Standards et de Technologie (NIST) [94]. Chaque test identifie l’aléa selon un certain critère. 
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On a choisi quelques tests pertinents et on a regardé le taux moyen de succès aux tests (i.e. 
mean pass rate) afin de simplifier l’analyse.  
2.2. L’étape de quantification 
On a choisi de quantifier le coefficient complexe du canal en raison de sa richesse en 
information, surtout du fait qu’il contient à la fois l’information sur la puissance et sur la 
phase. Pour transformer cette information en un certain nombre de bits, on a choisi 
d’implémenter l’algorithme de quantification alternatif (« channel quantization alternating », 
CQA), qui utilise deux plans de quantification en alternance de telle sorte que le plan choisi 
soit adapté à l’observation du canal [58]. En d’autres termes, cela permet de réduire l’erreur 
entre les clés d’Alice et de Bob lorsque le coefficient du canal est proche d’une frontière entre 
deux symboles différents. L’intérêt de cet algorithme est qu’il améliore l’accord entre Alice et 
Bob sans perte d’information et qu’il fournit des symboles équiprobables sur I et sur Q, ce qui 
aide à générer des clés aléatoires.  
2.3. Canal dispersif dans le temps 
Comme une clé résulte de la concaténation de plusieurs symboles, sa robustesse est en partie 
liée à la décorrélation entre les symboles, ce qui requiert une décorrélation entre les 
coefficients du canal. Cela implique de disposer d'échantillons suffisamment séparés dans 
n’importe quel domaine et dépend des caractéristiques de l'environnement radio (surtout la 
richesse en multi-trajets). Par conséquent, la variabilité du canal est essentielle pour achever la 
SKG avec de meilleures performances.  
Les plus simples variations du canal auront lieu dans le temps grâce à la mobilité des 
terminaux ou à des mouvements dans leur entourage. En revanche, un tel scénario n’est pas 
toujours possible, par exemple lorsqu’il s’agit d’une communication entre un point d’accès et 
un ordinateur fixe dans un environnement statique. De ce fait, on propose d’appliquer la SKG 
tout en exploitant autres types de variations du canal et cela à travers l’exploitation des degrés 
de liberté dans les domaines spatial et fréquentiel. 
Cette partie est dédiée à l’analyse de la qualité des clés générées tout en exploitant le degré de 
liberté fréquentiel. Pour cela, on considère un modèle simple de profil de puissance-retard 
(« Power delay profile », PDP) où les trajets discrets sont périodiques dans le domaine 
temporel et avec une puissance moyenne exponentiellement décroissante. Les trajets sont 
indépendants et leurs amplitudes sont distribuées selon la loi Rayleigh. Par une simple 
transformée de Fourier, on obtient un ensemble de coefficients du canal dans le domaine 
fréquentiel.  
Idéalement, le nombre de bits disponibles (𝐼𝐾) croît proportionnellement au nombre de sous-
porteuses (𝑁𝑓) utilisées dans la génération de clés. Toutefois, à cause des corrélations entre les 
sous-porteuses, cette croissance se fait avec une pente plus faible. En fait, 𝐼𝐾 augmente 
linéairement avec 𝑁𝑓 jusqu’à une certaine valeur au-delà de laquelle la pente de la courbe 
diminue montrant une tendance à la saturation (Figure 6). Au point de déviation, les degrés de 
liberté sont pleinement exploités dans la SKG où l’ensemble de fréquences utilisées permet de 
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résoudre parfaitement les multi-trajets dans le domaine temporel par des sinus cardinaux.  
Puisque les trajets filtrés sont indépendants, la SKG profite du degré de liberté de chaque 
trajet tout en considérant son SNR. Au-delà de la première déviation, la courbe continue à 
augmenter, même avec une pente plus faible, en montrant plusieurs résonances. En effet, la 
densité spectrale de puissance de chaque sous-porteuse est constante. L’augmentation de 𝑁𝑓 
implique ainsi une augmentation de la puissance totale et ensuite une amélioration du SNR de 
chaque trajet résolu.  
 
Figure 6 L'évolution de 𝑰𝑲 en fonction du nombre de sous-porteuses 
Par ailleurs, pour un SNR fixe par sous-porteuse, l’augmentation de l’étalement temporel 𝜎𝜏 
aboutit à une augmentation de la puissance relative de chaque trajet. Cela implique un canal 
plus riche en aléa et par conséquent des clés plus longues (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7 𝑰𝑲 en fonction de l’étalement temporel 𝝈𝝉 pour 𝑵𝒇 = 𝟐 (gauche) et 𝑵𝒇 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
(droite) 
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3. Modèle du canal adapté à la SKG 
L’objectif de cette partie est d’étudier l’impact du scénario de l’espion Eve sur la qualité des 
clés générées. Dans ce but, on a besoin d’un canal multi-utilisateurs qui prend en compte la 
corrélation spatiale entre deux utilisateurs à proximité l’un de l’autre.  
Dans la littérature, la SKG est étudiée tout en considérant deux cas extrêmes : le premier 
correspond à un espion très lointain des terminaux légitimes, alors que le deuxième 
correspond à un scénario où Bob et Eve sont très proches l’un de l’autre et où ils partagent les 
mêmes composantes de multi-trajets. Comme ils ne sont pas co-localisés, ils partagent les 
mêmes puissances de multi-trajets alors que les phases changent sur une distance d’une 
fraction de λ. Les résultats dépendent de la richesse en multi-trajets.  
D’autre part, bien que la littérature sur les modèles de canaux soit très riche, ces modèles ne 
sont pas dédiés à la problématique de la SKG et ne répondent pas à son besoin spécifique, tel 
que la nécessité d’une modélisation fidèle de la corrélation spatiale.  
Pour toutes ces raisons, et afin d’évaluer la SKG en utilisant un modèle de canal simple avec 
un petit nombre de paramètres, on a développé notre propre modèle de type stochastique et 
géométrique. On vise notamment à dépasser la stationnarité spatiale entre Bob et Eve. 
3.1. Description du modèle 
 
Figure 8 Modèle stochastique et géométrique 
On considère un modèle stochastique et géométrique où les diffuseurs sont uniformément 
répartis dans un disque centré autour de Bob (Figure 8). Eve est à l’intérieur du disque et se 
trouve à une certaine distance de Bob. Quant à Alice, elle est supposée très lointaine, de sorte 
que les rayons envoyés vers le disque proviennent d’une direction unique. Les canaux vus par 
Bob et Eve sont calculés en utilisant les propriétés géométriques de la distribution des 
diffuseurs. Ainsi, on tient en compte de l’atténuation en espace libre et de la corrélation 
spatiale du shadowing en utilisant une loi log-normale. On suppose que les diffuseurs sont 
136 
 
indépendants les uns des autres, alors que les trajets émis par le même diffuseur vers Bob et 
Eve sont corrélés en fonction de leur écartement angulaire. Les terminaux sont équipés 
d’antennes omnidirectionnelles.  
La génération d’une clé secrète requiert de l’aléa qui peut être fourni par une variation petite 
échelle (« Small Scale Fading », SSF). Pour cela, on fixe les paramètres macroscopiques et 
ceux du shadowing et on crée de la variabilité petite-échelle en bougeant les diffuseurs autour 
de leurs positions macroscopiques. Cela implique que la phase varie fortement, créant ainsi 
des variations SSF par le jeu des interférences et l’indépendance entre le mouvement des 
divers diffuseurs. La statistique petite échelle SSF permet d’obtenir une clé unique alors que 
la statistique macroscopique sert à fournir un ensemble de clés. 
D’après la Figure 9, on observe que lorsqu’Eve s’éloigne de Bob, les composantes des multi-
trajets vus par chacun d’eux se décorrèlent, ce qui implique une décroissance de la 
vulnérabilité, en terme de proportion de bits vulnérables (𝐼𝑉𝐾/𝐼𝐾) ainsi que de taux d’erreur 
binaire entre leurs clés (BER). En particulier, concernant 𝐼𝑉𝐾/𝐼𝐾, on constate qu’au-delà de 
λ/2, cette proportion ne diminue que de façon progressive avec la distance, montrant une 
mémoire spatiale allant bien au-delà de la longueur d’onde.  
En comparant avec le scénario de Clarke, on aperçoit qu’il y a ainsi une vulnérabilité 
résiduelle au-delà de λ/2. Cela est expliqué par le nombre limite de trajets dont l’augmentation 
aboutit à moins de vulnérabilité. En revanche, le BER ne reflète pas la vulnérabilité résiduelle. 
En effet, l’algorithme CQA repose sur des changements majeurs du canal, ce qui ne permet 
pas à Eve d’exploiter toute l’information partagée avec les terminaux légitimes.    
 
 Figure 9 La vulnérabilité (𝑰𝑽𝑲/𝑰𝑲 et BER) en fonction de la distance Bob-Eve  
4. Le comportement de la SKG pour des canaux déterministes simulés 
On considère dans cette partie des canaux plus réalistes simulés avec l’outil de tracés de 
rayons (VolcanoLab de Siradel). L’intérêt est d’étudier la performance de la SKG en 
environnement extérieur, où il est difficile d’effectuer des mesures. On considère ainsi 
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l’environnement ouvert du Louvre (Paris) en mettant en relief l’implémentation du modèle de 
diffusion dans l’outil de simulation.   
On considère un système OFDM de 64 sous-porteuses couvrant une bande de 20 MHz. La 
densité spectrale de puissance de chaque sous-porteuse est constante et son SNR moyen est 
fixe. Conformément aux résultats obtenus pour le modèle PDP (Figure 6), 𝐼𝐾 augmente avec 
𝑁𝑓 en présentant une tendance à la saturation mais de façon sous-linéaire (Figure 10). Cette 
tendance indique que les principaux trajets sont résolus pour une bande inférieure à 20 MHz. 
En effet, puisque l’environnement est ouvert, la réponse impulsionnelle est longue et les 
trajets principaux sont bien étalés dans le temps. D’autre part, cela peut-être dû, en partie, aux 
limitations de l’outil de tracés de rayons où le nombre d’interactions rayons-obstacles est 
limité, ce qui implique une réponse impulsionnelle non continue (Figure 11). 
On calcule les canaux en utilisant l’outil de tracés de rayons, avec et sans implémentation du 
modèle de diffusion. La Figure 10 met en relief la pertinence des trajets diffus sur la SKG où 
les valeurs de 𝐼𝐾 atteignent le double de celles obtenues pour des canaux simulés sans le 
modèle de diffusion. En effet, les rayons diffus enrichissent le canal en des nouveaux trajets, 
ce qui implique plus d’aléa à exploiter dans la génération de clés.  
 
Figure 10 𝑰𝑲 en fonction de 𝑵𝒇 : avec diffusion (gauche) et sans diffusion (droite) 
 
Figure 11 Des exemples de profils de puissance-délai  
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L’augmentation de l’étalement temporel 𝜎𝜏 entraîne une réponse impulsionnelle plus étalée 
dans le temps, ou en d’autres termes, une bande de cohérence plus faible. Ce qui implique une 
croissance de 𝐼𝐾 (Figure 12). Ce résultat est ainsi cohérent avec celui obtenu plus haut (Figure 
7), sauf pour un grand 𝑁𝑓 et pour des grandes valeurs de 𝜎𝜏. Ceci est expliqué par le fait 
qu’une réponse impulsionnelle plus étalée dans le temps ne signifie pas un canal plus riche en 
multi-trajets, mais plutôt des trajets bien espacés temporellement. 
 
Figure 12 𝑰𝑲en fonction de delay spread: 𝑵𝒇=2 (gauche) et 𝑵𝒇=64 (droite) 
La Figure 13 montre une comparaison statistique des valeurs de 𝑰𝑲 résultant de l’exploitation 
des degrés de liberté spatial et fréquentiel. On note que le calcul d’une seule valeur de 𝑰𝑲 dans 
le domaine fréquentiel repose sur une statistique petite-échelle en espace, alors que dans le 
domaine spatial, ce calcul utilise une statistique fréquentielle. Pour l’environnement étudié, il 
est fiable d’utiliser les deux domaines dans la SKG puisqu’ils contiennent statistiquement la 
même quantité d’aléa.  
 
Figure 13 𝑰𝑲 dans les domaines spatiaux et fréquentiels 
Conformément aux résultats observés dans la Figure 5 𝑰𝑽𝑲/𝑰𝑲 en fonction de la distance de 
séparation Bob-Eve, la proportion de bits vulnérables diminue avec la distance de séparation 
Bob-Eve en raison de la décorrélation des canaux. On peut toutefois remarquer l’existence 
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d’une vulnérabilité résiduelle, même pour de grandes distances, ce qui montre l’impact de 
l’environnement local sur la SKG (par exemple la richesse en multi-trajets). Par ailleurs, 
augmenter 𝑁𝑓 apporte un avantage à Eve comme aux terminaux légitimes.  
 
Figure 14 𝑰𝑽𝑲/𝑰𝑲 en fonction de la distance Bob-Eve et pour 𝑵𝒇=1 (gauche) et 𝑵𝒇=32 
(droite) 
5. Le comportement de la SKG pour des canaux mesurés 
On vise dans cette partie à examiner la performance de la SKG pour des canaux réels et 
mesurés en environnement intérieur.  
Les mesures ont été effectuées dans les locaux de Télécom ParisTech dans deux salles de 
dimensions et caractéristiques différentes (Figure 15 et Figure 16). Les coefficients complexes 
du canal ont été mesurés et enregistrés par un analyseur de réseaux (VNA) à 4 ports dont les 
paramètres de configuration sont indiqués dans le Tableau 1. Un port du VNA était dédié à 
Alice alors que les trois autres correspondaient à Bob et/ou Eve. Chaque port a été équipé 
d'une antenne ULB bicône de 2 dBi de gain. 
 
Figure 15 Mesures en salles de classe 
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Figure 16 Mesures en amphithéâtre 
Tableau 1 Les paramètres de configuration du VNA 
Fréquences 2-6 GHz 
Nombre de fréquences 1601 
Bande IF 5 KHz 
Puissance transmise  10 dBm 
Dynamique de mesure 96 dB 
Plancher de bruit typique -86 dBm 
 
Pour générer des clés, on a besoin de l’aléa. Pour ce but, lors de ces mesures, les trois 
récepteurs représentant Bob/Eve sont statiques alors que l'émetteur représentant Alice est 
spatialement balayé sur une grille carrée de 11x11 points (30 cm de côté et 3 cm de pas) 
confinée à une petite zone, de manière à capturer l’évanouissement petite-échelle (SSF). Plus 
clairement, puisque le pas de la grille est d'environ une demi-longueur d'onde à 5 GHz, les 
coefficients du canal sont très probablement statistiquement décorrélés. 
5.1.La comparaison des clés générées par le trio Alice-Bob-Eve 
Pour générer des clés, les terminaux appliquent l’algorithme CQA sur l’ensemble de 
coefficients complexes du canal qui constituent le plan de quantification. Ce plan est divisé en 
𝑀 régions de quantification, ce qui résulte en un symbole de √𝑀 bits par coefficient du canal. 
D’après la Figure 17, le taux d’erreur binaire des clés générées par Alice et Bob diminue 
quand le SNR augmente et quand 𝑀 diminue. Par conséquent et pour une meilleure 
performance, le nombre de bits (√𝑀) à générer par observation du canal doit être adapté au 
SNR de manière à ne pas dépasser un certain seuil de BER.  
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Figure 17 Le BER entre les clés d'Alice et de Bob en fonction du SNR 
Eve exploite ses mesures pour générer une clé en espérant qu’elle soit très proche de celle 
obtenue par les terminaux légitimes. Elle applique CQA sur les canaux mesurés quand 
l’émetteur est Alice (ℎ𝑒𝑎) ou Bob (ℎ𝑒𝑏), et obtient ainsi deux valeurs de clés. D’après la 
Figure 18, le BER est autour de 0.5, ce qui signifie que les clés générées par Eve sont presque 
complètement différentes de la clé légitime. Cependant, la vulnérabilité augmente quand Eve 
est en vue directe de Bob et quand Alice est l’émettrice puisque l’aléa mesuré par Bob et Eve 
est apporté par les déplacements d’Alice sur la grille. 
 
Figure 18 Taux d'erreur binaire par rapport à l’espion 
5.2. Evaluation de la quantité d’aléa fournie par différents degrés de liberté 
En exploitant le degré de liberté spatial, les clés sont générées en concaténant des symboles 
issus des coefficients complexes du canal sélectionnés de façon arbitraire parmi ceux 
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correspondant aux 121 positions d’Alice sur la grille carrée. Un ensemble de clés résulte 
d’une sélection arbitraire sur différentes sous-porteuses de la bande 20 MHz. Quant au degré 
de liberté fréquentiel, l’ensemble des clés résulte d’une sélection aléatoire de sous-porteuses 
dans une certaine bande, pour différentes positions d’Alice sur la grille. Chaque clé est 
fabriquée par accumulation des bits quantifiés à partir de sous-porteuses sélectionnées de 
façon arbitraire. En effet, pour construire une clé de 128 bits et en utilisant 𝑀 = 4, on a 
besoin de quantifier 64 sous-porteuses dans les bandes de 40, 80 ou 160 MHz.  
Les tests de NIST montrent que les clés dérivées du degré de liberté spatial sont suffisamment 
aléatoires (Figure 19). Cela est dû au fait que le canal est échantillonné avec un pas minimal 
de λ/2 à 5 GHz. En outre, l’exploitation du degré de liberté fréquentiel (Figure 20) montre que 
le caractère aléatoire s’améliore avec une bande passante plus grande où l’écart entre deux 
sous-porteuses sélectionnées augmente, impliquant moins de corrélation entre elles et par la 
suite entre les bits générés. Les coefficients du canal doivent être séparés par la bande de 
cohérence pour garantir leur décorrélation. En outre, le mean pass rate augmente avec la 
distance de séparation entre Alice et Bob, ce qui est expliqué dans la Figure 21 par le fait que 
l’étalement temporel augmente avec la distance et par la suite la bande de cohérence diminue. 
De plus, on remarque que la condition NLOS assure plus d’aléa que LOS puisque la première 
implique des canaux plus riches en multi-trajets.  
 
Figure 19 Evaluation de l’aléa fourni par le degré de liberté spatial 
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Figure 20 Evaluation de l’aléa fourni par le degré de liberté fréquentiel pour M=4 
 
Figure 21 𝝈𝝉 en fonction de la distance Alice-Bob pour LOS (gauche) et NLOS (droite) 
En environnement intérieur, le degré de liberté fréquentiel fournit moins d’aléa que le spatial 
(Figure 22). En d’autres termes, la source d’aléa la plus adaptée à la SKG provient du degré 
de liberté spatial, alors que la moins bonne résulte de l’exploitation du degré de liberté 
fréquentiel. Comme compromis, l’exploitation conjointe des degrés de liberté spatial et 
fréquentiel semble être efficace, tout en considérant un système large bande avec un réseau de 
deux ou quatre antennes (soit typiquement 2 ou 4 degrés de liberté spatiaux). L’augmentation 
du nombre d’antennes réduit la demande en bande passante.  
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Figure 22 Comparaison de l'aléa fourni par les différents degrés de liberté 
5.3. L’impact de 𝑵𝒇 sur le nombre de bits disponibles 𝑰𝑲 
En exploitant plus de degrés de liberté en fréquence, le nombre de bits qu’Alice et Bob 
peuvent partager croît de façon sous-linéaire (Figure 23). Contrairement aux résultats déjà 
obtenus pour l’environnement extérieur (Figure 10), l’évolution de 𝐼𝐾 en fonction de 𝑁𝑓 n’a 
pas tendance à saturer puisque la réponse impulsionnelle (Figure 24)  est continue et requiert 
une large bande pour que les trajets soient parfaitement résolus. Néanmoins, les canaux en 
intérieur sont moins riches en aléa que ceux en extérieur en raison du faible étalement 
temporel. Pour augmenter les valeurs de 𝐼𝐾, les sous-porteuses doivent être plus écartées en 
augmentant la bande passante. 
 
Figure 23 𝑰𝑲 en fonction de 𝑵𝒇 
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Figure 24 Un exemple de réponse impulsionnelle en environnement à l'intérieur 
5.4.La stratégie complète de la SKG 
Alice et Bob doivent parvenir à générer exactement la même clé (i.e. BER=0) pour qu’elle 
soit utilisée pour le cryptage des données. En revanche, les clés résultant de l’étape de 
quantification présentent quelques différences évaluées par le BER. Le rôle de la 
réconciliation est ainsi de rendre les clés d’Alice et de Bob complètement identiques tout en 
utilisant un code correcteur d’erreur. On choisit ainsi le code BCH pour mettre en œuvre cette 
étape. D’autre part, pour réduire l’information révélée à Eve et améliorer la qualité de la clé, 
on implémente l’étape d’amplification de confidentialité à travers des fonctions de hachage. 
Chaque erreur sera distribuée sur la clé entière grâce à des opérations de convolution, ce qui 
augmente la différence entre les clés d’Eve et des terminaux légitimes. 
La Figure 25  montre que presque 95% des clés sont parfaitement réconciliées pour SNR=15 
dB alors que seulement 12% le sont pour SNR=10 dB. On peut ainsi souligner qu’il faut bien 
choisir les paramètres de la réconciliation pour qu’ils soient adaptés au SNR. En outre, 
l’amplification de confidentialité augmente le BER des clés non réconciliées, ce qui révèle 
son utilité pour compliquer le travail de l’espion. Par ailleurs, cette dernière étape améliore la 
qualité de l’aléa des clés quel que soit le type de degré de liberté utilisé (Figure 26). 
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Figure 25 Le BER des clés légitimes durant les différentes étapes de la SKG 
 
Figure 26 Le caractère aléatoire des clés durant les étapes de la SKG 
6. Conclusion et perspectives 
6.1.Conclusion 
On a examiné dans cette thèse le processus de génération de clés secrètes à partir de l’aléa du 
canal de propagation. En particulier, l’analyse de performance a concerné l’impact de la 
propagation sur la qualité des clés, tout en considérant différents degrés de liberté du canal. 
Le degré de liberté spatial est le plus adapté à la SKG quel que soit le type de 
l’environnement. Cela est conditionné par le fait que les antennes sont suffisamment espacées, 
par exemple λ/2.  En outre, le degré de liberté fréquentiel ne fournit pas suffisamment d’aléa 
en environnement intérieur, au contraire d’en environnement extérieur. En effet, la bande de 
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cohérence est plus large dans le premier que le second. Toutefois, en exploitant conjointement 
le domaine spatial (par exemple avec 2 ou 4 antennes) et fréquentiel (avec une certaine 
bande), des clés robustes peuvent êtres extraites du canal. 
D'une manière générale, il est intéressant d'augmenter le nombre de sous-canaux, même 
lorsqu'ils sont corrélés, puisque cela augmente légèrement le taux de clé secrète. Cependant, 
cela signifie également de concevoir des systèmes intelligents, capables de produire de 
longues clés de bits indépendants à partir de très longues clés de bits corrélés. Cela peut être 
accompli par l’amplification de confidentialité. Néanmoins, la qualité de clé est améliorée de 
façon remarquable tout en implémentant la stratégie complète de la SKG, i.e. la réconciliation 
et l’amplification de confidentialité. Les paramètres utilisés doivent être adaptés au SNR. 
 
6.2.Perspectives 
Il existe plusieurs perspectives au travail réalisé dans cette thèse.  
 Il est intéressant de calculer la longueur théorique des clés, i.e. l’information mutuelle, 
pour n’importe quel type du canal. Cela permet d’évaluer l’efficacité de la SKG dans 
l’environnement considéré 
 L’antenne est un élément du canal de transmission et elle peut affecter la performance 
de la SKG, d’où la nécessité de considérer et d’étudier son influence sur la qualité des 
clés générées 
 En pratique, le canal n’est pas parfaitement réciproque puisque d’une part, les 
terminaux ne l’estiment pas en même instant et d’autre part, dans un système 
d’émission-réception les signaux émis ne suivent pas le même chemin que les signaux 
reçus. Par conséquent, il est important de considérer les sources de non réciprocité 
 La SKG repose sur une sécurité du point de vue de la théorie de l’information où seule 
l’information peut aider l’espion à affaiblir la confidentialité des données. De ce fait, 
Eve peut investir des techniques lui permettant d’acquérir plus d’information ainsi que 
plus de corrélation avec le canal légitime. Dans ce but, Eve peut utiliser des outils 
puissants de calcul de la propagation pour améliorer sa connaissance du canal Bob-
Eve, de type tracé de rayons. Néanmoins, la complexité de la physique de la 
propagation, par exemple la diffusion diffuse, rendent une telle hypothèse très peu 
vraisemblable ? 
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Appendix A
Information theoretic bounds
For zero-mean jointly complex Gaussian channels, the capacity of available key bits
is expressed as follows:
IK = I(hˆa, hˆb)
= log2
|Rˆaa||Rˆbb|
|RˆAB|
(A.1)
Straightforward evaluation of the estimated covariance matrices reveals:
Rˆaa = E{hˆahˆHa } = Raa + σ2aI (A.2)
Rˆbb = E{hˆbhˆHb } = Rbb + σ2b I (A.3)
RˆAB = E{[hˆaHhˆHb ]H [hˆ
H
a hˆ
H
b ]} =
[
Raa + σ
2
aI Rab
RHab Rbb + σ
2
b I
]
(A.4)
with
Rxy = E{hxhHy } (A.5)
We recall that hx is a stacked channel vector with Nh elements, i.e. parallel sub-
channels, assuming all the terminals having the same number Nh. Accordingly, I
is an Nh × Nh identity matrix, while {.}H denotes for matrix conjugate transpose
(Hermitian). Moreover, we designate by σ2x the average noise power at node x, with
x being referring to Alice (a or A), Bob (b or B) and Eve (e or E).
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Similarly, the secret key capacity is expressed as follows:
ISK = I(hˆa, hˆb|hˆe)
= log2
|RˆAE||RˆBE|
|RˆE||RˆABE|
(A.6)
while the estimated covariance matrices are explicitly evaluated as:
RˆAE =
[
Raa + σ
2
aI Rae
RHae Ree + σ
2
eI
]
(A.7)
RˆBE =
[
Raa + σ
2
aI Rae
RHae Ree + σ
2
eI
]
(A.8)
RˆE = Rˆee = Ree + σ
2
eI (A.9)
RˆABE =
 Raa + σ2aI Raa RaeRaa Raa + σ2b I Rae
RHae R
H
ae Ree + σ
2
eI
 (A.10)
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Appendix B
Some characteristics of the IEEE
802.11 standard
IEEE 802.11 [130] is a set of MAC (media access control) and PHY (physical layer)
specifications for implementing WLAN (wireless local area network). It is commonly
known as WiFi. It relies on a series of half-duplex modulation techniques that employ
the same basic protocol. While the family of the IEEE 802.11 standards uses mainly
two modulation techniques: DSSS and OFDM, we focus here on the characteristics
of the OFDM waveforms.
Table B.1 summarizes the main characteristics of the IEEE 802.11 versions that
use the OFDM modulation at the physical layer, where the number of data sub-
carriers excludes those dedicated for guardband interval.
• 802.11a: Released in 1999, it defines protocols that enable transmission and
reception of data at rates of 1.5 to 54 Mbit/s at 5 GHz band. Wireless access
point (cards and routers) manufacturers used the term “802.11a” to describe
interoperability of their systems at 5.8 GHz, 54 Mbit/s.
• 802.11g: Released in 2003, it operates at 2.4 GHz band with a maximum phys-
ical layer bit rate of 54 Mbit/s. Owing to the desire for higher data rates as
well as to reductions in manufacturing costs, consumers started adopting the
802.11g in January 2003.
• 802.11n: Released in 2009, it is an amendment which improves upon the previ-
ous 802.11 standards mainly by increasing the channel DoFs, by adding MIMO
and wider channel bandwidths (40 MHz vs. 20 MHz). 802.11n operates on both
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the 2.4 GHz and the lesser used 5 GHz bands, where the 40 MHz bandwidth is
exclusively used at 5 GHz band. It operates at a maximum net data rate from
54 Mbit/s to 600 Mbit/s.
• 802.11ac: Approved in 2014, it is an amendment that operates at the 5 GHz
band. It relies on 802.11n, but brings improvement with respect to 802.11n
including wider channel bandwidths (80 or 160 MHz vs. 40 MHz), more spatial
streams (up to 8 vs. 4), higher order modulation (up to 256-QAM vs. 64-QAM),
and the addition of multi-user MIMO.
Table B.1: IEEE 802.11 standard characteristics.
Standard Frequency Bandwidth FFT size Total sub-carriers Data sub-carriers MIMO
IEEE band (GHz) (MHz)
802.11a 5 20 64 52 48 N/A
802.11g 2.4 20 64 52 48 N/A
802.11n 2.4, 5 20, 40 64, 128 52(or 56), 114 48(or 52), 108 4
802.11ac 5 20, 40, 80, 160 64, 128, 256, 512 52, 114, 242, 484 48, 108, 234, 468 8
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